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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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The Board of Directors of the Academy of Political Science announces with sorrow the death of its former President Robert Howe Connery, at age 90, on July 3, 1998. Besides having been President of the Academy from 1965 to 1986, Robert Connery was a long-time professor of government at Columbia University, Duke and Stanford. He also served in the Navy Department during World War II and authored numerous books on American government and public policy.

George B. Munroe, Chairman

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

LEWIS J. EDINGER and BRIGITTE L. NACOS examine whether reunited Germany remains a model of democratic stability in the heart of Europe. They hold that Germany's democracy is well suited to adapt to and cope with the challenges posed by domestic changes such as reunification and international developments.

DOUGLAS B. HARRIS discusses the increased tendency of Speakers of the U.S. House of Representatives to use media strategies for legislative leadership. He argues that this is a general trend in the nature of the speakership rather than a phenomenon attributable to the present Speaker. He concludes with an examination into the ways in which this trend might affect legislative coalition building and congressional policy making.

R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD analyzes the political difficulties in reforming Social Security in the absence of a short-term crisis. He argues that the chief political problem is to find a way to impose short-term costs on current taxpayers when the benefits of advance funding are exclusively long-term for future retirees.

RYAN C. HENDRICKSON looks at the interplay between Congress and the president over war powers. He argues that despite the presence of an ostensibly assertive and highly partisan Congress in foreign policy, the Republicans followed the congressional norm of deferring to the commander in chief in his desire to deploy U.S. forces to Bosnia.

KAREN KAMPWIRTH reviews the role of gender in postwar elections in Nicaragua and El Salvador. She argues that the campaigns contrasted dramatically, mainly due to differences in the way women were incorporated into the politics of the civil war years.

WILLIAM P. AVERY investigates domestic political interests in the negotiations and ratification of NAFTA.

ROBERT A. DIVINE evaluates two new books based on presidential tapes—those of John F. Kennedy's deliberations with his advisers during the Cuban missile crisis and of Lyndon B. Johnson's telephone conversations during his first ten months in office. He finds both to be revealing but ultimately disappointing.

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DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic: Can a Stable Democracy Continue?

LEWIS J. EDINGER
BRIGITTE L. NACOS

German politics have not attracted much attention in the United States since the fall of the Berlin Wall and other spectacular events marking the end of the cold war. On occasion, there are sensational accounts harking back to the Nazi era, but reports of neo-Nazi activities and renewed religious persecution are misleading, because they tend to ignore that in this day and age politics in Germany are solidly rooted in democratic institutions, beliefs, and practices. Two upcoming events are, however, likely to get the attention of the American media. The first is Germany's national election on 27 September 1998 that could mark the end of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's and his government's long rule; the second follows a few months later on 1 January 1999, when Germans will start to move from the long comfortable certainties of a sound national currency to the uncertainties of the new untried one of the European Monetary Union (EU).

After the parliamentary election the German Bundestag will no longer meet in Bonn but in Berlin, once again the capital of the leading country in Europe. Its home will be the more than 100-year-old former Reichstag or parliament, torched when Hitler came to power, almost totally destroyed in World War II, and more recently restored and refurbished for a new era of German politics. Just before the job got under way, two American conceptual artists were allowed to briefly conceal the remaining shell of the massive nineteenth-century structure by draping it entirely in silken-colored fabric. The spectacle gave the crowds that flocked to see it no clues as to what the home of their legislature would be like in the future. For the transition from the politics of

LEWIS J. EDINGER is professor of government emeritus and BRIGITTE L. NACOS is an adjunct professor of political science at Columbia University. This article is adapted from their new book, *From Bonn to Berlin: German Politics in Transition.*

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the Bonn Republic in a divided Germany to those of the Berlin Republic in a reunited Germany, however, emerging trends and patterns indicate quite a bit about how, if not where, the process is going.

Several developments seem particularly striking: first, as German politics are moving out of the distinctive shadows of the Nazi era, they are becoming less exceptional. Second, reunification has led to long-lasting socioeconomic cleavages between East and West Germans. Third, while the fundamental features of the political system remain in place, there are indications that changes in united Germany's party line-up, in the electorate, and in the mass media move the country toward an American-style television democracy. Fourth, with Germany's economic engine stalling, policy makers and the public are preoccupied with economic and social policy. Finally, military security and foreign policy issues are not as essential as they used to be.

Out of the Shadows

Politics in the Bonn Republic were from the start marked not only by decidedly negative memories of the Third Reich but of the failure of the democratic regime during the preceding Weimar Republic. The constitutional Basic Law of 1949 was designed to make sure that Bonn would not be Weimar. Its authors concluded from bitter personal experiences that under Weimar's constitution, democracy had gone too far. Too much direct democracy allowed its enemies to use presidential elections and plebescites for the mobilization of misguided voters. A more restrictive form of representative democracy in the present constitution limits direct democracy to the election of parliamentary deputies.

The Basic Law denies "antidemocratic" elements the freedom of expression and organization they enjoyed in the Weimar era and lets public authorities limit their activities—or even outlaw them entirely. These and other restrictions—such as a ban on neo-Nazi publications and broadcasts—curtail liberties in ways that would be unacceptable to most Americans. Germans accept them in light of the Nazi past as safeguards against antidemocratic propaganda. Memories of Nazi control over the citizenry in the Third Reich made Germans reluctant to adopt curbs acceptable to Americans, such as government eavesdropping on suspected criminals. But in early 1998, the governing coalition of Chancellor Kohl and the leaders of the Social Democratic opposition managed jointly to get just enough votes in the parliament for a constitutional amendment allowing electronic surveillance of private homes for fighting crime—an overriding issue for voters in Germany as in the United States.

Weimar's fate and Hitler's rule left their imprint on the law and politics of the Bonn Republic for close to half a century and on occasion are still brought to mind. When a huge influx of refugees from former communist countries stirred popular opposition and acts of violence against foreigners in the early 1990s, horrified commentators reminded their fellow Germans of Nazi persecution. Later, when unemployment climbed to what it had been just before Hitler

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came to power, opinion leaders recalled the disastrous collapse of the Weimar democracy as they debated whether political stability and social peace would now be better served by reducing or preserving costly social benefits. The invocation of specters of the past by right-wing extremists set on violating prevailing anti-Nazi political norms capture more media attention at home and abroad than warranted by the circumstances.

Right-wing extremism is far less of a problem in Germany than in France, Austria, and other countries. Two to three generations of West Germans have been effectively immunized through formal schooling and mass media exposure against a recurrence of mass opposition to democracy and mass support for totalitarianism. But roughly one out of five Germans who did not live in the Federal Republic until the end of the cold war draw their experiences primarily from the dictatorial rule in East Germany or some other communist country. Whether these newcomers are as sensitive to the lessons of the past and as strong in their support of democracy as the old Federal Republicans—especially in the face of prolonged socioeconomic difficulties—remains to be seen.

Disunity in Unity

Eight years after reunification, 3 October, the Day of German Unity marking the event, is still not a particularly festive national holiday like America's Fourth of July. Since the days of jubilation over the fall of the Berlin Wall, East as well as West Germans have found little to celebrate and much to complain about coming together. When both of them were asked by their political leaders in the mid-1990s to give up a work-free legal holiday to fund a new social insurance program, two out of three East Germans questioned by pollsters showed their disillusionment by nominating the Day of German Unity. West Germans, who used to wax sentimental about "our brothers and sisters in the East" before unification, now joke nastily that the communist wall builder, Erich Honecker, should have been given the Federal Republic's highest decoration "for keeping the East Germans off our neck for so long." And while East Germans had shouted "we are one people" in demonstrating for unification in 1989, their morning-after hangover sentiments point to economic and social consequences of political union that created a new wall between the old and the new members of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The West Germans of the Bonn Republic had learned to consider their country the only legitimate Germany and communist East Germany its missing part. Reunification accordingly brought lands and people back into the country from which they had been improperly separated. But the cost of the merger has taken a lot more money out of their pockets than West Germans had expected and has substantially dimmed their initial enthusiasm. The unavoidable restructuring of communist Germany's decrepit economy and the integration of some sixteen-million new citizens into the Federal Republic's extensive so-

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cioeconomic system requires vast transfers of public funds from old to new states.[1] This has proved politically a lot more difficult than it might have been if West Germany's own economy had not been forced to undergo a costly restructuring process that provides its policy makers with a lot less expendable income than before unification.

East Germans perceive the substitution of West German institutions for those of the communist regime as outright annexation, rather than gradual integration. Most consider themselves much better off politically but not socially and economically than under communism. Joining the Federal Republic did not, as East Germans had come to expect from watching the West's television before unification, instantly bring West German living standards. Catching up is likely to take a long time. For the foreseeable future, East Germans will have lower average income, suffer more unemployment, and lack the inherited capital available to West Germans for private investments in government-subsidized economic development projects in East Germany.

New Wine in Old Bottles

The 1990 treaty that brought East Germany into the Federal Republic called for a thorough reconsideration of its Basic Law, if not an entirely new German constitution. Little came of that. The provisional structure established in 1949 for the Bonn Republic suited the ruling Western parties that had expanded into the East; in a specially formed constitutional reform commission, their representatives vetoed all proposals for significant changes. Thus, the basic features of the anatomical framework of German politics established half a century ago remain in place for the Berlin Republic. Such institutional continuity matters more in the German than in the American political system, as formal-legal arrangements for dealing with ordinary as well as extraordinary policy issues carry more weight, and informal ones are less common and more tenuous.

Germany's Basic Law is similar to the U.S. Constitution in that it establishes a complex and rather cumbersome system of checks and balances between executive, legislature, and judicial authorities. But there are significant differences. Germany's parliamentary form of government provides for much greater interdependence between executive and legislature, and its federalism has more extensive interaction between national and subnational authorities. The states are responsible for the uniform applications of national law, but they also play a substantial role in national policy making. Representatives of the state governments make up the upper house of the national legislature, which can block measures desired by the federal government in control of the directly elected lower house. Since most laws require the approval of the upper cham-

[1] From 1993 to 1997 such transfers amounted to 549 billion German Marks or about $322 billion according to "Excerpts of Current Accounts on Economic Recovery in the New States" put out by the German Federal Government in January 1997.

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ber, the federal government must negotiate and find common ground with recalcitrant state leaders—often members of the major opposition party. That has become more difficult in a reunified Germany beset by mounting socioeconomic problems. Conflicting economic interests of the old West German and the new East German states cause differences between governmental representatives in the Council—and with the federal government—that override common party labels. Moreover, the constitutional separation of powers between national and subnational authorities is being undermined by the growing intrusion of the European Union in policy making.

Political parties are the principal elements within the anatomical structure of the German political system—its lifeblood, so to say—in the Berlin Republic as in the Bonn Republic. National parties are the leading players at every level of government, and it is not enough to be a nominal member to get ahead in politics. A most unusual constitutional provision specifically makes democratically constituted parties the only proper instruments for the selection and election of the German people's representatives in public offices. The parties not only choose the candidates for public office, but also finance and run their campaigns.

More than in the United States, that arrangement has and will continue to give individual lawmakers less freedom from their party but more from their constituents when it comes to unpopular decisions. Under the American form of representative democracy, legislators are more dependent on their popularity in particular districts than under the German system. American legislators tend to give more consideration to their popularity among the folks at home than among their party colleagues in Congress and state houses, even when they are elected for more than two-year terms. Members of the German federal parliament and state legislatures, in contrast, are all elected for four years and not only have more time between elections to live down unpopular legislative actions but fewer reasons to be concerned about their personal standing with the voters. German voters are accustomed to hold entire parties, rather than individual lawmakers, accountable for legislation they favor or oppose. But under the Federal Republic's special brand of cooperative federalism, meting out rewards or punishment to competing parties in state and national elections is not so easy when governing and opposition parties have obscured the choices before the voters by overcoming their differences through compromise agreements.

In the American system of winner-takes-all, single-member elections, one of the two major parties is sure to win a majority in national and state legislatures; but that is nearly impossible under the German system of proportional representation in national elections and very difficult in state contests. Thus, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) have formal as well as informal legislative coalitions with each other and/or at least one minor party. For many years the only third party in the Bonn Republic, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), had a disproportionate amount of influence as coalition partner in federal and state governments. After winning represen-

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tation in the national diet in the 1980s for the first time, the Green Party has strengthened its position in the 1990s—especially in the western states. The Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor party of East Germany's Communist party, is a force to be reckoned with in the eastern states, because East Germans perceive the PDS as the only genuine East German party and an outlet to voice their protest against West German dominance.

Christian and Social Democrats will most likely remain the leading players in German politics. But loyalties that once tied a majority of the electorate to these parties have diminished, a trend that parallels the increase in independent voters in the United States. About one out of two German voters is now an independent swing-voter. Young people, far more than the older generation, identify themselves as independents. And not surprisingly, East Germans, who have no direct experience with the Western parties that have expanded into their territory, show a particular inclination for swing-voting.

Strategies and tactics in election campaigns have been changing correspondingly. Parties and candidates can no longer aim at getting the party faithful to the polls but must try to win over the growing number of unaffiliated swing-voters. This cannot be accomplished by playing the party circuit but requires broader appeals through the mass media. Moreover, given the decline of party media in the last decades, even party members must be addressed increasingly through media outlets that claim to be nonpartisan.

While German voters still cast their ballots primarily for parties and not for individual candidates, they are increasingly inclined to evaluate and compare the personal attributes of top contenders. The major parties' candidates for the chancellor's office have always more or less affected the outcome of elections, as Konrad Adenauer or Willy Brandt demonstrated. But the more recent changes in Germany's party line-up and in the electorate have forced candidates, especially those on top of the ticket, more than ever to compete personally for votes. This development has been magnified by the proliferation of private cable and satellite television channels. Commercial television—far more than the nonprofit public channels that enjoyed long years of a virtual broadcast monopoly—tends to focus on personalities rather than on issues. Moreover, the new abundance and competition of channels and programs offer politicians unprecedented opportunities to appeal to large audiences.

In the United States the decline of the political parties, the proliferation of binding primaries, and the concurrent rise of television have shifted important political functions from the parties to the mass media, namely those of informing citizens about political matters and politicians about the electorate's attitude. Moreover, the media have become instrumental in the recruitment of candidates and the strategies and tactics used in campaigns. In some respects, electoral politics in the Federal Republic seem to move in the same direction: while traditional campaign tools such as posters and personal appearances in party meetings are still used, they are less important than in the past. Mass-mediated activities are moving center-stage in national and state-wide cam-

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paigns. Even mass rallies and other personal encounters between candidates and voters are increasingly tailored to attract the greatest possible media attention.

Young and middle-aged politicians, who have grown up in the age of television, are comfortable with the electronic media and skillful in exploiting television and interactive communication technologies in ways that the party bosses of the past could not have imagined. While the road to public offices still goes through the political parties, one would expect that this will change in the foreseeable future. Dwindling party membership, weakening party loyalties, and the growing role of the mass media should favor the swift rise of media-savvy newcomers who understand the shift from programmatic to personality-centered politics.

Unlike U.S. presidents, German chancellors have not spent a great deal of time and effort to lead and shape public opinion; German leaders are not as obsessed with public opinion polls as American politicians. But as party membership and loyalty has declined and unity within and between parties has been harder to come by, leaders have looked increasingly to public opinion as a means to get their way with fellow-partisans and political foes. Even an old-style party politician like Chancellor Helmut Kohl, though not embracing opinion-leadership like Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, was eventually persuaded by his advisers to use regular question-and-answer sessions with friendly journalists on a private TV channel to go public.

Some observers of the German political scene deny that public opinion affects decision makers; they point to the differences between public opinion polls and the climate of opinion that entails a much broader spectrum of views. But just as public opinion polls have mushroomed and become influential in American politics, there has been a comparable proliferation of survey organizations and greater attention to poll results in Germany. As in the United States, the leading newspapers, news magazines, and television channels in the Federal Republic have formed partnerships with survey organizations. Moreover, the political parties and/or their think-tanks commission opinion polls.

As the American example shows, a shift toward media-centered politics offers political elites and citizens ample opportunity to communicate with and sometimes even understand each other. But the mass media's reporting formats are more likely to trivialize politics and politicians and magnify the public's negative and cynical view of the governmental process and the political class.

In the coming years, as the Federal Republic must deal with the most formidable problems in its history, German decision makers are likely to use the mass media increasingly for opinion leadership in efforts to win support for reforming its socioeconomic system.

Putting the System to the Test

The Bonn Republic's democratic house rested for more than forty years on two pillars of strength: a broad consensus on the country's vital role within the

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West's anticommunist camp, and a robust economy that supported a generous social safety net and a comfortable, virtually riskfree standard of living for all. When the cold war ended, a robust economy was all the more important. But when the economic engine began to stall shortly after the two Germanys united, more than minor repairs were needed to get it moving again. Unemployment rose to and has remained at record levels, and the welfare state is under pressure to trim down. But many observers inside and outside the country doubt that Germany's brand of capitalism with a human face can cope with these problems.

The country's economy is by far the largest in Europe and the third largest in the world behind the United States and Japan. Although foreign trade has been and will continue to be imperative for Germany's economic well-being, business executives, labor union leaders, and public policy makers have been much slower than their counterparts in the United States in adjusting to the changes in the competitive global markets. While labor costs dropped in the United States during the 1980s, they rose in West Germany. And well before reunification in 1990, many manufacturing sectors in West Germany were rapidly pricing themselves out of global markets. Even in the face of record unemployment, Germany's labor force still earns higher hourly wages, works shorter hours, enjoys significantly longer vacations, and collects more contractual perks than their counterparts elsewhere in the industrialized world. The Federal Republic's industries are squeezed both by competitors in newly emerging markets with low labor costs and by highly industrialized countries like the United States, which have restructured old industries and moved swiftly into the high technology sector. In addition, there is now competitive pressure from former communist countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland.

Blaming the high labor costs in the Federal Republic for their competitive woes, most business leaders do not acknowledge that this is but one reason for their problems. During their prosperous decades, they failed to push ahead with innovation and rationalization at home and missed early opportunities to move into newly emerging markets.

The Federal Republic established early on and fine-tuned over the years an elaborate legal framework of rules, regulations, and processes for a capitalist system in which the various actors operate and, just as important, cooperate with each other. This dependence on law and order in the economic arena, what Germans call *Ordnungspolitik*, relies for most routine matters and conflict resolution on prescribed statutes, regulations, and standard operating procedures that leave little to chance. Thus, the whole area of labor relations is shaped by a complex system of legal precepts designed to foster cooperation between and among employers and employees and their respective top-level organizations. This particular feature made the Federal Republic for many years a most attractive site for industrial production. But many aspects of *Ordnungspolitik* also caused some serious problems and/or prevented early intervention to effectively solve them. Major restructuring measures and reforms would have

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been inevitable for West Germany's economic model, even if reunification had not taken place; but there is no doubt that the immense cost of rebuilding East Germany's debilitated economic base magnified these problems and hastened the need to deal with them.

Like other national governments, the Federal Republic cannot control an economy that is increasingly affected by global market forces. Moreover, as the policies and rulings of the European Union intrude more and more into economic, fiscal, and monetary matters, they constitute potent outside checks—even though representatives of the Federal Republic do have, of course, influence in the organs of the EU. But to the extent that Germany's domestic institutions and actors matter—and they still do—they have given some signals that they try to adapt to the new realities. Nowhere has that been more obvious than in what used to be a rather rigid system of collective bargaining. In the last few years, labor unions and/or works councils along with employer associations are showing considerable flexibility about agreeing on such matters as changes in wages, work hours, weekend-shifts, and the employment of part-time workers. Reforms of restrictive blue laws now allow retailers to stay open longer than before. And there have been some improvements in the cumbersome government regulations that delayed approval of genetic engineering research, the marketing of new drugs, or simply the construction of new plants.

In the 1990s and probably well beyond, the German economic model is tested as never before. There are encouraging signs along with business-as-usual tendencies regarding the outcome of this trial. New or more pronounced divisions within and between the major political parties, labor unions, and business groups interfere with the old consensus-oriented decision-making process and make for more adversarial relationships along the line of American capitalism. But the unchanged institutional arrangements, the formalized rules of the game, and the lingering legacy of the past continue to provide powerful impulses for continued cooperation and consensus-building—even when that means making substantial adjustments in what Germans call "social market economy."

The "social" component of German-style capitalism is under pressure as well. When Americans encounter the term "social security," they think of the government's old-age pension insurance that was adopted with the Social Security Act of 1935. For Germans, the quasi-public old-age pension insurance is merely one element in the nationally mandated social security package encompassing a wide range of social insurance, social assistance, and other benefits such as child allowance and educational assistance. Germany added a mandatory long-term care insurance at the same time the U.S. Congress rejected President Clinton's health-care reform plan. In contrast to the United States, the basic premises of the well developed German welfare state—including a social assistance program that is generous in comparison to American welfare benefits—have all along rested on a societal consensus that spans the ideological, partisan, and socioeconomic spectrum.

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The challenges from the global markets, the costs of rebuilding East Germany, the extension of benefits to East Germans, millions of asylum seekers and refugees, and a demographic shift toward an aging society force Germans to seriously reexamine their social welfare system. By common agreement, the system is too costly and needs to be overhauled. To be sure, whose ox is to be gored, how and when benefits are to be cut and taxes for social programs to be increased are touchy political questions. But as the legislative approach leading to negotiated agreements of several cost-cutting measures in the mandatory health insurance system recently indicated, politicians in the party state can and do override even the most influential interest groups, when they convince the general public that those reforms will preserve the social security system. Ultimately, the political institutions and arrangements of the strong party state with their stress on conflict-resolution and consensus give the strongest assurance that the country can effectively reform its welfare state short of drastic surgery and keep the basic strand of its social security net intact.

The Politics of Foreign Policy

In Germany, as elsewhere, the politics of foreign policy are concerned with how people inside the country deal with matters on the outside. Contrary to the fears of some and the hopes of others on the outside, the people on the inside appear at this point neither ready nor willing to have the Federal Republic take a more active part in world politics than before unification. They still have to come to terms with their country's new geopolitical position in the midst of Europe, where it is second only to Russia in population and second to none in economic power. The capital of the new Berlin Republic is closer to the eastern borders with Poland than the capital of the old Bonn Republic to the western borders with Belgium. But West as well as East Germans, accustomed to parochial politics when they lived apart in separate states, have been slow to expand their vision beyond their borders since coming together in one state.

Since reunification, foreign policy issues have on the whole been neither particularly prominent nor controversial. Germans certainly do not want their country to engage in power politics as in the past. But few seem to have more than a vague idea of where they might be going in international relations. Neither government nor opposition leaders have been keen to tackle a question for which they evidently have no clear answer—at least not for publication. Instead they have confined themselves to noncontroversial generalizations concerning the desirability of democracy, stability, and open markets for free trade throughout the world. The ideological cleavages and passions that once animated the politics of foreign policy in the Bonn Republic have given way to bland interparty consensus on the need for lasting military security arrangements with the United States in NATO, for more European economic integration, and for greater efforts to keep Germany at the top in world trade. But clearer and potentially more divisive definitions for distinctive German inter-

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ests in these areas seem unavoidable in a world where "normal" countries like the United States have no inhibitions about promoting their own. The incoming generation of new leaders competing for policy-making positions in the Berlin Republic can be expected to be more specific, outspoken, and assertive on that score than the present leaders of the Bonn Republic.

The politics of the Bonn Republic in a divided Germany featured some bitter battles on particular aspects of the preeminently military American connection, especially over the potential use of American nuclear weapons on German soil. Those controversies are now meaningless. United Germany is not threatened by any country and threatens none. American forces remain in large numbers under NATO auspices with German blessings. The question facing German leaders in this connection concerns the mission, structure, and cost of their armed forces in the years ahead—more particularly, whether, when, and how the Federal Republic should use force or the threat of force in dealing with other countries. That it would do so on its own except in self-defense is politically out of the question. That it would do so under all circumstances to honor mutual defense commitments under the NATO and Western European Union treaties is more open to question. However, the long avoided question of German participation in the international military operations outside the NATO area was answered in the affirmative by Germany's parliament in December 1995. With their lopsided vote to let German soldiers join NATO peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, government and opposition parties may have set a pathmark for the politics of German foreign policy on the road from Bonn to Berlin.

More economic integration with European countries and more competition with the United States in global markets diminish the value of the American connection for the Germans. The times are past when close personal ties between influential German and American proponents of a so-called Atlantic Community provided strong links. Future German policy makers are likely to be not so much against but rather not so much for their American partners in world affairs.

The constitution of the Federal Republic once called for a united Germany. Now it is the only one committed to "the realization of a united Europe." That, however, seems to be even less up to the Germans than the international treaties leading to the unification of their own country. The Bonn Republic of divided Germany was considered an economic giant but a political dwarf among European countries. The united Germany of the Berlin Republic is still the economic giant of Europe but certainly no longer its political dwarf.

While Germany was divided, what was then the European Economic Community afforded the Federal Republic its best opportunity for the gradual recovery of German influence on the continent. No wonder that West German governments consistently embraced Europeanization with a great deal more enthusiasm and public support than the French and especially the British governments did. Germans did not have to yield national independence in the bar-

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gain but could subscribe to limitation on national sovereignty then and now totally unacceptable to Americans.

Since unification and the full restoration of their political independence, the benefits of European integration have seemed less attractive to Germans. Thus far, however, neither the scheduled elimination of their valued Deutsche Mark through the currency of the European Monetary Union nor the existing and scheduled limitations by organs of the European Union on their domestic and foreign policies have aroused much controversy. Sustained mass unemployment might provoke more questions about whether a strong commitment to European integration continues to serve German interests. Most business and political leaders hold that the benefits remain much greater than the costs. As they have it, Germany's economy, which depends so heavily on foreign trade and investments, is sheltered by an umbrella providing unencumbered access to markets in other countries within the Union as well as protection against competition from countries on the outside, like the United States.

The Road Ahead

Commenting on the Federal Republic's bright economic past and the present difficulties, one American observer noted recently that the Germany entering the year 2000 would be a very different place from the Germany of 1990. Others have suggested that nothing less than Germany's particular brand of democracy was on the test stand, since the successes of the Bonn Republic had strongly relied on its prosperity and generous social system.[2] But if the Federal Republic has arrived at a crossroads, as conventional wisdom has it, a fundamental change of direction is just as unlikely as the notion that the Berlin Republic will simply be a carbon copy of the Bonn Republic.

Today's foremost question is whether the predominantly old and the limited, but not insignificant new features in the present system will help or hinder leaders in finding a balance between the continuity that most Germans cherish and the change that the country's immense socioeconomic problems demand. The verdict is not yet in. But it seems to us that the very features of Germany's political institutions and arrangements that work in favor of continuity and incremental change in normal times have at the same time the attributes needed for adopting major reforms in the face of extraordinary problems and looming crises. Some Germans believe that the magnitude of their socioeconomic problems call for bold solutions that only a grand coalition government of the two

[2] Klaus Friedrich has concluded that the Germans "are running into severe problems with their much-praised system." See his "The End of Germany's Economic Model," *New York Times*, 10 June 1996. And George Melloan has predicted that "the Germany that enters the year 2000 is going to be very different from the Germany that began this decade with one of the most momentous events in its modern history." See his "German's 'Flagship' Casts Off as Kohl Fiddles," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 January 1997. See also, Kurt J. Lauk, "Germany at the Crossroads: On the Efficiency of the German Economy," *Daedalus* 123 (1) 1994.

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major parties can work out and adopt. Others prefer joint problem solving between government, opposition parties, and interest groups in case-by-case negotiations. Either way, the idea is that broad consensus is the best hope for meaningful reforms.

All of this is not to say that contemporary German politics are without bitter conflicts and confrontations. On the contrary, the enormity of the problems and the dimension of the needed reforms have led to more inter- and intraparty divisions between conservatives and liberals, friends of labor and friends of business, those emphasizing the social and others stressing the free market part of Germany's brand of capitalism. Moreover, as the projected demise of the German Mark as well as the waning influence of Germany's highly respected central bank, the *Bundesbank*, approach and the impact of the European Union's decision making on German affairs becomes more transparent, one wonders whether the deepening and widening of Europe's integration may not become a major issue in German politics.

Most Germans support meaningful change to preserve their socioeconomic arrangement, even if that means sacrifices. Of course, they have different views about specific measures and how they should affect various societal groups. This presents German politicians with a need for opinion leadership. While the privatization of broadcasting offers political leaders plenty of opportunities to go public, they are on the whole not yet as media-savvy as their American counterparts.

"Reform" was the most frequently used word in the headlines of German newspapers in 1997. As the nation warmed to the subject, one politician compared his country's politics with the disarray at a giant construction site in the heart of Berlin, where a multitude of monumental buildings rose for the relocation of the federal government from Bonn to Berlin. What looked like a wasteland for a while became eventually the new center of Berlin with new buildings and traditional structures side by side. The successful transformation of Berlin may be a good omen for Germany's struggle to cope with the challenge of today and tomorrow—although restructuring the economic and social system will be far more difficult than preparing Berlin for housing the federal government.

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
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

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The Rise of the Public Speakership

DOUGLAS B. HARRIS

In the 1994 elections, the Republican party won a majority in the House of Representatives for the first time since a Republican House majority was swept into office with the election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. Attention to this historic change centered on the Speaker of the House. Newt Gingrich (R-GA) was the most "public" Speaker in memory.[1] The House Republican agenda in the 104th Congress was based on the well publicized "Contract with America." On 7 April 1995, Speaker Gingrich delivered a nationally televised address to the American people, and on 11 June 1995, Gingrich shared a stage in New Hampshire with President Bill Clinton to debate various national issues. NBC congressional correspondent Lisa Myers said, "Newt is the star. Newt's setting the agenda."[2] In each of these events, Speaker Gingrich was defying the traditional understanding of what a congressional party leader does. Scholars have long argued that congressional party leadership is primarily internal.[3] But to accept that Gingrich's speakership was more public and external than the speakerships of Joe Martin (R-MA), Sam Rayburn (D-TX), John McCormack (D-MA), and Carl Albert (D-OK)—the four Speakers from 1940 until 1976—is not to say that Gingrich is unique in his public role. In fact, there has been a growth in the public nature of the speakership over the last two decades with Tip O'Neill (D-MA), Jim Wright (D-TX), Tom Foley (D-WA), as well as Gin-

[1] The term "public speaker" is from Barbara Sinclair, *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), chap. 11.

[2] Quoted in Howard Kurtz, "Television Has Trouble Bringing Congress's Revolution Into Focus," *Washington Post*, 24 January 1995.

[3] Robert L. Peabody, *Leadership in Congress: Stability, Succession, and Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); Nelson W. Polsby, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962" in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, 4th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 260–290.

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grich. Just as presidents had perceived and exploited an opportunity to use mass media to build coalitions in Congress, congressional party leaders, most notably Speakers of the House, were "going public" too.[4]

In this article, I will examine the increasing visibility of House Speakers and the increasingly public nature of the speakership since the 1970s. Furthermore, I will explore the causes and potential consequences of this more public role for the speakership and party leadership in Congress as well as the role of Congress in American democracy.

Historical Perspective

As both a partisan office and a constitutionally dictated institutional position, the speakership conjoins the power of the House majority party and the institutional resources of the House itself. At times, the speakership has been a very potent office. Speakers Henry Clay, Thomas Brackett Reed, and Joseph Cannon each enjoyed considerable power primarily because of the unity of the congressional parties they led.[5] But as the strength of political parties declined, so too did the strength of the speakership. Comparing Speaker Rayburn to Reed and Cannon, one finds that "Rayburn was not and could not be as powerful a Speaker as Cannon or Reed. His sources of leverage in the formal and party systems were simply not comparable."[6]

The speakership—its power, style, and role—is variable over time. Just as Rayburn was a different kind of Speaker than Clay and Cannon, contemporary Speakers do not fit the Rayburn mold: their sources of leverage are different from Rayburn's. Although the House reforms of the 1970s gave contemporary Speakers more internal prerogatives than Rayburn had, the task of leadership is more difficult in that contemporary Speakers must lead a House that is more decentralized than the House of the Rayburn era. Moreover, contemporary Speakers do not fit the Rayburn model in that they are more visible and willing to use media strategies than was "the taciturn" Speaker Rayburn.

This public, media-oriented congressional leadership would have been foreign to Rayburn in whose House there was a distinction between showhorses and workhorses. He would say, "Damn the fellow who's always seeking publicity."[7] Rayburn saw media as counterproductive and even a direct challenge to

[4] On these trends in the presidency, see Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997).

[5] For overviews on the office of the speakership as well as these particular Speakers, see Mary Parker Follett, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1896); Chang Wei-Chiu, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928); and Ronald M. Peters, Jr., *The American Speakership* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

[6] Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn," *American Political Science Review* 75 (June 1981): 423.

[7] D. B. Hardeman and Donald C. Bacon, *Rayburn: A Biography* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987), 5.

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his party leadership efforts. He said, "If we allowed the televising of everything that comes along up here we would never get anything done."[8] Rayburn's effectiveness rested on his personal relationships with key House members (most notably committee chairs) and his ability to keep muted the ideological divisions that challenged the unity of southern and northern Democrats. Media had the potential to undermine the feudal power of committee chairs while simultaneously highlighting those policy issues that would divide the fragile House majority.

In the postreform House, changes in membership, the role of political parties, and the internal distribution of power in the House led to a change in both the importance of the Speaker and the Speaker's leadership style. The House context had changed and thus the speakership had changed. Speaker Gingrich said: "Each generation produces its own style of being effective. The most accurate statement of how I see the speakership [is] somebody who could somehow combine grassroots organizations, mass media and legislative detail into one synergistic pattern."[9] Before addressing the causes and consequences of this change in leadership style, I will illustrate the many changes in the Speaker's role as well as changes in the office of Speaker supportive of that new role.

A More Public Speakership

Speakers of the House have become political symbols, public as well as congressional leaders and even celebrities in the post-O'Neill era. Aided by increased media attention as well as their own activities, Speakers have transformed the speakership into a public office in which the responsibilities of external leadership rival their traditional internal responsibilities.

Speakers on the Nightly News

One measure of the extent to which the speakership has become a more public office is the amount of coverage Speakers of the House receive on the three networks' nightly news programs as well as the amount of coverage they get relative to other House members. In his study of media coverage of Congress, Timothy E. Cook ranked House members most often mentioned on the nightly news from 1969 to 1986.[10] In 1969, Speaker John McCormack was mentioned on the three networks' nightly news programs only seventeen times. In fact, five other House members—minority leader Gerald Ford (R-MI) and four of

[8] H. G. Dulaney and Edward Hake Phillips, eds., *Speak, Mister Speaker* (Bonham, TX: Sam Rayburn Foundation, 1978), 459.

[9] Quoted in David S. Cloud, "Speaker Wants His Platform to Rival the Presidency," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 4 February 1995.

[10] Timothy E. Cook, *Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the U.S. House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1989), app. B, 192-8. 1969 was the first full year that Vanderbilt University monitored television newscasts.

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McCormack's fellow Democrats—were mentioned more often than the Speaker. In 1972, Speaker Albert was mentioned only twelve times, and ten House members received more television attention than he. By 1977, the first year of the O'Neill speakership, the Speaker would receive more television coverage than both his predecessors and any other House member that year. O'Neill was mentioned in ninety-eight television stories in 1977 and as many as 184 in 1981. In 1984, O'Neill was mentioned 168 times—exceeding the combined number of mentions for the nine House members who immediately followed O'Neill on the most televised list. Although Speakers Wright and Foley were less visible than O'Neill, they were still more visible than the Speakers who preceded O'Neill.[11] And mentions of Speaker Gingrich surpassed the number of mentions of even Speaker O'Neill; in the first three months of the 104th Congress alone, the three networks broadcast 114 stories in which Gingrich was mentioned.[12]

Although mentions on the nightly news provide a broad gauge of the visibility of Speakers, they do not necessarily reflect their intentions to get on the evening news. Rather, mentions could simply reflect the focus of the news organizations on the Speaker as a symbol of House politics without any corresponding effort from the Speaker. Thus, the more proper focus of inquiry is the number of appearances on the nightly news rather than the number of mentions. Appearances are preferable, because they require at least some complicity on the part of the Speaker; at the very least, the Speaker must be willing to talk while the cameras are on him. Of course, the Speaker may at times feel coerced into making a statement or answering a question, but were he truly trying to avoid media exposure he would simply refuse to speak or he would say "no comment." Certainly, tracing the number of times that Speakers appear on the nightly news gives a more accurate picture of Speakers' attempts to gain media coverage. Thus, appearances are used rather than mentions. Moreover, I have removed stories from the data set in order to minimize the extent to which certain events beyond the control of the Speaker push the Speaker into the limelight. These are when Speakers are both invoked and appear regarding personal scandals, the constitutionally dictated line of presidential succession, and presidential election year politics where Speakers are asked to "handicap" both the primary and general election races.

Figure 1 demonstrates that there has been a substantial increase in the number of appearances by Speakers on the nightly news from the 91st to the 104th Congresses (1969–1996). Two periods of dramatic change are represented. First, Speaker O'Neill is nearly five times as likely to appear on the nightly news during the 97th Congress (1981–1982) as he was during the 96th Congress. This is most likely due to the fact that the 97th Congress represents the first Congress

[11] Data from 1987–1994 were compiled by the author from the *Vanderbilt Television News Abstracts and Indices.*

[12] Katharine Q. Seelye, "Clinton Edges Congress in Amount of Television Coverage, Study Says," *New York Times*, 4 April 1995.

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FIGURE 1
Speakers' Appearances on the Nightly News, 101st–105th Congress



Source: *Vanderbilt Television News Index and Abstracts.*

of the Reagan presidency in which O'Neill is thrust by both divided government and Republican control of the Senate to the forefront of media politics. The second period of dramatic change is between the 103rd and the 104th Congresses (1993–1996). Gingrich is almost six times as likely to appear on the nightly news as Foley was during the 103rd Congress. In fact, during the 104th Congress Gingrich is twice as likely to appear on the nightly news as any Speaker in any preceding Congress. Of course, much of this change is due to the attention given to the Republican takeover of the House, the new Republican majority's agenda, and Gingrich's role in both. Moreover, the return to divided government explains, at least in part, both increased media attention on the Speaker and increased incentives for the Speaker to go public.

Perhaps more important than these changes between Congresses is the fact that after the initial increase in Speaker appearances during the 97th Congress, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Speakers remain much more visible than their counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than secular growth in Speaker appearances on the nightly news, there is what has been described in other settings as punctuated change.[13] In the political context, "[p]unctuated

[13] The concept of "punctuated change" is a critique of evolutionary theory most associated with Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, "Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism" in T. M. J. Schopf, ed., *Models in Paleobiology* (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper, 1972), 82–115.

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political change is marked by an enduring, qualitative shift in the structure and outputs of a political system."[14] From the 91st to the 96th Congresses, Speakers appear on the nightly news an average of 18.0 times per Congress. From the 97th Congress to the 103rd Congress, Speakers appear on the nightly news an average of 106.1 times per Congress. Note that this figure does not include the 291 nightly news appearances by Speaker Gingrich during the 104th Congress. Speakers are engaging in activities at unprecedented levels, and they continue to do so. In the words of theorists of punctuated change: "the political system is remade in light of a new political reality,"[15] and the new equilibrium style of the speakership is that it is much more public than previously.

Party Leaders on Sunday Morning Talk Shows

Besides appearing on the nightly news, Speakers and other party leaders have turned to Sunday morning talk shows to help disseminate their messages. When Sam Rayburn was asked to appear on Sunday morning television, he rarely complied. When asked to appear on *Meet the Press* in 1957, Rayburn replied: "I do appreciate your wanting me to be on *Meet the Press*, but I never go on programs such as yours. . . . The trouble about my going on one program is then I would have no excuse to say to others that I could not go on their program. It is a chore that I have never relished and one that I doubt if I would be very good. . . . I will have to tell you what I tell all of the others, and that is that I do not go on these programs."[16]

This practice seems to hold true for the speakerships of McCormack and Albert as well as for the more open, public speakership of Tip O'Neill. O'Neill wrote, "I was always happy to talk to the press, but I drew the line at the Sunday morning talk shows on television. . . . I insisted on keeping my weekends free for my family and friends."[17] Speakers Wright and Foley, however, made frequent use of the Sunday morning format. John Barry describes a leadership meeting in which Wright discussed media options to confront President Ronald Reagan on peace initiatives in Nicaragua: "Wright juggled TV interview requests, saying: 'There are two critical points. My time and who.' *MacNeil/Lehrer.* Of course. *Good Morning America.* Yes. What about this weekend? *Meet the Press* offered eighteen minutes; Brinkley offered only nine but has

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The concept has been used to explain change in American politics. See Walter Dean Burnham, "Critical Realignment: Dead or Alive?" in Byron E. Shafer, ed., *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 101-39, esp. 109-12; and Sean Q. Kelly, "Punctuated Change and the Era of Divided Government" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., *New Perspectives on American Politics* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1994), 162–90.

[14] Kelly, "Punctuated Change and the Era of Divided Government," 166–7.

[15] Ibid., 166.

[16] Sam Rayburn letter to Lawrence E. Spivak, 4 May 1957, in Dulaney and Phillips, eds., *Speak, Mister Speaker*, 325.

[17] Tip O'Neill with William Novak, *Man of the House: The Life and Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O'Neill* (New York: Random House, 1987), 227.

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FIGURE 2
House Party Leaders on Meet the Press, 85th–104th Congresses



higher ratings. They chose the longer time" in this instance.[18] Similarly, Speaker Foley seemed to prefer the Sunday talk format to other media outlets. One of his aides told Barbara Sinclair that "When Foley and [Richard] Gephardt are asked [to be on Sunday Morning talk shows], they [say yes] for important reasons. . . . You have a Congress that has more of a domestic agenda than the president [Bush] has and a good way of conveying that to the public, and the only way we have, is through the media. So certainly we say yes when we are asked, and in fact we are likely to increase it rather than anything else."[19]

That Speaker Foley's aide suggests a routine policy of accepting invitations to appear on Sunday morning talk shows suggests more evidence that the media role of party leaders has become institutionalized and routine. Contemporary Speakers are more likely to appear on Sunday talk shows than were earlier Speakers, and this activity fits a broader pattern of increased media presence throughout the congressional party leadership. A more systematic look at party leaders' appearances on Sunday morning talk shows supports this conclusion. An examination of the guest roster of *Meet the Press* from the 85th Congress to the 104th Congress (1957–1996) reveals sharp increases in party leaders' ap-

[18] John M. Barry, *The Ambition and the Power* (New York: Penguin, 1990), 348–9.
[19] Sinclair, *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking*, 291.

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pearances on that program in the post-O'Neill years.[20] Although party leaders in the O'Neill years are only slightly more likely to appear on *Meet the Press* than they were in the Rayburn, McCormack and Albert years, the number of appearances increases sharply during the 100th and 101st Congress (the Wright and Foley speakerships). Moreover, party leaders' appearances on *Meet the Press* are more than twice as frequent during the 103rd and 104th Congresses than during the 100th and 101st Congresses. And the forty-five appearances by party leaders on *Meet the Press* during the 103rd and 104th Congresses (22.5 appearances per Congress) are more than twelve times as frequent as were party leader appearances from the 85th to the 96th Congresses (two appearances per Congress from 1957 to 1977). Thus, not only have Speakers become more visible on Sunday morning talk shows as they have on the nightly news, but this increased media visibility is more generally indicative of and consistent with changes in the congressional party leadership.

Speakers' Responses to Presidential Addresses

Since the early 1970s, during periods of divided government, Democratic congressional leaders have sought network access to reply to the president's State of the Union address as well as other major speeches.[21] Particularly during the O'Neill and Wright speakerships, the Democratic congressional leadership evinced an increasing sophistication in securing congressional response time and performing once that time had been secured.[22] Speakers Wright and Foley continued to secure response time to the State of the Union address while becoming more sophisticated in the technical aspects of their responses by preparing speeches extensively and hiring technical consultants. Moreover, Speakers in this era often give the opposition's response to the president's weekly radio address. These activities by House Democratic leaders pale in comparison to those of Speaker Gingrich in the 104th Congress. His opening day speech to the House, his April address to the nation, and his New Hampshire debate with Clinton were covered widely by broadcast as well as print reporters.

Whether one views the punctuated change in nightly news appearances or the secular growth of appearances on *Meet the Press*, one thing is clear: the contemporary speakership (as well as the congressional party leadership) is a more public, media-oriented office than in the Rayburn era.

Organizational Support

As Speakers became more public figures, the office of Speaker changed to accommodate that more public role. Moreover, the multiple institutions that

[20] Data compiled by author from guest rosters of *Meet the Press*. The author wishes to thank Betty Cole Dukert, senior producer of *Meet the Press*, for supplying this information.

[21] For a thorough discussion of this topic, see Joe S. Foote, *Television Access and Political Power: The Networks, the Presidency, and the 'Loyal Opposition'* (New York: Praeger, 1990).

[22] Ibid., 115–8.

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comprise the House majority party leadership apparatus began to change as well as to provide support for the public speakership and congressional leadership. The most notable organizational changes are in the Speaker's daily press conference, media relations staff allocations in the speakership and the broader party leadership, and the role and function of House party organizations.

The Speaker's Daily Press Conference

All Speakers since Rayburn have had daily meetings with the press, but the tone and purpose of these meetings has changed considerably with the rise of the public speakership. In Rayburn's press briefings, the topic was always the upcoming schedule, and discussion centered on arcane legislative procedure. One observer noted: "Speaker Rayburn perceived relationships with reporters as an advantage internally within the House rather than a conduit to a national constituency. He was far more concerned with what his colleagues read than with what the general public read."[23] Speakers McCormack and Albert continued Rayburn's daily press conferences. Recounting his experiences as a congressional correspondent, reporter David Broder described the Speaker's daily press conferences of the late 1960s and early 1970s as "a very quick, mumbled, almost meaningless daily meeting with the press."[24]

O'Neill's press conferences, however, represented a marked contrast to those of his predecessors. One reporter described the "vaudevillian overtones" of an O'Neill press conference: "O'Neill responds to questions with a mixture of routine business, political analysis, humor, partisan sniping and social commentary."[25] Besides the stylistic changes, reporters detected a marked contrast to previous Speakers in the value and purpose of O'Neill's press conferences. One wrote that O'Neill's press conferences "evolved into carefully planned quests for time on the evening news and space in the national papers."[26] Still another congressional correspondent claimed that "for the first time . . . a Speaker's press conference has become a place where reporters can really find out what House Democrats are up to."[27] And O'Neill's staff understood the increased importance of the daily press conference and began the practice of transcribing it.

Speaker Wright's daily press conferences were even more sophisticated than O'Neill's. Prior to each press conference, Wright would meet with other top Democratic leaders to coordinate the message for the day. Upon completion of the press conference, the other party leaders would remain to talk to

[23] Joe S. Foote, "The Speaker and the Media" in Ronald M. Peters, Jr., ed., *The Speaker: Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1994), 138.

[24] See David Broder's testimony, *Hearings Before the Commission on Administrative Review*, U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., 30 November 1976, 69.

[25] "Tip Talk," *National Journal*, 2 September 1978, 1405.

[26] Alan Ehrenhalt, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 22 March 1985, 691.

[27] Richard Lyons, "A Powerful Speaker," *Washington Post*, 3 April 1977.

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FIGURE 3
House Party Press Secretaries 1961–1995



reporters in an effort to reinforce Wright's points. Wright also extended contacts to broadcast reporters immediately following the daily print meeting. In the beginning of the 104th Congress, Gingrich opened up the traditionally pen-and-pad press session to the broadcast media, thus formalizing and extending the attention to broadcast journalists that Wright and Foley had pioneered on an informal basis.

Congressional Party Press Secretaries

In the postreform House of Representatives, public Speakers and other congressional party leaders have increasingly recognized the need for media expertise in the form of press secretaries, assistants, and communications directors. Neither Rayburn nor McCormack had a press secretary. In fact, the speakership did not include such a position until 1972, when Carl Albert hired J. Roddy Keiser as press secretary. Speaker press secretaries have increased in number, prestige, and experience since Albert's speakership. O'Neill made press secretary Christopher Matthews co-administrative assistant (the highest position within a congressional office) in the Speaker's office. And Speakers since O'Neill have allocated multiple staff positions to media relations. Both Wright and Foley had as many as three press assistants in their leadership of-

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fices, and by 1996, Gingrich had four media staff positions, the titles of which were "Press Secretary," "Deputy Press Secretary," "Press Assistant," and "Communications Coordinator." *MacNeil/Lehrer* producer Kenan Block said: "Speaker Gingrich is surrounded by people who are incredibly sophisticated about how to use the media and how to use television."[28]

House party leaders in both the majority and minority parties have increasingly employed press staff to assist in their leadership efforts. An examination of *The Congressional Staff Directory* reveals that there has been a substantial increase in recent years in the number of press staff in the offices of the Speaker, the majority and minority leaders, and the majority and minority whips. Throughout most of the 1970s, both the majority party and the minority party each had a single press secretary. From 1979 to 1983, there was a significant increase in the number of press secretaries in party leadership offices. And the number increased significantly both from 1989 to 1991 and from 1993 to 1995.

Role and Function of House Party Organizations

Evidence of the press/communications efforts of the House parties goes beyond staff allocations. First of all, there has been an increased integration of press/communications activities as communications staff from the Speaker's office, the majority leader's office, the whip operation, and the caucus or conference have regularized meetings with one another. Furthermore, the stated mission of the various party organizations has changed. During the 104th and 105th Congresses, the House Republican Conference's mission statement listed four chief goals, the last of which stated that the conference "Organizes and implements an internal and external communication plan." Among other things, the communications plan includes: "Providing talking points . . . on pending bills and issues of significance; . . . promoting House Republican positions through the 'Theme Team' and public and press communications; [and] coordinating talk radio."[29]

Similarly, the House Democratic minority leadership put an emphasis on communications strategy in the new Republican Congresses. Representative David Bonior (D-MI) described his role as minority whip: "My new role will not only be counting the votes by which we are going to lose. My role will be to emphasize the message which we are trying to convey to the American people." To accomplish this goal, House Democrats established a communications team to "run the Democrats' floor show for one-minutes, morning business, and special orders, trying to coordinate Members' speeches to hit on themes that the party wants to emphasize."[30] Moreover, House Democrats and Republicans created Message Groups, Message Boards, Theme Teams, and Commu-

[28] Quoted in Mary Jacoby, "Gingrich Briefings to Be Scaled Back," *Roll Call*, 4 May 1995.

[29] See "Hillsource: A Service of the House Republican Conference" (http://hillsource.house.gov/atc/mission.html), November 1996.

[30] Gabriel Kahn, "Bonior Overhauls His Whip Operation," *Roll Call*, 16 January 1995.

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nications Strategy teams (dubbed CommStrat by House Republicans) to coordinate and disseminate messages to the media. And like the offices of the top party leaders, the Democratic Caucus, the Republican Conference, and both parties' whip offices have hired increasingly large communications staffs.

Causes and Consequences of the Public Speakership

In terms of both their visibility and the institutional support they have erected to support this new leadership style, Speakers and their party leadership colleagues have been forging new strategies of leadership strategically avoided by Rayburn, McCormack, and Albert. What might explain this change in House leadership from a strictly inside game to a more public, media-oriented congressional leadership? And, what are the possible consequences of this public role for the speakership? Although a comprehensive examination of the causes and consequences of the public speakership are beyond the scope of an article, it is useful to review them here.[31]

Causes

Possible explanations of this more public speakership range from changes in the political system, such as changes in the nature of mass media and the prevalence of divided party control of the national government, to changes in Congress itself. Certainly the nature of mass media has changed since the time of Rayburn. Television news expanded from fifteen minutes to half an hour to twenty-four hours a day; cable television has provided for both an expansion of congressional coverage through C-SPAN and C-SPAN II and news coverage more generally; and the growth of alternative media such as talk radio and the Internet has provided more media outlets for politicians. Like changes in media, the prevalence of divided government is supportive of the rise of the public speakership as well. Indeed, in almost two-thirds of the period from 1960 to 1996 there was divided party control of the Congress and the presidency. Coupled with the use of media by presidents, this intuitively seems to explain the rise of the Speaker's position as public spokesperson.

Although changes in the political system seem supportive of this change in leadership style, neither changes in mass media nor the prevalence of divided government can fully explain the rise of the public speakership. While technological changes in the media certainly facilitated the rise of the public speakership, they alone cannot explain the change. Rayburn's House majority party lagged far behind the presidency, the Senate, and even the House minority party in utilizing media strategies. During the 1960s, the House and Senate mi-

[31] For a more extensive treatment of both the causes and consequences of the public speakership, see Douglas B. Harris, "The Public Speakership: The Media and Party Leadership in the House of Representatives, 1950–1996" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University, 1998).

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nority leaders started holding televised press conferences. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen and House Minority Leader Charles Halleck were the stars of the "Ev and Charlie Show." When Halleck was succeeded by Gerald Ford as House minority leader, the press conference was replaced by the "Ev and Gerry Show." Although the rise of the public speakership did not begin until 1977, certainly media opportunities existed for Speaker McCormack in the 1960s and Speaker Albert in the early 1970s.

The prevalence of divided government and the fact that presidents were increasingly using media are important factors in the rise of the public speakership. Indeed, those changes that led presidents to believe that going public would help them build legislative coalitions likely affected congressional leaders as well. Samuel Kernell argues that presidents are more likely to go public in a system in which members of the policy-making community in Washington are more independent (what he calls "individualized pluralism") than they were in an earlier era in which policy makers regularly engaged in bargaining to build coalitions ("institutionalized pluralism").[32] Members' independence of political parties relative to earlier eras and their increasing sense of exposure to the public (and the consequent sense of vulnerability) made support of legislative proposals increasingly contingent on public perceptions and sentiment. The importance of media politics to building legislative coalitions was likely impressed upon O'Neill and other House party leaders by President Reagan's successful use of media to build support for his legislative program in 1981. In many ways, divided government increased the incentives for both congressional party leaders to go public and for reporters to focus on them.

But divided government as the explanation of the rise of the public speakership leaves important questions unanswered. First, when Rayburn wrote *Meet the Press* that he "never" went on Sunday morning programs, it was in the divided government of the Eisenhower years. Speakers McCormack and Albert were not very "public" during the divided government of the Nixon administration. And during the 103rd Congress, when Democrats controlled the House, the Senate, and the presidency, Foley (although less visible than O'Neill, Wright, or himself during divided government) was nearly three times as visible on the nightly news as were Speakers from the 91st to 96th Congresses, four Congresses of which were during divided government. Although the incidence of divided government has some explanatory power, it falls short in explaining the broad historical changes that are suggested by the empirical findings in Figure 1.

A more complete explanation of the rise of the public speakership requires attention not only to the changing environmental factors of increasing media outlets and divided government but also attention to changes within the House. Joseph Cooper and David Brady demonstrate that changes in congressional leadership strength, activity, and style are most likely due to changes in the in-

[32] Kernell, *Going Public*, 20–37.

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stitutional context of the House.[33] This contextualist theory suggests that the impetus for a new leadership style for Speakers is most likely found in a new type of House member. There is considerable evidence that members' individual and collective styles and expectations were significantly different in the Rayburn era from the era of the public speakership. Individually, members in the postreform, post-Watergate Congress had more power within the House due to reforms which distributed power,[34] were more comfortable with media politics,[35] and felt increasingly vulnerable electorally and sought cover from their leaders.[36] Collectively, recent House majorities have been more ideologically homogeneous.[37] Taken together, these changes increased the benefits of leaders' use of media while reducing the perceived costs of such public leadership. Leaders in the postreform House could increase Congress's role vis-à-vis the presidency, satisfy increasingly media- and policy-oriented members while simultaneously providing electoral cover for colleagues by using the media to explain the House position and put positive spin on House activities. Moreover, both the obstacles of feudalist committee chairs threatened by media politics and ideological divisions within the majority party were lessened as committee reforms broke up the feudal system and the ideological divisions between northern and southern Democrats waned.

Leadership style changed because members' expectations of leaders changed. In both the leaders they select and the expectations that shape current leaders' activities, members have increasingly not only allowed, but expected a more public congressional party leadership. In describing the contours of several Democratic leadership contests in the late 1980s, Lynne Brown and Robert Peabody argue that candidates for leadership posts increasingly use "modified insider-outsider strategies" in which they demonstrate their traditional insider qualifications while "willingly display[ing] their strengths" in the "two areas

[33] Cooper and Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style."

[34] See Roger H. Davidson, "Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making" in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 99–133; Leroy N. Rieselbach, *Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern Congress* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1994). For how House reforms affected leadership, see David W. Rohde, *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 17–39.

[35] See Burdett Loomis, *The New American Politician: Ambition, Entrepreneurship, and the Changing Face of Political Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 87; Michael J. Robinson, "Three Faces of Congressional Media" in Mann and Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress*, 63; and Cook, *Making Laws and Making News.*

[36] See Anthony King, "The Vulnerable American Politician," *British Journal of Political Science* 27 (January 1997): 1–22; Thomas E. Mann, *Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 91. Indeed, the subjective perception of vulnerability rather than "objective" vulnerability has been found to lead followers in state legislatures to put "an emphasis on [the] external activities" of their leaders. See Thomas H. Little, "Understanding Legislative Leadership Beyond the Chamber: The Members' Perspective," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20 (May 1995): 269–89, 282.

[37] Rohde, *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.*

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where members themselves increasingly stress leadership abilities—fundraising and media performance."[38] Based on numerous interviews with Democratic House members, Barbara Sinclair reports that "Every House Democrat questioned about members' expectations of the leadership mentioned in one form or another this more public role."[39] Not only did the challenges to media politics of the Rayburn era wane, but members now demanded media leadership from their party leaders.

Consequences

As the rise of media leadership represents a fundamental change within the House of Representatives, it has had an impact on many elements of American politics. First of all, by equipping the House majority to compete in media politics, this change could have an effect on the relative balance of power between the Congress and the presidency. In 1970, Senator William Fulbright said: "Television has done as much to expand the powers of the President as would a constitutional amendment formally abolishing the co-equality of the three branches of government."[40] Just as the use of media gave rise to the strong presidency in the twentieth century, its use by congressional leaders has empowered Congress as well. Certainly, Congress does not enjoy the extensive coverage the president receives, but it increasingly has opportunities to counter messages emanating from the White House. And at times, Congress and not the president has dominated the policy agenda. By coupling their internal and external roles, Speakers Wright and Gingrich came to dominate not only the House agenda but, in many ways, the nation's agenda as well during the 100th and 104th Congresses respectively. At a 1995 conference on congressional leadership, Gingrich outlined his view of a prime ministerial speakership. In short, Congress is no longer a defenseless victim of media politics.

Where this public role has made Speakers more potent leaders, it has also made them more powerful symbols for the opposition. In different ways, Wright, Foley, and Gingrich were made symbols of their parties' programs and faced challenges to their position as a result. For Wright and Gingrich, ethics charges were brought in part because of the political advantage seen by the minority party. For Foley, his public leadership on key issues of congressional term limits and gun control made him more vulnerable in his district.

Besides changing the power of the Speaker and the Congress, this change represents a profound change in the nature of the speakership and congres-

[38] Lynne P. Brown and Robert L. Peabody, "Patterns of Succession in House Democratic Leadership: Foley, Gephardt, and Gray, 1989" in Peabody and Polsby, eds., *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, 319–72, 360.

[39] Sinclair, *Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking*, 263.

[40] Quoted in "Equal Time for Congress: Congressional Hearings," Communications Subcommittee, Senate Commerce Committee in Robert O. Blanchard, ed., *Congress and the News Media* (New York: Hastings, 1974), 105.

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sional party leadership. The speakership is an institution that changes over time to meet the needs and expectations of the House members. For Cannon, leadership strength was hierarchical; he was the "Czar." And Cannon's communications with followers were conducted within the party caucus in the form of orders to followers dependent upon him for reelection. For Rayburn, leadership was bargaining with powerful committee chairs.[41] And his communication was highly personal and collegial. For public Speakers, leadership is often based on mediated rather than face-to-face communication with followers.

In the more open House since the O'Neill speakership, party leaders must deal with a vastly larger number of members with powers of consequence. These members are largely independent of party leaders for reelection. To complicate matters further, party leaders have fewer opportunities to meet with members face to face because there are so many important members; and members visit the floor less frequently, because they are now able to monitor floor activities on C-SPAN in their offices. As a result, mediated congressional leadership is more ideological and less pragmatic. Indeed, public Speakers are neither the boss of their House colleagues as Cannon was nor are they chief bargainers as Rayburn was.[42] The types of arguments most persuasive to members are less likely to be promises of favor-trading or cash as in Rayburn's day, but rather those arguments likely to persuade interest-group supporters and constituents are most persuasive to members.

For these reasons, public Speakers increasingly use media in conjunction with the mobilization of groups and the shaping of public opinion to build legislative coalitions from outside Congress. In the 104th Congress, for example, Republican Conference Chairman John Boehner (R-OH) "presided over a weekly strategy session with representatives of almost two dozen interest groups."[43] Including organized interest group leaders in strategy is important to leaders who will call upon these groups to help them persuade members. To similar effect, since the 1980s, congressional leaders have increasingly employed polling to shape media messages and monitor the success of their media efforts. According to John Barry, "polls had been crucial to O'Neill's legislative strategy."[44] And, in the 104th Congress, polls were important to the marketing strategy of the "Contract with America." Moreover, poll results can be used by leaders to persuade members. For example, while he was House majority whip, Representative Tony Coelho (D-CA) convinced other House leaders to conduct regular polls. But "Coelho suggested keeping the polling operation secret; that way they could make results public when they showed good news, and could avoid releasing them when they carried bad news."[45]

[41] See Cooper and Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style."

[42] Indeed, Kernell, *Going Public*, 3–4, argues that going public "violates" and is incompatible with bargaining.

[43] Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, *Storming the Gates: Protest Politics and the Republican Revival* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996), 199.

[44] Barry, *The Ambition and the Power*, 200.

[45] Ibid., 201.

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In the new style of legislative leadership—including the use of media strategies, group coalitions, and polling—leaders do not simply bargain within the confines of the Capitol and within the constraints of the legislative environment, but rather they seek to shape the environment in which they and other legislators must act. As majority whip and future Speaker, Tom Foley said in 1986: "Sometimes to pass a bill you have to change the attitude of the country."[46] Where public Speakers probably balance the old style with the new, there are signs that the new style is increasingly supplanting the old. In 1996, Gingrich handed over the daily operations of the House to Majority Leader Dick Armey "free[ing] Gingrich to travel around the country to promote the Republican congressional message."[47]

This new style of leadership does raise questions about the quality of Congress's contribution to policy making in American politics. Students of media politics often question the ability of the media to facilitate sound deliberation on public policy matters,[48] and those institutions within Congress that help foster sound, responsible deliberation (that is, committees and bargaining) are undermined by attempts to publicize legislative proposals and market congressional parties.[49] Joseph M. Bessette claims that "the duty to deliberate well may often be inconsistent with attempts to conduct policy deliberations on the plane of public opinion."[50] House party leaders increasingly use public opinion polls to determine the content of legislation as well as media strategies to shape public perceptions of legislation. Increasingly, it seems, party leaders are packaging legislative proposals for media and public consumption. Leaders use polling and media to change the ways they talk about proposals in addition to changing the legislation. In reshaping Clinton health care proposals in 1994, congressional leaders had as their chief objective to convince the public that their proposal was not "the Clinton bill," despite the remarkable similarities that remained. When engaging in the Medicare debate in 1995, House Republican leaders would cry foul when reporters and Democrats would use the seemingly innocuous words "cut" and "change" to describe Republican proposals. Pollsters had told Republicans that those words hurt their popularity.

As with the speakership, it seems that the external role of congressional policy making has at times superseded the traditional legislative role for con-

[46] Quoted in Alan Ehrenhalt, "Media, Power Shifts Dominate O'Neill's House," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 13 September 1986, 2134.

[47] Jackie Koszczuk, "With Humor and Firm Hand, Armey Rules the House," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 March 1996, 523.

[48] See Benjamin I. Page, *Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[49] On the deliberative capacity of Congress and the institutional fostering of deliberation within Congress, see Joseph M. Bessette, *The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy & American National Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), esp. 146–8; and Joseph Cooper, "Assessing Legislative Performance: A Reply to the Critics of Congress," *Congress and the Presidency* 13 (Spring 1986): 21–40.

[50] Bessette, *The Mild Voice of Reason*, 221.

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gressional party leadership. In the words of House Republican Conference Chair John Boehner: "Communications is where it's all at. It's not what you're doing but the perceptions that are so important."[51] The cases of health care reform and Medicare are illustrative of this final crucial point: where traditionally to get public support and votes in Congress, congressional party leaders would have to rewrite legislation or at least trade favors in regard to other legislation, now legislative coalition building involves using media to change public perceptions of the legislation at hand. Increasingly, the changes to be made are not only to the legislation but to media coverage and public discourse regarding the legislation.

In all, Congress is more important to the constitutional system than previously, but its contribution is potentially less deliberative. Thus, this change in congressional party leadership has not only changed the balance of power between the Congress and the president, but it also has the potential of lowering the quality of Congress's contribution to policy making.

Conclusions

In the 104th Congress, Gingrich extended the trend toward the public speakership, but he was able to do so in large part because of the context of the House he led. The Republican party in the House was much more homogenous than recent Democratic majorities had been, particularly in regard to the predetermined House agenda—"The Contract with America." Coupling internal and external House leadership, as was the case with Wright in the 100th Congress, Gingrich's power rivaled that of the president. In responding to questions about his own potential candidacy for the presidency, Gingrich reveals this change in Speaker style and power: "I think I should stay and focus on what I am doing and get things done. I hardly need to run for president to get my message out."[52]

In 1996, with public approval of Gingrich reaching record lows, Gingrich strategically played a less salient role as Speaker. Contemporary lore held that the once public Speaker Gingrich had disappeared. Indeed, Gingrich had already suspended the Speaker's daily press conference that dated back to Rayburn. Moreover, from 1995 to 1996, Gingrich's appearances on the nightly news dropped by nearly 70 percent. Having not recognized the historical and institutional roots of the public speakership, some pronounced it short-lived and defunct. But did Gingrich disappear? The Speaker's office suspended the daily press conference in an attempt to gain greater control over the message rather than to withdraw from media politics. Gingrich's press secretary, Tony Blankley, said that the Speaker's office was developing a "package of alterna-

[51] Quoted in David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, *"Tell Newt to Shut Up"* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1996), 142.

[52] Kevin Merida, "Gingrich Says He Won't Run for President," *Washington Post*, 14 February 1995.

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tives . . . to put forward to meet the needs of the media and to be regularly available."[53] And the dramatic decrease in television appearances is a function of the high number of appearances in 1995. In fact, in 1996 Gingrich's sixty-nine appearances on the nightly news were well above the yearly median in the era of the public speakership. In only four years were Speakers more visible than Gingrich was in 1996.[54] In 1996, Gingrich only "disappeared" relative to Gingrich in 1995. That observers regarded Gingrich's reduced profile as a "disappearance" speaks to the extent to which we now expect a public speakership.

Although it is still too soon to tell whether and how long the public speakership will continue, if the roots of this change in leadership style are—as contextualist theory would suggest—in the expectations members have of leaders, then only changes in members' expectations would alter the style of Speakers. Regardless of how long Gingrich lasts in the speakership, the public speakership is likely to remain as long as the institutional context remains supportive. Changes beyond the occupant of the office are necessary to turn back this new role for the Speaker. The public speakership remains with all of its potential opportunities and pitfalls for Speakers, the Congress, and representative democracy.*

[53] Quoted in Donna Cassata, "Gingrich to End News Briefings," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 6 May 1995, 1224. The Speaker objected more to the format than to contacts with the press more generally; on this point, see Maraniss and Weisskopf, *"Tell Newt to Shut Up,"* 205.

[54] Gingrich appeared 222 times in 1995; O'Neill appeared 80 times in 1983; and O'Neill and Wright appeared 72 times each in 1985 and 1987 respectively. See Appendix A.

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Appendix

Speakers' Appearances on Nightly News, 1969–1996

Year	*Speaker*	*Number of Appearances*
1969	McCormack	2
1970		1
1971	Albert	4
1972		0
1973		10
1974		9
1975		18
1976		7
1977	O'Neill	20
1978		12
1979		11
1980		14
1981		57
1982		64
1983		80
1984		60
1985		72
1986		53
1987	Wright	72
1988		35
1989	Wright/Foley	58
1990	Foley	60
1991		44
1992		35
1993		29
1994		24
1995	Gingrich	222
1996		69

Source: *Vanderbilt Television News Archives, Index and Abstracts.* Compiled by author using both paper copy of the index as well as on-line search of Vanderbilt holdings. The on-line search was used to differentiate between mentions and appearances.

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The Politics of Reforming Social Security

R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD

What are the chances that Congress and the president will tackle the social security problem and enact reforms within the next several years? Does it seem more likely that they would adopt a comprehensive new system for retirement security or that they would approve more modest adjustments to the current system, returning the program to actuarial balance without altering its fundamental character? Are some kinds of reforms more politically attractive than others? These are important questions that deserve careful answers. This article addresses these questions within a general discussion of the political feasibility of alternative schemes for reforming Social Security.

Policy analysts often avoid questions of political feasibility, preferring to design programs that they believe will best achieve certain ends, while leaving it to politicians to "do the right thing." Sometimes this works nicely, and elected politicians enact analysts' handiwork. Quite frequently, however, the absence of early political analysis leads to unhappy outcomes. Sometimes Congress rejects not only the proposed policy but the notion of doing anything at all. Some would argue that this is what happened with President Bill Clinton's health-care package. A comprehensive plan designed by policy specialists without proper attention to political feasibility drove health-care reform off the governmental agenda. A second possibility is that Congress may start with policy analysts' most-preferred policy but quickly transform it into something that is unrecognizable to its early advocates and unlikely to achieve their intended purpose. The 89th Congress did this with President Lyndon Johnson's proposal to concentrate large sums of money in a few Model Cities by insisting that smaller sums be dispersed among 150 cities.[1] A third possibility is that Congress

[1] See R. Douglas Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 165–206.

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may adopt a proposal that seems attractive, only to have the program's supporting coalition unravel once the program begins operating. Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act by overwhelming margins in 1988, for example, only to reverse itself a year later and repeal the entire program after beneficiaries protested the way costs were allocated.[2]

Early attention to the political feasibility of alternative schemes for reforming Social Security seems especially appropriate given the stakes. This is no ordinary program. Social Security is the cornerstone of retirement security for most Americans, with 60 percent of retirees drawing more than half their retirement income from this one program.[3] The long-term problems of Social Security are serious, however, and most experts counsel that the sooner Congress and the president fix these problems the better. Given these stakes, it makes sense to map carefully the political terrain that lies ahead, so that policy advocates do not make the kinds of mistakes that drive reform off the governmental agenda or push necessary changes far into the future.

Before addressing the central question of political feasibility, it is important to understand what political science can—and cannot—accomplish. Political scientists have no special expertise in predicting the behavior of specific individuals. They have no tools for forecasting what Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, or Dick Gephardt will decide to do tomorrow morning, where each will come down on a particular proposal, or whether in the midst of difficult negotiations one of them will decide to be intransigent or accommodating, visionary or parochial, statesmanlike or petty. What specific individuals choose to do and especially how institutional leaders decide to behave will surely affect decisions about Social Security, but unfortunately political scientists have no special tools for analyzing these things.

Political scientists do have tools for analyzing how lots of politicians—say the 535 members of the House and Senate—might behave when they choose among specific policy options. Analysis is possible for large groups of legislators, because many of the idiosyncracies that seem so pronounced when one focuses on individuals disappear when summed across several hundred legislators. Analysis is also aided by the fact that legislators face similar problems year after year. Politicians establish habits for dealing with recurrent problems, and these habits shape how they deal with just about every problem that comes their way.

Some observers of Congress emphasize all the changes that occur on Capitol Hill. Electoral tides sweep one party in, the other out. Retirements and electoral defeats change the cast of characters. Political scientists tend to emphasize constancy on the Hill. The sources of constancy are two—one institutional, the

[2] For an excellent account, see Richard Himelfarb, *Catastrophic Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

[3] Advisory Council on Social Security, *Report of the 1994–1996 Advisory Council: Reports of the Technical Panels* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1997), 287.

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other electoral. The institutional fact is that Congress is a majoritarian institution in which legislators are equals. No legislator has constitutional authority over another; leaders serve at the pleasure of members; individual legislators are free to support or reject any alternative put before them. The electoral fact is that legislators retain their seats by their individual efforts to please their constituents. A seat in Congress is an individual franchise. As a consequence, legislators are extraordinarily attentive to what they hear from constituents, careful about how they deal with organized interests, and cautious when they cast major votes, calculating how specific votes might look in the middle of the next campaign if challengers decide to focus attention on them.[4]

The Agenda

Why is Social Security on the agenda for the first time in fifteen years? Why are policy makers considering modifying or replacing the program? Social Security was once such a regular item on the governmental agenda that no detailed explanation was really required. Between 1935 and 1973, Congress and the president enacted twenty-five Social Security laws—more than one bill every two years—as they transformed a relatively small retirement program, with initial tax rates of 1 percent each on employees and employers, into the mature program we know today, with tax rates of 6.2 percent.[5] During the final six years of this period, Social Security was constantly on the agenda, as Congress and the president responded to unusually high inflation by raising benefits seven times. Finally, in 1972, they placed Social Security on automatic pilot by enacting a provision that each year adjusts the wage base for changes in average wages and retirement benefits for changes in the consumer price index.

The 1972 law essentially removed Social Security from the regular governmental agenda. The program had reached maturity, and particularly as the economy stalled, there were no further pressures to expand it. Although insulated from inflation, Social Security was still vulnerable to other economic shocks and to long-term demographic changes. Social Security has returned to the governmental agenda only twice since 1972, each time because of actuarial imbalances. It first returned in 1975, after actuaries calculated that the program was facing a deficit within three years. The sources of the problem were two: some mistakes in drafting the original adjustment formula, which overcompensated for inflation, and economic stagnation which reduced revenues below their projections. After two years of debate, Congress and the president enacted a 1977 bill that phased in tax increases and recalibrated the inflation ad-

[4] On how the electoral connection shapes legislators' voting decisions, see David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, 3rd ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989); and R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

[5] For a summary of Social Security legislation, 1935 to 1977, see Martha Derthick, *Policymaking for Social Security* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979), 429–432.

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justment. Four years later, Social Security was again back on the governmental agenda when actuaries forecasted both short-term and long-term deficits. After two years of intense effort, Congress and the president adopted the 1983 reform bill, this time just a few months before the trust fund would have run dry and current revenues would have been insufficient to cover benefit checks. This bill included both tax increases for current workers and benefit cuts for future retirees.[6]

What is unusual about Social Security today is that it is *not* facing a short-term deficit. Indeed, the trust fund is larger than ever and growing steadily. The problem is entirely long-term. Government actuaries calculate that the system can pay all benefits until about 2032, after which the trust fund will be empty, and current revenues will only cover about three quarters of promised benefits.[7] The lack of any short-term crisis has profound implications for the politics of Social Security reform. First, there is nothing to force politicians to come to agreement about how to reform the system. Everyone may agree that reform is necessary and that early reform is desirable, but there is nothing to compel early action. No one doubted the urgency of reform in the early 1980s, yet it took two years and the prospect that benefit checks were about to be curtailed before politicians agreed to a specific package of reforms. Nothing focuses politicians' minds on problem solving and compromise more than the prospect that their constituents might be deprived of benefits at daybreak.

The lack of a short-term crisis has also made it possible for policy makers to consider comprehensive reforms of Social Security rather that the incremental fixes that are typical when the well is about to run dry. Although Social Security has long had its critics, it has been difficult for these critics to get their ideas and proposals on the table. Either Social Security was flourishing and no one wanted to hear from a spoilsport, or Social Security was facing a short-term crisis and no one had time to reinvent the system. The opportunity to develop and consider comprehensive reforms does not suggest that these plans have any advantage over more incremental reforms, only that for the first time since 1935 policy makers are open to considering alternative approaches to retirement security.

Policy Options

There is no shortage of plans for reforming Social Security.[8] In January 1997, the Advisory Council on Social Security proposed three separate plans, com-

[6] For the story of the 1983 reform, see Paul Light, *Still Artful Work: The Continuing Politics of Social Security Reform*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995).

[7] Two years ago, when the Advisory Council on Social Security was preparing its recommendations, the projected date of insolvency was 2029. For the most recent projections, see Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, *The 1998 Annual Report* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 4.

[8] On the various approaches to reforming Social Security, see Peter Diamond, "Proposals to Restructure Social Security," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10 (Summer 1996): 67–88; Edward M.

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monly referred to as Maintain Benefits (MB), Individual Accounts (IA), and Personal Security Accounts (PSA).[9] Each plan was supported by a minority of the thirteen-member council. Other plans on the table include those associated with prominent organizations (for example, the Cato Institute), those drafted by various groups of scholars (Kotlikoff-Sachs), and those already introduced in Congress (Kerrey-Simpson).[10] The following discussion concentrates on five plans that represent the range of alternatives. Rather than using the confusing and overlapping names provided by their champions—personal security systems, personal security accounts, individual accounts, and the like—it is simpler to refer to them by the names of their principal advocates: the Ball plan, the Gramlich plan, the Weaver-Schieber plan, the Kotlikoff-Sachs plan, and the Ferrara-Cato plan.[11] A final section examines two recent proposals: the Kasich plan and the Moynihan plan.[12]

Although these five reform plans differ in many important respects, ranging from their basic organizing principles to myriad details of implementation, two differences are fundamental to questions about political feasibility. The plans differ in the extent to which they provide for advance funding of retirement benefits. They also differ in how all of this advance funding should be invested, whether in a centrally managed fund where risks and rewards are shared, or in various types of private accounts where individual workers select investment options and bear the risks and rewards individually.

Today's Social Security system is essentially a pay-as-you-go transfer program, with the contributions of current workers paying for the retirement benefits of current retirees. Although the system has a trust fund, it is relatively small and designed more to smooth out demographic fluctuations than to accumulate

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Gramlich, "Different Approaches for Dealing with Social Security," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 10 (Summer 1996): 55–66.

[9] See Advisory Council on Social Security, *Report of the 1994–1996 Advisory Council: Findings and Recommendations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997).

[10] For a useful table summarizing the elements of seven plans, see Employee Benefit Research Institute, "Keeping Track of Social Security Reform Proposals: A Summary," *EBRI Notes* 17 (November 1996): 1–8.

[11] The Ball, Gramlich, and Weaver-Schieber plans are presented in Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations.* The other two plans are described in Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "It's High Time to Privatize," *The Brookings Review* 15 (Summer 1997): 16–22; Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "The Personal Security System: A Framework for Reforming Social Security" (presented to the Subcommittee on Social Security, House Committee on Ways and Means, *Hearings on the Future of Social Security for This Generation and the Next*, 105th Congress, 1st sess., 6 March 1997); and Peter J. Ferrara, "A Plan for Privatizing Social Security," *The Cato Project on Social Security Privatization* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1997).

[12] Robert M. Ball, Edward M. Gramlich, Carolyn L. Weaver, and Sylvester J. Schieber were members of the thirteen-member Advisory Council on Social Security (1994–1996). Laurence J. Kotlikoff is professor of economics at Boston University, Jeffrey Sachs is professor of economics at Harvard University, and Peter J. Ferrara is an associate scholar at the Cato Institute. Members of Congress are Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE), former Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-WY), Representative John Kasich (R-OH), and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY).

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vast sums for investment.[13] The trust fund is currently accumulating extra funds while members of the baby-boom generation are in their working years, but these reserves will be drawn down during their retirement years. The trust fund is invested exclusively in bonds of the United States government.

All five reform plans move Social Security in the direction of advance funding. Four plans include some type of individual accounts. The largest faction on the Advisory Council advocates a Maintain Benefits plan (the Ball plan) that would retain most of the system's pay-as-you-go character, while incorporating adjustments that would allow the trust fund to grow larger, be invested more aggressively, and thereby play a greater role in financing benefits.[14] At the other end of the spectrum, both the Kotlikoff-Sachs proposal and the Ferrara-Cato plan would phase out most of the current pay-as-you-go system and replace it with an advance-funded plan in which workers' contributions would be squirreled away in individual investment accounts. Another of the Advisory Council's proposals, the Weaver-Schieber plan, occupies a midpoint between these two extremes, with about half of all benefits provided by advance-funded, individually-directed Personal Security Accounts and the other half by a variant of the current pay-as-you-go system. The third of the Advisory Council's proposals, the Gramlich plan, occupies some of the space between the Ball and Weaver-Schieber plans, grafting a smaller version of advance-funded Individual Accounts on top of a reduced pay-as-you-go system.

The debate is vigorous between those who propose to privatize all or part of Social Security by establishing individual accounts and those who seek to preserve a collective system where risks and rewards are shared. At least for the purists—the complete privatizers and the strict preservationists—the debate reflects fundamentally different conceptions of what Social Security should be. The complete privatizers envision Social Security as just another pension plan. They believe that workers should be allowed to control how their compulsory contributions are invested just as they currently control how their voluntary contributions to IRA or 401(k) accounts are invested. They celebrate the fact that risk and reward would be concentrated on individuals. The preservationists insist on viewing Social Security as social insurance rather than just another pension plan. They believe that it is essential to have a collective system that provides a guaranteed floor of retirement security for all Americans and that protects each individual from the risk of having inadequate retirement income. They believe that the current system is appropriately sized and that benefits should not be reduced.

[13] The trust fund is currently equal to about 1.7 years of benefit payments. See Board of Trustees, *The 1998 Annual Report*, 127.

[14] Under present law, the trust fund would decline to zero in 2032, whereas under the Ball plan the trust fund would grow to about 4.5 years worth of benefits and then stabilize around that level. A fund of this magnitude could provide investment earnings equivalent to what an additional 2 percent payroll tax would supply. See Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 172, 184.

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If the debate were simply between the strict preservationists and the complete privatizers, then the preservationists would almost certainly prevail. Completely dissolving the safety net of social insurance and allowing individuals to manage all of their retirement assets is not a serious option given the broad public support for the idea of Social Security. But there are plenty of intermediate positions between strict preservation and complete privatization. The Gramlich and Weaver-Schieber plans, for example, are hybrids that call for partial privatization. They propose scaling back the size of the defined benefit system and creating a parallel defined contribution system that allows for some individual choice.

Social Security has long been conceived as part of a three-legged stool—the other two legs being employer-provided pensions and private savings—where the three legs together support the retirement needs of Americans. The partial privatizers are essentially asking whether the social insurance leg is too large. Although the question is always legitimate, it is especially so given all the changes that have occurred during the past two decades in the other two legs.[15] When the question was last raised in the 1960s and 1970s, a strong bipartisan consensus developed in favor of expanding the Social Security system. Today, as the deep divisions within the Advisory Council demonstrate, no consensus exists on the appropriate size of Social Security—at least in its current form.

Conflicts over the question of privatizing Social Security are intense. Questions about the appropriate size and scope of government are inherently ideological, partisan, and conflictual. But the whole question of moving toward advance funding is itself politically troublesome. Although questions about advance funding may appear tame by comparison to questions about establishing individual accounts, since advance funding ignites neither ideological nor partisan passions, a careful analysis of the politics of moving toward advance funding demonstrates the fallacy of this conclusion. Advance funding is troublesome for politicians of every partisan and ideological persuasion. Since advance funding is an essential component of every proposal for privatizing even a portion of Social Security, this makes adopting privatization more difficult politically than the ideological conflict between individual choice and social insurance suggests.[16]

The Politics of Funding Decisions

Advance-funded retirement systems have several advantages over pay-as-you-go systems. Among other things, they promote national savings and thus eco-

[15] See David Cutler, "Reexamining the Three-Legged Stool" in Peter Diamond, David Lindeman, and Howard Young, eds., *Social Security: What Role for the Future?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).

[16] Advance funding is not logically necessary for privatization. For example, Latvia created a privatized but unfunded pension system. But such hybrid schemes are both rare and difficult to explain to politicians and citizens. On the distinction between privatization and advance funding, see John Geanakoplos, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Stephen P. Zeldes, "Would a Privatized Social Security System Really

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nomic growth, and they help insulate the financing of retirement plans from the effects of large demographic shifts.[17] From a political perspective, however, they have one large liability: They deliver no benefits in the near term for which politicians can claim credit. As their name implies, the costs are now, the benefits far in the future. Few politicians enjoy imposing costs on their constituents without also delivering some fairly immediate benefits—especially if there is an easier way.[18]

Social Security actually began as an advance-funded system.[19] The original plan, enacted in 1935, imposed a one-percent payroll tax, but promised no retirement benefits until 1942. Perhaps the costs were sufficiently small that they were not seen as a major political liability; perhaps it helped that contributors were promised that they could start collecting retirement benefits in just a few years. By 1939, policy makers had begun the transformation to a pay-as-you-go system, first by accelerating workers' eligibility for benefit payments to 1940, then by adjusting benefits upward so that retirees received far more than their own contributions could have earned, and finally by postponing planned tax increases so that the trust fund would remain only a small buffer, not a large investment fund.

The transformation from an advance-funded system to a pay-as-you-go system was easily accomplished, because it united a diverse coalition of interests. Program enthusiasts sought to deliver more benefits to retirees as soon as possible. Many legislators sought to minimize the tax burden on current workers by deferring tax increases until they were absolutely necessary to fund current retirees' benefits.[20] And some conservatives were opposed to a large trust fund, fearing, according to Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), "such an unmanageable accumulation of funds in one place in a democracy."[21] The same political logic that allowed for the transformation to a pay-as-you-go system also fueled the program's vast expansion over the next three decades. Because workers greatly outnumbered retirees, modest increases in the payroll tax, phased in

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Pay a Higher Rate of Return?" in R. Douglas Arnold, Michael Graetz, and Alicia H. Munnell, eds., *Framing the Social Security Debate: Values, Politics, and Economics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, forthcoming).

[17] On the economics of advance funding, see Peter Diamond, "Macroeconomic Aspects of Social Security Reform," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (2, 1997): 1–87.

[18] Politicians are not the only people who behave in this fashion. Many consumers use installment debt to maximize current benefits and minimize current costs. Perhaps politicians adopted advance funding for Social Security in the 1930s because advance funding better corresponded with the values of the day, just as the subsequent movement towards pay-as-you-go funding corresponded with the buy-now-pay-later mentality of the 1960s and 1970s.

[19] For a superb political analysis of Social Security from 1935 to 1977, see Derthick, *Policymaking for Social Security.*

[20] Ibid., 215.

[21] Ibid., 232.

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gradually, covered large increases in retirement benefits.[22] The incremental costs for workers were small, the incremental benefits for retirees large.

Although policy makers gradually replaced an advance-funded system with a pay-as-you-go system, they retained the original rhetoric. They spoke in the common language of insurance, not in economists' language of transfer payments. The vocabulary of insurance was not only familiar, it was in many respects appropriate, because policy makers were creating *rights* to benefits for workers who paid their dues.[23] Most people do not understand exactly how various types of insurance are funded, including casualty, health, and life insurance. What they do know is that by paying premiums they acquire rights to have future losses covered by insurance companies. By using similar language for retirement security, policy makers created similar rights. These new rights were not stated in a legal contract to be enforced by the courts, but as a social contract to be enforced by elected politicians subject to the court of public opinion. Mere transfer payments could be eliminated by future politicians, but Social Security benefits were different. They were earned rights, and no future politician could eliminate them without the consent of those who had paid their dues.[24]

The Politics of Advance Funding

Moving from the original advance-funded Social Security system to a pay-as-you-go system was relatively easy. Accelerating benefits and postponing costs is one of the easiest things that politicians do. The difficulties arise when one attempts to reverse gears and reestablish advance funding as the organizing principle for retirement security. In order to do so, one must fund both systems for a while, simultaneously setting aside money for current workers while honoring all the existing obligations to retirees, near retirees, and all those who have paid substantial sums into the current system. These obligations are immense. One estimate is that the program's unfunded liability to current workers and retirees is in the neighborhood of $9 trillion.[25]

[22] The number of workers per beneficiary declined from forty-two in 1945, to seventeen in 1950, nine in 1955, five in 1960, and four in 1965. It reached its current level of 3.3 workers per beneficiary in 1975. See Board of Trustees, *The 1998 Annual Report*, 122.

[23] According to Martha Derthick, "Social Security was presented to the public as a program in which the worker takes care of his own future, gets back at least what he has paid for, and is entitled to get it back as a right." Derthick, *Policymaking for Social Security*, 289.

[24] All of the reform plans recognize the sanctity of these rights. Even the plans that seek to replace the current Social Security system with something completely different recognize that they must provide benefits over the next six or seven decades for all workers and retirees who have been part of the pay-as-you-go system.

[25] Recalibrated in terms of taxes, it would require a tax of 1.5 percent of taxable payrolls for about seventy years to eliminate an unfunded liability of $9 trillion. See Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 109.

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The Kotlikoff-Sachs plan is clearest about what it would require to satisfy existing obligations while concurrently allowing workers to direct their own contributions into individual investment accounts. They propose a federal sales tax that "would begin below 10 percent and would decline to a permanent level of roughly 2 percent within 40 years."[26] Since the permanent tax of 2 percent is to fund a safety net for the poor, the remainder, perhaps 7 or 8 percent initially, is to pay transition costs. The political difficulties of establishing such a large tax are clear. First, it would be the largest new tax in American history, imposed at a time when "no new taxes" seems closer to the governing philosophy. Second, it would procure for the federal portfolio a form of taxation long reserved for states and localities, who would resist any invasion of their turf. Third, a sales tax, unlike the current payroll tax, would be a tax on retired citizens. It is not likely to be popular with retirees or with the American Association of Retired Persons, a group that probably has the power to scuttle any plan that it finds unacceptable.[27] Finally, members of Congress still recount the tale of how Al Ullman (D-OR), chair of House Ways and Means, was defeated at the polls after championing a national value-added tax as the solution to the federal deficit.[28] Creating a new broad-based tax is more difficult for politicians than increasing an existing one. In short, both the size and the form of the transition tax proposed by Kotlikoff and Sachs highlight some of the political difficulties associated with moving toward an advance-funded system.

The proponents of advance funding are not naive. They know that neither citizens nor policy makers will be attracted by transition costs of this magnitude. Their argument is that the benefits of moving to advance funding would be immense and that the benefits would more than justify the admittedly large costs. The principal advantage of advance funding is that it would increase national savings, and these savings would stimulate economic growth.[29] A second advantage is that workers would eventually pay less for a given bundle of retirement benefits, because their benefits would be based on their own contributions as well as earnings on these contributions.

Estimating the costs and benefits of moving to an advance-funded system may demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that total benefits would eventually exceed total costs. The problem is that neither citizens nor politicians tend

[26] Kotlikoff and Sachs, "It's High Time to Privatize" and "The Personal Security System."

[27] Kotlikoff and Sachs note that the poorest senior citizens—those who are totally dependent on Social Security—would be insulated from the new tax, because Social Security benefits would continue to be indexed for price changes. All other senior citizens, however, would suffer declines in their living standards because other forms of retirement income are not indexed. Although Kotlikoff and Sachs argue that compelling senior citizens to pay a share of Social Security's unfunded liability is "intergenerationally equitable," it is not an argument that many elected politicians are likely to find appealing.

[28] See Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action*, 45–46.

[29] On the effect of Social Security reform on private and national saving, see Eric M. Engen and William G. Gale, "Effects of Social Security Reform on Private and National Saving" in Steven A. Sass and Robert K. Triest, eds., *Social Security Reform: Links to Saving, Investment, and Growth* (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1997).

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to evaluate policy alternatives by comparing total costs and benefits over an extended period of time.[30] Politics is much more about the timing and incidence of costs and benefits than about totals, and much more about the degree to which specific costs and benefits can be traced to politicians' individual actions. Because it is easier for citizens and politicians to estimate the incidence of costs and benefits in the short-term, and because it is easier for citizens to connect short-term costs and benefits to politicians' individual actions, politics invariably revolves around these short-term effects. Both citizens and politicians tend to undervalue long-term effects when they evaluate policy alternatives.

Applying this logic to the Kotlikoff and Sachs plan, one sees that all workers and many retirees would incur large costs in the short-term, and these costs would be directly traceable to the actions of individual legislators who supported their imposition. In contrast, the benefits would either be diffuse benefits, such as economic growth, or somewhat higher retirement benefits that would appear only in the long term. Most citizens would never trace either type of benefit to the actions that individual legislators took years before to produce them. In short, legislators could face electoral retribution for imposing easily traceable early-order costs, while it is doubtful that they would ever be rewarded for delivering such general benefits as economic growth and prosperity or such later-order benefits as the higher investment returns of individual retirement accounts.

Transition Costs

The point is not that it is impossible to reestablish a Social Security system based on advance funding. The point is that it is not yet in legislators' self-interest to impose the necessary transition costs. Reform is possible only when large majorities of Americans come to understand and accept the nature of the sacrifices that would be required to pay for the transition. Legislators will not enact this kind of reform just because they believe that advance funding is a good idea. Most legislators are unwilling to forfeit their careers to advance even a very good idea. Proponents of these reforms need to be honest with the American people, stating that whatever large benefits would be generated by adopting an advance-funded system would not be immediate. The benefits would be long-term; and until then, workers (and perhaps retirees) would pay increased costs.

Some proponents of privatizing Social Security claim that large majorities of Americans already support full-scale privatization. Michael Tanner reports on a 1996 poll in which 69 percent of registered voters supported a detailed privatization plan, while a mere 12 percent opposed it.[31] Although the poll ap-

[30] For a full theoretical treatment of the issues in this paragraph and the next, see Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action.*

[31] See Michael Tanner, "Public Opinion and Social Security Privatization," *The Cato Project on Social Security Privatization*, (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996), 4–5.

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pears to have been professionally administered in terms of sample size and the like, the 200-word description of a privatized system that prefaced the actual question failed to mention transition costs. It summarized all the benefits of privatization, along with "no reduction in benefits for current Social Security recipients"; but it neglected to mention the sacrifices required to pay for both systems. Politicians will not be fooled by such nonsense. Polls that emphasize benefits and ignore costs tell us nothing more profound than that everyone likes a free lunch.

Proponents of advance funding need to be clear and precise about the transition costs. Kotlikoff and Sachs pass this test with ease. In contrast, the Ferrara-Cato plan attempts to show that "the transition can be financed without new taxes and without cutting benefits for today's recipients."[32] The miracle of a costless transition is justified in nearly a dozen ways, my favorite being: "Any remaining transition costs should be financed by cutting other government spending, much of which is wasteful and even counterproductive. Reducing it will not amount to a significant cost."[33] Ferrara has in mind cutting about $60 billion per year.[34] No matter how insignificant he believes these expenditures to be, cutting budgets is never an easy task, especially after the extensive budget cutting of the past decade. It is a mistake to pretend that there are no significant transition costs.

The proponents of moving toward an advance-funded system also need to be clear about who will pay for the transition. The notion that everybody—and every age cohort—can be better off during the transition is implausible. Martin Feldstein poses the distributional question starkly: "During the transition, which are the age groups that win and which are the age groups that lose?"[35] Feldstein and Samwick analyzed one possible transition scheme and concluded that it would take about nineteen years for the cost of funding two systems to drop below the cost of funding the current system alone.[36] The bottom line by age cohort: "Those who are retired when the transition begins are completely unaffected. Those who are at least 45 years old will always face a higher combined mix of taxes and PRA [personal retirement account] contributions. Those who are younger will face a higher mix for 19 years and then a lower mix. The younger they are, the more likely that the present value of the combined payments will be lower in the transition than in the baseline."[37]

[32] Ferrara, "A Plan for Privatizing Social Security," 1.

[33] Ibid., 14.

[34] It is reminiscent of the magic asterisk in President Ronald Reagan's first budget that also referred to unspecified future expenditure cuts of $60 billion annually. It was far easier to assume that such cuts would be made than to make them. See William Greider, *The Education of David Stockman and Other Americans* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1982), 36.

[35] Martin Feldstein, "Transition to a Fully Funded Pension System: Five Economic Issues," NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper No. 6149 (1997): 20.

[36] Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick, "The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security," NBER Working Paper No. 5761 (1996); Feldstein, "Transition to a Fully Funded Pension System," 11.

[37] Feldstein, "Transition to a Fully Funded Pension System," 21.

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More studies of this type would be useful, with additional studies investigating alternative transition schemes and making alternative assumptions about economic returns. Although it may also be useful to estimate the distributional effects of increased economic growth, these estimates need to be separate from estimates of the distributional effects of transition costs. The transition costs are certain and directly traceable to legislators' actions, whereas increased economic growth is more speculative and completely untraceable to legislators' decisions.

The reason why proponents of advance funding must be clear about who would pay for the transition is that opponents are certain to focus on the issue of costs. Pretending that everyone will profit is implausible and could easily undermine the legitimacy of a reform proposal. That was the fatal error made by the proponents of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, who failed to prepare senior citizens for the fact that some of them would be worse off.[38] A better strategic model for enacting advance funding would be the decade-long effort to balance the federal budget. No one pretended that the transition to a balanced budget was costless. The debate was about who should sacrifice, who should pay higher taxes, and who should have their favorite benefit programs shaved, slashed, or terminated.

Policy makers can also modify the incidence of transition costs. Total costs may be fixed, but their incidence by income and age is a matter of choice. Policy makers can also choose to phase in transition costs gradually. Advocates of advance funding often recommend that taxpayers swallow large doses of bitter medicine as quickly as possible so that the benefits would accrue rapidly. Politicians are more likely to prefer gradual transitions, beginning with small doses and slowly increasing the dosage over time. Gradualism was the approach that policy makers adopted in 1935 when they first instituted Social Security. Gradualism was also the approach that policy makers employed over the past decade when they moved the federal budget toward balance. Establishing what should be the proper transition period is not a matter in which policy experts have a comparative advantage, other than to show the relationship between the pace of sacrifice and the likely flow of benefits. The length of the transition period is a political choice, and it is best left to politicians who are skilled in estimating the rate at which their constituents can tolerate increased costs.

The General Problem of Costs

The analysis of the politics of replacing the current pay-as-you-go system with one based on advance funding has focused on transition costs, because these costs are the principal impediment to reform. Imposing costs is a general problem, however, and one that all reformers must face. The current system is not adequately funded, and there is no way to fix it without imposing costs on either

[38] Himelfarb, *Catastrophic Politics.*

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today's generations or future generations. Before analyzing how other reform plans propose to apportion these costs, it will prove useful to examine how policy makers have allocated Social Security costs in the past.

Policy makers' aversion to imposing costs is not unique to the 1990s. From the very inception of Social Security, policy makers have been careful about how they apportioned costs. Gradualism has been the key to every single decision about costs from 1935 to 1983. The original Social Security Act, which imposed a payroll tax of 1 percent beginning in 1937, contained a gradual schedule for increasing the tax to 3 percent in 1949. But even this twelve-year schedule proved too rapid for politicians. Congress repeatedly slowed the schedule, moving the first scheduled increase from 1940 to 1950, and moving the original 3-percent ceiling to 1960.[39] Although Congress eventually increased the payroll tax to 6.2 percent, this was accomplished in twenty separate steps, averaging only 0.26 percentage points per step. Over the entire fifty-four-year period required for reaching the present tax rate, Congress increased taxes by less than 0.10 percentage points per year.[40] In short, policy makers increased costs as slowly and imperceptibly as possible.

The initial decision to impose identical payroll taxes on workers and employers was another way to make costs less perceptible. Economists can argue all they want about whether workers ultimately pay the employers' share too with foregone wages, but politicians know that workers perceive only the part that is deducted from their wages. Workers are unlikely to perceive either the employers' share or something as nebulous as foregone wages. The one group that would have noticed that they were paying both employee and employer taxes was spared having to do so. From 1951 to 1983, self-employed workers paid only about three quarters of the combined employee and employer rates.[41] Only under the pressure to find revenue to rescue Social Security in 1983 did Congress eliminate the special rate for self-employed workers, and even then, Congress created a seven-year transition period before the self-employed were brought up to parity with the combined tax rates for ordinary workers.[42]

[39] Derthick, *Policymaking for Social Security*, 429-431; Board of Trustees, *The 1998 Annual Report*, 33.

[40] Only four of the twenty tax increases between 1937 and 1990 were as large as 0.5 percentage points (1950, 1954, 1960, 1963). For a list of tax rates by year, see Board of Trustees, *The 1998 Annual Report*, 33–34.

[41] Congress began charging self-employed workers 75 percent of the combined rate, but it allowed the rate to dip as low as 69 percent between 1973 and 1980. Board of Trustees, *The 1998 Annual Report*, 33.

[42] Actually, Congress established parity in tax rates effective 1984, but it also granted self-employed workers an income tax credit to offset part of the increase. The credit was not phased out until 1990. Self-employed workers are currently allowed to deduct the "employers" half of the payroll tax from taxable income, just like any other employer. Of course, this tax deduction is much less valuable than either the original reduced tax rate for self-employed workers or the transitional tax credit. See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1983* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1984), 662.

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The 1983 reform bill was a masterpiece at imposing costs as gradually and imperceptibly as possible.[43] The seven-year phase-in of both parity for the self-employed and a higher payroll tax for everyone was accompanied by reducing benefits for retirees in the distant future.[44] The normal retirement age was increased from 65 to 67, and early retirement benefits were cut from 80 percent to 70 percent of full benefits (both changes phase in between 2003 and 2027). Even current retirees had their benefits reduced modestly. Cost-of-living adjustments were delayed for six months for all retirees, and upper-income retirees had some of their tax-free Social Security benefits transformed into taxable income. It was a classic share-the-pain strategy, imposing costs on workers and retirees alike. But the pain was administered as slowly as possible.

Advisory Council Plans

Each of the three Advisory Council Plans is a complicated amalgam of individual provisions for restoring actuarial balance. Each has a different plan for apportioning costs among workers, retirees, and future retirees. The most striking difference between the plans, however, is how they propose to increase taxes on workers and employers. Although all three plans propose increasing Social Security revenues by about 1.6 percent of covered payrolls, they differ in who would pay the incremental costs and when the payments would begin. The Gramlich plan would require an immediate increase in workers' contributions of 1.6 percent of earnings; employers would face no additional costs. The Weaver-Schieber plan would require an immediate increase in workers' and employers' contributions of 0.76 percentage points each; both increases would be eliminated after seventy-two years. The Ball plan would require that both workers' and employers' contributions increase 0.8 percentage points in the year 2045.

The Gramlich plan is most out of line with how Congress has apportioned Social Security costs in the past. Workers would bear directly all the incremental costs. The traditional parity between workers' and employers' contributions would be broken for the first time since the program's inception. It is hard to imagine any political advantages in breaking a link that has long been accepted by both business and labor, especially given the enormous political liabilities of doing so. As sure as the sun rises, opponents would claim that the provision was designed to soak poor- and middle-income workers while protecting rich corporations from sharing the burden. Arguments that imposing costs directly on workers was a better way to increase national savings would fall on millions

[43] Light, *Still Artful Work*; and *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 658–663.

[44] Strictly speaking, legislators voted to accelerate the imposition of tax increases that were originally passed in 1977 and scheduled to be phased-in between 1979 and 1990. Since the acceleration generated about $40 billion in additional revenues, it was a genuine tax increase, even if it did not raise the 1990 rate above what it would have become in the absence of the reform bill. See Light, *Still Artful Work*, 180.

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of deaf ears, as would arguments that workers eventually pay employers' share of the payroll tax through forgone wages. Breaking the link between workers' and employers' contributions would also increase the likelihood of partisan conflict, because one party has long been associated with business, the other with labor.

Moreover, by concentrating all of the incremental costs directly on workers, the Gramlich plan would require an enormous increase in workers' contributions. An immediate increase of 1.6 percentage points is more than three times greater than any increase in the history of Social Security.[45] It amounts to a 26 percent increase in the current payroll tax of 6.2 percentage points. At least on that count, the Weaver-Schieber plan is more attractive. By retaining the traditional link between workers' and employer's contributions, their plan would require an increase in workers' payments of only 0.76 percent of earnings. But even that rate is much larger than any increase in the history of Social Security. The point is not that it would be impossible for legislators to approve either the Gramlich or Weaver-Schieber rates. The point is that the designers of these two plans have made it unusually difficult for legislators to impose the level of costs that are essential for restoring actuarial soundness and moving toward advance funding. Recall that in 1983, when the well was about to run dry, legislators required a seven-year phase-in for an 0.8 percentage point increase in workers' contributions. Why, when the well is not scheduled to run dry until 2032, would legislators approve an immediate increase of either 1.6 or 0.76 percentage points? Why not employ the age-old strategy of gradualism?

Strictly speaking, the 1.6 percent increase in workers' payments under the Gramlich plan would not be a tax. According to the plan's proponents, it would be a contribution. Workers' contributions would be held by the government in individual accounts that would be invested in one or more indexed stock or bond funds; at retirement, both the contributions and the investment earnings would be used to purchase indexed annuities. Calling the payment a contribution rather than a tax, however, does not transform fundamentally the politics of imposing pain. When the government mandates that workers forgo current consumption, it makes more difference how much consumption is to be forgone than what the mandatory payment is called.[46] When the government mandates that workers keep their contributions in government-approved accounts until retirement and then mandates that the contributions be used to purchase government-approved annuities, the difference between a contribution and a tax becomes even narrower.

The assumption that citizens prefer making mandatory contributions to individual accounts over paying a higher payroll tax would be on firmer ground if the actual choice were between alternative payments of approximately equal

[45] See footnote 40.

[46] If the current Social Security system were somehow dissolved and the 6.2 percent payroll tax were transformed into a mandatory 6.2 percent contribution, would citizens across the land celebrate the elimination of a 6.2 percent tax?

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size. Direct ownership is highly valued in American society; and, all else equal, people might prefer sending their money to individually-named accounts rather than to a giant collective account. The problem is that no one is being asked to choose between a tax and a contribution of the same magnitude. The choice is between an immediate contribution of 1.6 percent of wages under the Gramlich plan and a tax half as large and imposed a half century later under the Ball plan. If citizens really do prefer a large, immediate, mandatory contribution to a much smaller tax imposed far in the future (and no reliable evidence exists one way or the other), then it must be because they believe that the benefits from a contribution to an individual account are vastly more certain than the benefits from a tax. The appropriate question is how much extra are citizens willing to pay to increase their sense of confidence that benefits will be delivered far in the future? Since advance funding is crucial to establishing individual accounts, this is just a variant of the more general question concerning how much citizens are willing to pay to finance the transition to advance funding.

The Weaver-Schieber plan makes an even greater commitment to advance funding through defined-contribution accounts. It would redirect into personal security accounts 5 percentage points of the 6.2 percent that workers currently pay in Social Security taxes, while adopting a temporary transition tax of 0.76 percentage points each on employees and employers to cover obligations under the current pay-as-you-go system. As previously discussed, the Weaver-Schieber plan has a more politically realistic mechanism for increasing taxes than the Gramlich plan, because it retains the current parity between employer and employee contributions that allows workers' direct contributions to be half as large. The fact that the transition tax would be temporary is also a nice feature; but a seventy-two-year transition period offers no political advantages, because all the benefits would be enjoyed by generations not yet born.

The Ball plan requires no immediate tax increase, because it takes only a tiny step toward advance funding. Advance funding appears in this plan not by establishing individual investment accounts and finding new revenue to fill them, but by incorporating various small adjustments that would allow the current trust fund to grow larger and be invested more aggressively. The eventual tax increase of 0.8 percentage points each for workers and employers in 2045 is designed more to keep Social Security from again drifting out of balance as life spans continue to increase than it is to provide additional revenue for advance funding. Legislators should have no trouble approving a deferred tax increase of this magnitude, since the tax would never be imposed during their watch.

Despite the similarities among the three plans, with each proposing to increase Social Security revenues by about 1.6 percent of covered payrolls, the plans propose strikingly different routes toward that target. Surprisingly, the Gramlich plan, which was designed to be a moderate alternative between the other two, is the least graceful in imposing new taxes. The Weaver-Schieber plan, which proposes the most radical redesign of Social Security, is more politi-

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cally adept at dealing with transition costs, because it retains the traditional parity between workers' and employers' contributions. And the Ball plan shows that it might be possible to incorporate additional advance funding in the current system without increasing taxes in the near term.

Other Costs

The analysis of the various reform plans has focused heavily on how they raise new revenue, because this is the most difficult aspect of moving toward advance funding. Imposing large, traceable, early-order costs on citizens is one of the toughest things that elected officials ever do. The three reform plans impose lots of other costs too, but none of these provisions are quite as difficult to accomplish as raising taxes for all workers. For example, all three plans forcibly enroll in the Social Security system all new state and local government workers. The three plans wisely steer clear of forcing current state and local employees to join the system, since such a provision would impose large, traceable, early-order costs on a well-organized group of workers that is politically active. By limiting the provision to newly hired workers—people who are not yet aware of their condition—the plans minimize the probability of electoral retribution. Current estimates are that this provision alone would eliminate about 10 percent of Social Security's long-range actuarial imbalance, in part because young government workers would contribute for many years before collecting benefits, and in part because many of these workers would have received some Social Security benefits anyway, based on other employment before, during, or after government service.[47]

All three plans would also impose costs on current retirees and future retirees. Current retirees would bear the lighter burden. None of the plans would directly reduce their benefits—something that would be large and noticeable to all. Instead, the plans would gradually alter the way in which Social Security benefits are taxed and then redirect the consequent income tax revenues into the Social Security trust fund. Gradualism and the fact that these tax provisions would affect only some retirees help to make them politically more palatable. These provisions also continue a trend, initiated in the 1983 reform plan and expanded in the 1993 budget bill, to tax as ordinary income a portion of Social Security benefits. All that is at stake is the precise location of an already existing line between taxable and tax-free benefits.

The three plans use various means for imposing costs on future retirees. The Ball plan proposes changing the benefit formula. The proposed change would be gradual and, given that most people don't understand the benefit formula anyway, future retirees would be unlikely to trace their slightly dimin-

[47] Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 20, 181–183.

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ished incomes to legislators' actions.[48] The Gramlich plan proposes even larger changes in the benefit formula, as well as gradual increases in the normal retirement age. The Weaver-Schieber plan proposes gradually replacing the current benefit formula with a flat-rate benefit beginning with workers younger than 55. Finally, all three plans would subject future retirees to the same kinds of gradual changes in the way Social Security benefits are taxed that would first affect current retirees.

All three plans seem to accept the notion that reducing benefits should be a gradual process. Gradualism allows everyone to readjust their affairs, and it minimizes the chances that anyone would notice any dramatic reduction in benefits that might stimulate a search for politicians to hold accountable. The surprise is that the Gramlich and Weaver-Schieber plans do not recognize the same political need to impose tax increases as gradually as possible. Perhaps in their zeal to move toward an advance-funded system as rapidly as possible they neglected the political imperative to impose all pain as slowly and imperceptibly as possible.

Investment Decisions

The three plans differ most significantly in how they propose to invest all this advance funding. Before discussing the investment options, it is important to note that we are now entering terra incognita. Congress has had plenty of experience deciding how to raise payroll taxes, adjust benefit levels, extend retirement ages, and restrict tax exemptions; and these past experiences help to inform an analysis of how legislators might handle similar provisions today. But Congress has never before chosen between polar opposites as the Weaver-Schieber plan, which introduces defined-contribution accounts with individual control over investment and distribution, and the Ball plan, which seeks to preserve the essential character of the current defined-benefit system. The Ball and Weaver-Schieber plans clearly rest on very different philosophies about how to organize a public pension system and about the trade-offs between universal retirement security and the importance of individual choice. What is yet to be determined is how these differences will play out politically.

The Ball plan has the advantage of familiarity. People can judge the proposed incremental changes against a well known entity. The overall package is right out of the 1983 playbook. It is a carefully calibrated collection of incremental changes that would not be very popular individually but that many people can accept as a package deal in order to preserve a highly valued program.

[48] The proposal is to increase the benefit computation period from thirty-five to thirty-eight years, which would reduce benefits by an average of 3 percent. Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 25.

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The one innovation is the proposal to consider investing the trust fund in the stock market.[49] This is also the plan's most controversial provision. The controversy has nothing to do with the riskiness of the stock market. Given that most private pension funds and most state and local pension funds are heavily invested in the stock market, it is difficult to sustain an argument that the largest pension fund in the country should be denied the higher yields of equities or the substantial advantages of diversification. The controversy is about whether it is healthy for the federal government to own a larger share of corporate America than any other shareholder. Under one plausible scenario, the Social Security trust fund would own about 5 percent of all corporate equities by the year 2020.[50] Direct investments of this magnitude could give the government power in corporate affairs beyond what it already exercises with its tax and regulatory authority.

It is relatively easy to devise mechanisms to allow the federal government to invest in private equities without acquiring additional power over private corporations. The government could decide to invest only in index funds and it could renounce all voting rights.[51] It could create a governing board that is as far removed from politics as possible—something like the Federal Reserve Board. Indeed, it seems likely that any plan to invest trust fund assets in the stock market would have to include these kinds of procedures in order to forestall the overwhelming opposition of corporations, corporate executives, and millions of citizens who believe that the federal government has no business using investment decisions or voting rights to interfere with corporate affairs.

The problem is that government cannot permanently establish a policy of passive investing or passive voting, because a future law can always repeal an existing one. No Congress can bind succeeding Congresses. So the question boils down to whether citizens are comfortable with a plan that includes the possibility that a future Congress might interfere with investment decisions or corporate governance. The issue is sufficiently new that it requires an active debate about how serious is the problem, how large is the probability of governmental interference, and how best to forestall it.[52] The best protection against

[49] Although the Ball plan does not explicitly endorse investing in equities, the actuarial projections that compare it with the other two Advisory Council plans assume that 40 percent of the trust fund would be invested in equities by 2015. Without this assumption, the Ball plan would be underfunded and additional tax increases or benefit cuts would be required. See Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 80–86, 166.

[50] P. Brett Hammond and Mark J. Warshawsky, "Investing Social Security Funds in Stocks," *Benefits Quarterly* 13 (3rd Quarter 1997): 52–65.

[51] In cases where nonvoting is equivalent to voting on one side or the other, the government could vote its shares neutrally.

[52] See Theodore J. Angelis, "Investing Public Money in Private Markets: What are the Right Questions?" and Howell E. Jackson, "Regulatory Problems in Privatizing Social Security," both in Arnold, Graetz, and Munnell, eds., *Framing the Social Security Debate.* On activism by state and local pension funds, see Roberta Romano, "Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered," *Columbia Law Review* 93 (May 1993): 795–853.

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governmental interference is not just a well designed set of procedures but public support for the notion that the federal government should remain a passive investor. Public support would help to forestall future efforts to modify governmental procedures. Vigorous advocacy of this position by a diverse group of interests is the best way to create such support.

The proponents of the Weaver-Schieber plan are convinced that the consequences of governmental interference in corporate affairs are so serious that they oppose any trust fund investment in the stock market.[53] Their alternative solution is to redirect 5 percentage points of the payroll tax into personal security accounts that individual workers would select and control. The model for this approach is something like 401(k) pension plans or individual retirement accounts (IRAs). Their approach is almost certain to guarantee that the federal government would have no direct influence over investment decisions or corporate governance.

Two controversies surround this approach. First, would it be worth the additional costs to establish, administer, and maintain millions of personal security accounts rather than maintaining a single, centrally-managed trust fund, especially if the principal reason for personal accounts is simply to prevent any possibility of governmental influence with investment decisions and corporate governance? The extra costs would be substantial both for employers, who would direct contributions to the appropriate individual accounts, and for workers, who would have some fraction of their contributions consumed by annual maintenance charges.[54] The first cost would be a special problem for small employers and for those with lots of part-time workers; the second cost would be a special problem for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution and for part-time workers. One measure of the magnitude of the total costs is the enthusiasm of Wall Street firms for individual accounts. On Wall Street these costs are counted as benefits.

The second controversy is whether it makes sense to have millions of workers making separate investment decisions in a public pension program that would continue to be the foundation of retirement security for most Americans. Are all workers capable of making sound investment decisions? What happens if some workers mismanage their investments or fail to annuitize their account balances at retirement and end up dramatically worse off? The proponents of the Weaver-Schieber plan are remarkably sanguine about the ability of workers to manage decisions about investment and annuitization.[55] Empirical studies are less supportive of the notion that individuals make sound investment decisions.[56]

[53] Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 126–131.

[54] On the administrative costs for various type of retirement systems, see Olivia S. Mitchell, "Administrative Costs in Public and Private Retirement Systems," NBER Working Paper No. 5734 (1996).

[55] Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 114–117.

[56] See James M. Poterba and David A. Wise, "Individual Financial Decisions in Retirement Saving Plans and the Provision of Resources for Retirement," NBER Working Paper No. 5762 (1996); Employee Benefit Research Institute, "Worker Investment Decisions: An Analysis of Large 401(k) Plan

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The two controversies together introduce question of fairness across income classes, educational brackets, and the like. Would the poor pay disproportionate administrative costs because their contributions are so small? Does the plan favor well educated workers or workers with particular skills because they are better able to manage their financial affairs? These are important political questions that have not been part of the Social Security debate since the program's inception. They are also the kinds of questions that tend to divide the two parties.

The Gramlich plan occupies the middle ground on investment decisions, annuitization, and the trade-off between individual choice and retirement security. The plan maintains more of the current defined-benefit system and squirrels away in individual accounts only about one-third as much money as the Weaver-Schieber plan (1.6 percent of earnings rather than 5 percent). The proposal also restricts individuals to only a few centrally managed investment options and requires full annuitization of account balances at retirement. The plan clearly comes down more heavily on the side of retirement security than on maximizing individual choice.[57] But it does so by increasing the possibility that a future Congress might abandon passive investing or choose to exercise its voting rights. Under the Gramlich plan, the possibility of government interference is less than it is for the Ball plan, because the new accounts would belong to named individuals; but the protection is not as great as it is in the Weaver-Schieber plan, where the accounts would not be centrally managed at all.[58]

Political Packaging

Most of the alternative schemes for reforming Social Security have been designed by experts on Social Security. Although Congress and the president could choose to adopt one of these prepackaged plans, they are more likely to design their own package. They need to design a plan that can appeal to a diverse coalition of interests in Congress and across the country. Although the

Data," *EBRI Issue Brief Number 176* (August 1996); Diamond, "Macroeconomic Aspects of Social Security Reform."

[57] The philosophical differences are best observed as the proponents of one plan critique another plan. Weaver, Schieber, et al. on the Gramlich plan: "Our first concern is that this option simply contains far more restrictions on workers' choices than we deem necessary or desirable. The option sharply limits workers' investment choices. . . . The plan also forces workers to annuitize their full accumulations at retirement." Gramlich and Twinney on the Weaver-Schieber plan: "The PSA plan permits workers attaining age 62 full access to their accounts that have been accumulated over an entire working career. The government is in effect saying to people that it does not trust them to save for the future when they are younger than 62, so it requires them to hold PSAs. But once these people become 62, they suddenly become wise and responsible, and the government no longer requires them to preserve their assets beyond that date." Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 129, 157.

[58] Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 129–131; Diamond, "Macroeconomic Aspects of Social Security Reform."

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exact mechanism for drafting such a plan has yet to be determined, it is likely that the drafters will be dominated by political experts who are skilled at assembling coalitions for difficult issues.

The menu of options available to policy makers is much greater than the prepackaged plans discussed above, or even all the specific provisions contained in these plans. Policy makers can choose to modify tax rates, benefit formulas, transition schedules, retirement ages, cost-of-living adjustments, tax exemptions, investment options, annuitization rules, and the balance between individual and collective accounts in an extraordinary number of ways and still return Social Security to actuarial balance.[59] Indeed, the amateur policy maker can design quite a few alternative plans just by choosing provisions from a menu of alternatives that the Social Security actuaries prepared for the Advisory Council.[60] For each of eighty-two separate provisions, the actuaries have estimated the impact on Social Security's long-range actuarial balance.[61] Policy makers can ask the actuaries to provide similar estimates for any other provisions that they find appealing.

Rank-and-file legislators will never have the opportunity to vote on all the individual provisions that are part of a final package. A reform package will probably be assembled by a presidential commission, a bipartisan executive-legislative panel, the House Ways and Means Committee, or the Senate Finance Committee; and then legislators will be given the opportunity to approve or reject the final package. Many of the provisions will be individually distasteful, and legislators would never approve them if they had to vote on them one by one. Many legislators would fear electoral retribution for imposing specific costs on citizens that they could easily trace back to legislators' individual roll-call votes. Instead, the package will be framed as an overall plan to rescue Social Security, one that imposes significant costs on lots of people but that does so fairly and in order to achieve a common and popular end.

The job of the drafters is to design a plan that both citizens and legislators perceive to be fair. Public opinion will surely be important to how legislators decide, but the consequential opinions will not be the snap judgments reflected in polls taken about abstract proposals. The opinions that matter will be those that evolve during the period when Congress and the president focus on specific proposals. Citizens' opinions will be shaped by politicians' rhetoric, by the actions of interest groups and the champions of various causes, and by the way the mass media cover the unfolding story. Also relevant is how legislators anticipate that public opinion might evolve after a plan is approved and implemented.[62]

[59] For a discussion of the range of options for dealing with the actuarial imbalance, see Advisory Council, *Reports of the Technical Panels*, 63–92.

[60] Advisory Council, *Findings and Recommendations*, 231–239.

[61] The aim is to pick a set of alternatives that together amount to 2.17 percent of taxable payrolls over the next 75 years (the estimated difference between Social Security's revenues and expenses).

[62] On how legislators anticipate future preferences, see Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action.*

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The Search for New Options

Given that the greatest impediment to privatization is the need to fund two systems for a while, politicians who favor full or partial privatization are actively searching for ways to reduce the transition costs. One approach is to dedicate all or part of the federal government's looming surpluses to reducing these costs. President Clinton stimulated a search for policy alternatives of this type when he declared in his 1998 State of the Union address that Congress should reserve every penny of the surplus for saving Social Security. His proposal was probably designed to block Republican legislators from adopting a new round of tax cuts and to give all legislators a strong incentive to solve the Social Security problem before dissipating the surplus on their favorite spending programs. No matter what his intent, Clinton's proposal is not neutral toward the various approaches to reform. It advances the cause of privatization—or at least partial privatization—more than it helps those who seek to maintain the current system.

To be sure, budget surpluses could be used to help shore up the current system. But the system is not in desperate need of revenue in the near term. Although Social Security clearly needs to have its revenue and benefit streams recalibrated to forestall long-term problems caused by demographic shifts, an infusion of cash today would only postpone the day of reckoning. A second problem is that Congress needs to devise a mechanism that can effectively reserve the looming surpluses for Social Security. The surpluses will not occur in the operating budget, where deficits continue to be large, but in the unified budget, where annual surpluses in the Social Security account mask annual deficits in the operating accounts. The challenge is to create a mechanism—no smoke and mirrors allowed—that allows surpluses in the unified budget to benefit Social Security when the surpluses are already attributable to surpluses in the Social Security accounts. The challenge is also to prevent future politicians from dismantling the mechanism the next time they need revenue for the operating budget.

The situation is very different for the proponents of partial privatization. They have a desperate need for additional revenue in the near term to reduce the costs of funding two systems. Federal surpluses are just the windfall they need to fund part of the transition. One proponent has already designed a clever mechanism that not only diverts surpluses to this end but also prevents future politicians from redirecting the accrued surpluses to other ends. In March 1998, John Kasich (R-OH), chair of the House Budget Committee, proposed placing most of the surplus into individual retirement accounts for each worker. Individuals could choose how to invest these funds from a list of government-approved options; they could not withdraw funds before retirement.

The Kasich plan has several political advantages. First, it jump-starts privatization by creating and funding individual accounts before Congress and the president settle all the long-term issues about Social Security reform, including

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whether to create a new defined-contribution system of individual accounts and what should be the balance between this new system and the current system. Once all these individual accounts are established, however, they provide both a precedent and the infrastructure for investing a portion of workers' payroll taxes in individual accounts. It is stealth privatization. Second, the Kasich plan launches privatization without Congress first having to increase taxes. It avoids the principal stumbling block in other privatization plans. Third, by placing the accrued surpluses in individual accounts, the plan places the money beyond the reach of future politicians who might be tempted to use it for other ends. Finally, it allows Republicans to claim that they have delivered another round of tax cuts, the only difference being that taxpayers cannot spend this particular windfall until retirement. It is a clever political package that makes the transition to partial privatization much easier, especially for those Republicans who consider that raising taxes is heresy.[63]

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), the senior Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee, has proposed a different route to partial privatization. Not only does his plan avoid the need for a tax increase, it allows for an immediate tax cut. He proposes reducing the current payroll tax from 12.4 percent to 10.4 percent and allowing workers to use the 2 percent cut to establish voluntary personal savings accounts. Moynihan avoids any transition costs by reducing benefits and by returning Social Security to its pay-as-you-go roots, with just a small contingency reserve. Reversing the planned growth in the trust fund means that the tax rate would eventually drift upwards as the baby-boom generation retires; but the eventual tax increase would be relatively modest, because the benefit cuts between now and then are quite large. The cuts include lowering cost-of-living adjustments by one percentage point a year for current and future retirees, taxing Social Security benefits under the same rules used for private pensions, and continuing to increase the retirement age as life expectancy increases.

The Moynihan plan for partial privatization has much in common with the Gramlich plan. Both plans create a system of individual accounts that would coexist with a slimmed-down version of the current defined-benefit plan. The principal difference between the two plans reflects the authors' occupational roots. Gramlich, the economist, views with alarm the low rate of national savings; he has devised a plan that would increase national savings as quickly as possible by requiring a mandatory contribution of 1.6 percent of taxable wages to an individual investment account. Moynihan, the practicing politician, sees little support among other practicing politicians for forcibly extracting that much additional revenue from workers. So, his individual accounts are to be voluntary, and the combined voluntary contribution and mandatory tax are to

[63] On 1 April 1998, in the first test of the popularity of this proposal, the Senate adopted, 51–49, a nonbinding resolution calling for dedicating the 1998 budget surplus to establishing Social Security personal retirement accounts. The vote revealed deep partisan divisions. Republicans supported the resolution, 49-6; Democrats opposed it, 43–2.

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be no larger than the current tax rate. All the pain in Moynihan's plan is in the future—benefit reductions that are phased in gradually and a series of relatively small tax increases that are imposed in the distant future.

The Prospects for Reform

The most important political fact about the Social Security program is that it is the status quo alternative. Do nothing and the program continues. Permanently established in law, Social Security requires neither annual appropriations nor any other type of regular political maintenance. Until Congress and the president agree on how to change the program, payroll taxes keep rolling in and benefit payments keep flowing out, all according to the tax and benefit formulas that were last revised in 1983. To be sure, the current formulas are not sustainable in perpetuity. Annual revenues, supplemented by the trust fund, are adequate to cover all benefit payments for only the next three decades. From a politician's perspective, however, three decades is a very long time.

The one position that virtually everyone who studies Social Security shares is that reforming Social Security expeditiously is preferable to waiting until the problem becomes more severe. No matter how painful some of the remedies seem today, each remedy becomes more expensive as time marches on. If Congress chooses the traditional remedy of raising taxes, it could restore actuarial balance over the next seventy-five years by increasing the payroll tax by 1.3 percentage points each for employees and employers no later than 2002. If it waits another twenty years, it would need to increase the payroll tax by 2 percentage points each. Alternatively, if Congress decides to restore actuarial balance by reducing benefits for new retirees, it would need to reduce benefits by 21 percent beginning in 2002, but by 34 percent beginning in 2022.[64] Delay is even tougher for the proponents of advance funding. Each year the unfunded liability grows larger. Eventually the combined cost of supporting two systems becomes prohibitive. If Congress does nothing until the trust fund is exhausted in 2032, it would require a payroll tax of 8.9 percent each for employees and employers just to pay the next year's promised benefits, plus whatever Congress decides should be set aside for a new advance-funded system.[65]

Those who seek to preserve something like the current system have the advantage that Social Security is a well known and popular program. Although preserving the current system would require difficult decisions about increasing taxes, cutting benefits, or extending the retirement age, these are decisions about which Congress has a great deal of experience. Skeptics sometimes argue that times have changed and that it is no longer possible for Congress to enact these traditional remedies. What the skeptics fail to appreciate is that it was always difficult for legislators to increase payroll taxes and cut benefits. Politi-

[64] Advisory Council, *Reports of the Technical Panels*, 66.
[65] Board of Trustees, *The 1998 Annual Report*, 108.

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cians struggled to save the system in 1983. No one wanted to enact the remedies that legislators eventually approved. The argument that times have changed is also undermined by the fact that over the past half-dozen years Congress has approved both tax increases and benefit cuts for the rest of the federal budget. Many people were equally skeptical that Congress could enact those painful provisions.

Those who seek to replace the current defined-benefit system with a defined-contribution system have the tougher row to hoe. They are attempting to sell something new and different, and innovation is a difficult sell in any political system. To be sure, their cause is helped by obvious similarities with such devices as individual retirement accounts, 401(k) plans, and mutual funds. It would have been inconceivable to enact something like the Weaver-Schieber plan or the Kotlikoff-Sachs plan in 1935. The greatest impediment to establishing individual accounts, however, is the need to fund two systems for a while. There is no free lunch here. If citizens want the benefits of an advance-funded system, with or without individual accounts, they must either increase their retirement contributions or accept a reduction in benefits. The closest thing to a free lunch is the unexpected surplus in the federal budget that could be used to fund part of the transition cost.

Although it is encouraging to see that President Clinton featured Social Security reform in his State of the Union address, proposed a White House conference for December 1998, and called for congressional action during 1999, it is impossible to overstate the obstacles to timely reform. The principal obstacle is the lack of a consensus on what Social Security should be. The debate today is not merely about tax rates and benefit levels—the traditional arena for Social Security politics. It is about the basic structure of the system. Altering the structure of any government program is always difficult, but it is especially so for a program that affects virtually everyone in American society.

A second obstacle to timely reform is the lack of an action-forcing crisis. Compromise is easiest when the failure to compromise creates a disaster. Essential to the reform of Social Security in 1983 was the fact that the trust fund was empty and revenues were insufficient to cover all benefit checks. No one wanted to be held accountable for reduced Social Security benefits. Essential to the annual budgetary agreements between Congress and the president is that failure to agree can lead to a government shutdown—a consequence that some politicians found appealing before they tried it several times. Unfortunately, the next action-forcing crisis for Social Security is penciled in for 2032.

Social Security reform today requires that political leaders come together and search for common ground. The search must be bipartisan, not simply because both Democrats and Republicans must join together to enact a reform plan, but because a bipartisan agreement is essential to selling a compromise plan to the American people. The chance that the American people will embrace a reform plan is far greater if Republican and Democratic leaders agree

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that the plan is fair than if they resort to partisan bickering as they did when they considered health-care reform.

No one can know today the exact contours of a plan that Republican and Democratic leaders might design months or years from now. What seems certain, however, is that politicians will pay special attention to how costs are imposed. Partial privatization may well be part of a compromise plan, but only if its advocates can devise acceptable ways of funding the transition to advance-funded individual accounts.*

* I am grateful to Peter Diamond, Josh Goldstein, Alicia Munnell, and Virginia Reno for helpful advice and comments. I have also profited from conversations with my colleagues on the Panel on Privatization of Social Security of the National Academy of Social Insurance and with the graduate students in the Arnold-Goldstein workshop on Social Security reform.

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War Powers, Bosnia, and the 104th Congress

RYAN C. HENDRICKSON

The question of who has the constitutional authority to use U.S. troops in armed conflict has been controversial since the founding of the Republic. As shown after the deaths of eighteen U.S. Army Rangers in Somalia in 1993, the struggle between the president and Congress over war powers remains in U.S. foreign policy. The issue has grown increasingly complex as U.S. presidents have used United Nations Security Council resolutions as legal justification for their deployments abroad. Since World War II, Congress has deferred to the president in foreign affairs, especially in the decision to use force.[1] Analysts contend that Congress does not want to take political responsibility for use of force abroad,[2] and that during the cold war Congress did not want to publicly challenge the president on constitutional grounds in the struggle against communism.[3] Yet, in 1995 a number of conditions existed for the potential reassertion of congressional war powers. An assertive and highly ideological Republican majority in the 104th Congress was very skeptical of U.S. participation in UN deployments. The president was perceived by many as weak in

[1] See Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Stephen R. Weissman, *A Culture of Deference* (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Barbara Hinckley, *Less than Meets the Eye* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Gary M. Stern and Morton Halperin eds., *The U.S. Constitution and the Power To Go To War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); John Hart Ely, *War and Responsibility* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[2] Weissman, *A Culture of Deference*; Fisher, *Presidential War Power*; and David P. Forsythe and Ryan C. Hendrickson, "U.S. Use of Force Abroad: What Law for the President?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26 (Fall 1996): 950–961.

[3] Joseph S. Nye, "The Domestic Environment of U.S. Policy Making" in Arnold L. Horblick, ed., *U.S.–Soviet Relations: The Next Phase* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Stephen F. Knott, *Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996).

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foreign policy,[4] and the cold war had ended, indicating that it may be more difficult for the president to use force against noncommunists without congressional oversight. Thus it can be argued that an environment existed for substantial change between Congress and the president in foreign policy making. If there ever was a time to break the war powers practice of deference to the commander in chief, the 104th Congress should have been a likely candidate to challenge the norm.

Yet, in the Republicans' first major foreign policy challenge vis-à-vis the president, Congress succumbed to President Bill Clinton's designs by failing to prevent the deployment of 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia. This article examines two key aspects of the interplay between Congress and the president over war powers, focusing on the 104th Congress's acquiescence to President Clinton and American participation in the UN Implementation Force (IFOR), which authorized U.S. troops to use force in Bosnia. First, I contend that Congress deferred to the president, despite the cold war's absence and the presence of a highly partisan and ostensibly assertive Congress. Second, I address the actual decision to defer to the president, answering why Congress chose to let the president deploy U.S. ground troops to the former Yugoslavia. In doing so, I maintain that new insights are gained on the war powers interplay. I argue that the Republican party leadership, the timing of the vote vis-à-vis other Republican policy agenda items, and the politically expedient vote crafted by the Republican majority to "support the troops but not the policy" all help explain why deference remained the norm. Moreover, I show that President Clinton used a novel strategy for recent commander in chiefs of tacit consultation with Congress.

The article begins with a discussion of why reasonable expectations existed for the 104th Congress to challenge the norm of deference and follows with evidence supporting Congress's decision to let the president have his way in Bosnia. It continues with an analysis of the reasons for deference in December 1995 and concludes with a discussion of the future implications of these findings for U.S. foreign policy and the U.S. status as a constitutional democracy.

The New Republican Majority

In 1995, the 104th Congress—especially House Republicans—took their seats in Washington with a spirited vigor to make policy change. The new Republican majority in the House and the Senate sought to revamp U.S. foreign policy, in particular the U.S. relationship with the United Nations and peacekeeping operations. With its newfound power, the Republican Congress exhibited an uncommon behavior in that the majority party appeared interested in and gen-

[4] See Maureen Dowd, "The Gap: Guess Who's Coming to Diplomacy" *New York Times*, 25 September 1994; Jonathan Clarke, "Rhetoric Before Reality," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (September/October 1995): 2-7; Richard N. Haass, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (January/February 1995): 43–58; Stanley Hoffman, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1995): 159–179.

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uinely committed to establishing a new role for Congress in U.S. foreign policy making. Their fervor stemmed in part from the "Contract with America."

The "Contract" was formulated during the 1994 midterm election cycle. Its aim was to provide voters with a clear issue platform of what House Republicans were committed to if given majority status. They promised to vote on the "Contract's" ten issues within the first 100 days of the 104th Congress. In the area of foreign policy, the "National Security Restoration Act," the "Contract" read: "No U.S. troops under UN command and restoration of the essential parts of our national security funding to strengthen our own national defense and maintain credibility around the world."[5] Once the House Republicans gained majority status, they took their pledges seriously. Even though very few American voters actually knew what the "Contract" was, House Republicans claimed that their victory and the "Contract" defined a legislative mandate for change.[6]

Republican discourse regarding President Clinton's foreign policy and the participation in United Nations peacekeeping was generally quite critical. Although it was not the first time a president had faced a hostile Congress over U.S. relations with the United Nations,[7] congressional vehemence aimed at U.S. foreign policy was striking. For example, on whether the "Contract" was a true "mandate" from the people on foreign policy, new House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-TX) stated, "It's a statement by the Congress that we, too, have heard the voice of the American people. . . . The nation has gone too far in the direction of globalism."[8] Later in 1995, Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) stated that the United Nations is "a collection of tin-pot dictators and corrupt regimens from around the world. . . . Everything done through the United Nations can be better accomplished on a bilateral basis."[9] House Republicans were especially motivated by the fiasco in Somalia in which eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed by armed Somalian clans and thus sought to avoid similar peacekeeping missions.

With a mood of this nature resonating among Republicans, the National Security Revitalization Act was introduced on 4 January 1995.[10] In the bill, Republicans hoped to achieve a number of goals. Most relevant to this study is the reassertion of congressional powers regarding UN peacekeeping deployments.

[5] Quoted in Clyde Wilcox, *The Latest American Revolution*? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 70.

[6] Ibid., 21; and Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections*, 4th ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1997), 162.

[7] Robert W. Gregg, *About Face? The United States and the United Nations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993); and David P. Forsythe, *The Politics of International Law* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

[8] Quoted in Pat Towell, "House Votes to Sharply Reign in U.S. Peacekeeping Expenses," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 February 1995, 535.

[9] Quoted in Donna Cassata, "As UN Marks its 50th Year, Congress Demands Change," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 21 October 1995, 3214.

[10] *Congressional Record*, 104th Congress, 1st sess., 4 January 1995, E 24.

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Titles III, IV, and V of the act dealt specifically with Congress's role vis-à-vis the UN Security Council. In a House Committee summary of Title IV, the new proposals required that any agreement regarding international peace and security made between the U.S. president and the United Nations Security Council would also demand approval from Congress.[11] These proposals differ little from the statutory language of the UN Participation Act in 1945. Before approving it, Congress demanded the implementation of Article 43 in the UN Charter, which required that prior to U.S. participation in UN military deployments, the "constitutional process" of members states must be satisfied. Once the president negotiated a "special agreement" with the Security Council to provide troops for a mission, U.S. participation was subject to "the approval of the Congress by appropriate act or joint resolution."[12] Although the legislative intent of the UN participation has never been fulfilled by either the president or Congress since the United Nations inception, with a new partisan and highly ideological Republican majority in 1995, it now appeared that the Republicans were seriously committed to a new role for Congress in UN deployment decisions.

Other key provisions of the 1995 bill demanded that any U.S. forces assisting in a UN operation must serve under a U.S. commander, and that Congress must be informed fifteen days in advance of any UN Security Council vote on requests for additional funding for peacekeeping missions. The House also wanted to restrict the transfer of U.S. intelligence to the United Nations by requiring prior approval from Congress before any information was shared with the United Nations.[13]

About these proposals, Dana Rohrabacher added: "This is America comes first as policy. . . . Americans have sacrificed their lives and well-being for an ungrateful world for far too long."[14] Representative Toby Roth (R-WI) added: "The reason we have a "Contract with America" is because we want to put Congress back into the loop in the decision making process when it comes to peacekeeping."[15] Although there was opposition to the bill from some Democrats, the bill passed in the Committee on National Security by a 41-13 vote.[16] The bill later passed on the House floor, 241-181, with near unanimous Republican support.[17] Thus, there were clear signs that a congressional ascent had oc-

[11] Larry Combest, "Report: National Security Revitalization Act," International Relations Committee, House of Representatives, Rept. 104–18, Part 3, 6 February 1995.

[12] 59 Stat. 621, sec. 6 (1945). See also Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 79–84; and Jane Stromseth, "Treaty Constraints: The United Nations Charter and War Powers" in Stern and Halperin eds., *The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War*.

[13] Floyd Spence, "Report: National Security Revitalization Act," International Relations Committee, House of Representatives, Part 1, 6 February 1995.

[14] Towell, "House Votes to Sharply Reign," 535.

[15] *Congressional Record*, 16 February 1995, H 1862.

[16] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Almanac Press, 1995), 9–16.

[17] Ibid., H-40. The act was slightly watered down by Doug Bereuter's (R-NE) proposal to allow the president to deploy troops under UN authorization if U.S. national security interests were at stake. Ibid., 9–18.

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curred in which the president would be checked by the House in many aspects of his foreign policy pursuits—especially deployments sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Ostensibly, the House was going to exercise its war powers.

In the Senate, members were also reevaluating presidential powers and the use of force abroad. On the first legislative day of the 104th Congress, Senate majority leader and aspiring president, Bob Dole (R-KS) along with nine cosponsors, introduced the Peace Powers Act.[18] Dole, who had originally supported the War Powers Resolution (WPR) in 1973, maintained that the WPR had led to greater tensions between the White House and Congress. He argued that the president needed greater flexibility as commander in chief, stating the need to "untie the President's hands in the use of force to defend U.S. interests."[19] Yet Dole also felt that the president needed greater limitations on his ability to deploy troops in UN operations. Thus, Dole's Peace Powers Act called for a repeal of the War Powers Resolution, but retained the WPR's language concerning "consultation" with Congress: "The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent hostilities are clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations."[20]

His act also restated the language employed in the United Nations Participation Act regarding Congress's role in UN military deployments: "Any special agreement or agreements negotiated by the President with the Security Council providing for the numbers and types of United States Armed Forces . . . to be made available to the Security Council for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by Act or joint resolution."[21]

The Peace Powers Act did little to solve the longstanding problem of defining "consultation" as stipulated in the War Powers Act,[22] nor did Dole's proposal offer a novel legal interpretation of Article 43.[23] Yet, Dole and his cosponsors were seeking a new and much more intrusive legislative posture for Congress in peacekeeping deployments. By offering the bill on the first legislative day of Congress and by repeating the WPR's consultation aspects and the relevant sections of the UN Participation Act, Dole's commitment to give Con-

[18] Dole had earlier introduced another version of his Peace Powers Act in 1994. See *Congressional Record*, 103rd Congress, 2nd sess., 25 January 1994, S 180.

[19] *Congressional Record*, 4 January 1995, S 101.

[20] Ibid. Dole also kept the reporting requirements as set forth in the WPR.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ellen C. Collier, "Statutory Constraints: The War Powers Resolution" in Stern and Halperin, eds., *The U.S. Constitution and the Power To Go To War*, 77.

[23] Stromseth, "Treaty Constraints: The United Nations Charter and War Powers"; and Fisher, *Presidential War Powers*.

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gress a greater say in troop deployments under the United Nations appears genuine.

At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee that dealt with both the Peace Powers Act and the National Security Revitalization Act in March 1995, in a rare move for a majority leader, Dole appeared before the committee to make his case. He repeated his desire to repeal the War Powers Resolution, but also argued that "we need to rein in the blank check on UN peacekeeping."[24] Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) also referred to Congress's "peace powers" oversight and argued that with Dole's legislation, some congressional responsibility would be restored.[25]

Despite the committee's attention given to Dole's and the House's legislative initiatives, the Senate acted no further on either of these proposals. Recognizing that Clinton would have vetoed Dole's legislation, and with a doubtful two-thirds majority in the Senate to override the president's veto, Senate leaders likely decided to avoid embarrassing one of their stronger Republican presidential challengers and simply dropped the issue. However, the Republicans' mood undeniably demonstrated a willingness to redefine the legal specifics of war powers, with Congress positioning itself as a meaningful legal player in troop deployment decisions.

Later in the summer of 1995, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL) offered an amendment to repeal the WPR. It kept the consultation and reporting requirements of the WPR, but eliminated the sixty-day clock that required a troop withdrawal if Congress had not yet approved of the mission.[26] Speaker Newt Gingrich supported the amendment by arguing that the presidency needed to be strengthened in foreign affairs and national security, which seemingly challenges the House's overall reassertion of congressional war powers.[27] Yet Hyde's proposal is different from the issue of UN peacekeeping and did not reflect Congress's feelings on U.S. participation in UN operations. While many Republicans theoretically wanted a powerful commander-in-chief, this was not the case with UN deployments. Congressman Hyde's primary motive was to strengthen U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis an enemy who might seek to exploit the sixty-day clock to his advantage. The Republicans who voted against Hyde's amendment also noted that with the potential of a deployment to Bosnia, it made little sense to vote for a repeal because of the WPR's value as a legislative and symbolic tool to check the president's powers as commander-in-chief.[28] Gingrich's commitment to the amendment is also suspect because of the pres-

[24] Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, "The Peace Powers Act (S.5) and the National Security Revitalization Act (H.R. 7)," 21 March 1995, 63.

[25] Ibid., 25.

[26] *Congressional Record*, 7 June 1995, H 5655-H 5656.

[27] Ibid., H5672.

[28] Carroll J. Doherty, "House Approves Overhaul of Agencies, Policies," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 10 June 1995, 1656.

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ence of a highly cohesive and well disciplined new Republican majority, which Gingrich could not deliver. The amendment failed in a 201-217 vote.[29]

The President

While the Republicans attempted to assert a congressional role in U.S. participation in UN operations, pressure was also placed on Clinton's policy in Bosnia. Central to the analysis is the extent to which Congress influenced the decision(s) to use American force in Bosnia. Soon after Bill Clinton became president, he pledged that the United States would provide 20,000 U.S. troops in a peacekeeping force if a comprehensive peace plan was established for the former Yugoslavia.[30] Prior to the Republican take-over of Congress, Clinton had also engaged U.S. troops in five airstrikes on Bosnian-Serb targets in 1994. These bombing raids were conducted under the authority of NATO and had approval from the UN Security Council.[31] For these bombings, Clinton argued that with the Security Council's support, as commander-in-chief, and "under his powers to conduct foreign policy" he had constitutional authority to allow U.S. troops to participate in military combat.[32] In May 1994 the president also announced Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25—a new outline of the U.S. role in UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. In a summary of the report, Section VII stated that Congress was to play a substantial role in U.S. foreign policy making regarding UN operations.[33] However, since the announcement of PDD 25, the U.S. deployment in Haiti, and the 1994 NATO bombings, the 103rd Congress had played a minimal role in these decisions to use force. The reality of PDD 25 was that little had changed. The president continued to act independently of Congress, and the legislature remained passive on the legal specifics of these operations.

Once the Republicans introduced their new legislation in January 1995, Clinton reacted sharply and worked to prevent any limitations on the president's perceived powers. In a letter to Gingrich, Clinton argued that the National Security Revitalization Act harmed U.S. interests by limiting his constitutional powers. He claimed that the act unconstitutionally limited his authority to place U.S. troops under temporary foreign command and wrote that require-

[29] *Congressional Record*, 7 June 1995, H 5673.

[30] Bill Clinton, "Remarks at a Town Meeting in Detroit," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 10 February 1993; and "The President's News Conference with President Francois Mitterand of France," *Public Papers of the Presidents,* 9 March 1993.

[31] Bill Clinton, "US Support of UN Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Department of State Dispatch*, 19 April 1993.

[32] Bill Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia," *Public Papers of the Presidents,* 1 March 1994; and Bill Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Public Papers of the Presidents,* 12 April 1994.

[33] Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State Publication 10161, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," May 1994.

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ment of consultations with Congress would limit his ability to respond "swiftly and proportionally" to protect U.S. interests abroad.[34] In another letter to congressional leaders, the president lobbied members to accept a strong role for the United Nations in American foreign policy.[35] Both U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright and Secretary of State Warren Christopher also spoke out against the Republicans' foreign policy initiatives.[36] Sensing the pressures from Congress, Clinton worked hard to protect his perceived constitutional powers against the new Republican initiatives. The president clearly recognized the potential risk that the Republicans posed to his administration's perceived constitutional powers.

Bosnia and the Use of Force

While Clinton faced constitutional challenges to his perceived authority as commander-in-chief, he was also faced with an assertive Congress on his Bosnia policy specifically. By the first part of April 1995, congressional evidence of massive human rights abuses was mounting against the Bosnian Serbs. Members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Committee, including co-chair Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) and Representative Steny H. Hoyer (R-MD) argued that NATO had failed and that new action must be taken.[37] Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole also placed a great deal of public pressure on Clinton's policy in Bosnia by calling for an end to the UN-imposed arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia.[38]

As congressional pressure mounted and as human rights violations continued in Bosnia, the president resorted to NATO bombings. U.S. participation in these strikes occurred on 25 and 26 May and on 11 July 1995. On neither occasion did Clinton file a letter with congressional leaders notifying them of the attacks, nor did the new Republican majority react with constitutional concern over his decision. More importantly, there was virtually no congressional challenge to Clinton's legal authority to conduct the bombings. Constitutional questions on Clinton's authority to use force were simply not addressed.

In between the NATO bombings, the House Committee on International Relations met to discuss American policy in Bosnia. Chairman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) stated the necessity for consultation between Congress and the

[34] Bill Clinton, "Communication for the President of the United States: H.R. 872," *House Document 104–35*, 14 February 1995.

[35] Bill Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 13 February 1995.

[36] Madeleine Albright, "Advancing American Interests Through the United Nations," Department of State Dispatch, 20 February 1995; Warren Christopher, "Maintaining the Instruments of America's Global Leadership," Department of State Dispatch, 6 March 1995.

[37] Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina," U.S. House of Representatives, 4 April 1995.

[38] Carroll J. Doherty, "Bosnia's Weapon in the U.S." *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 July 1995, 2283.

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White House prior to the deployment of any ground troops.[39] Doug Bereuter (R-NE) likewise emphasized the importance of "real" consultation, which in his view went beyond mere committee hearings.[40] Thus, Republican House leaders were posturing themselves for a battle with the president if ground troops were to be deployed.

By midsummer, Clinton's Bosnia policy was in deep trouble as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was in dire need of help. The Bosnian Serbs had embarrassed the United States and the United Nations by overrunning Srebrenica—a UN "safe enclave"—and by taking thirty Dutch peacekeepers hostage in mid-July. U.S. Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady was shot down in flight over Bosnia by the Bosnian Serbs, prompting a strong reaction from Congress. Congressional concern escalated significantly in August when both the House and Senate passed resolutions requiring the president to end U.S. participation in the arms embargo.[41]

In late August, President Clinton responded to these developments by authorizing substantial airstrikes against the Bosnian-Serbs. Under NATO auspices, 3,500 sorties occurred, in which U.S. bombers conducted 2,318 of the raids.[42] In his legal defense, Clinton said he "authorized these actions in conjunction with our NATO allies to implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and NATO decisions."[43] He also relied upon claims "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive."[44] Congress's response, just as it had been earlier in the year to NATO's bombings, was virtual silence. Both chambers were quite passive considering the gravity of NATO's conduct.[45] Congress was willing to verbally reprimand the president for not taking action, but did not place themselves on record in an up or down vote supporting NATO's conduct. In doing so, Congress could lambaste Clinton for not taking action, while at the same time reserve criticism for a later date if the bombings resulted in American deaths. Congress employed a wait-and-see approach, while avoiding any constitutional responsibility for American participation in the NATO attacks.

Congressional Deference Reigns

After the August NATO bombings, a cease fire arrangement was signed between the three main factions in Bosnia, and it looked as if there was a strong

[39] Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, "Situation in Bosnia," 8 June 1995, 2.

[40] Ibid., 22.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Rick Atkinson, "With Deliberate Force in Bosnia," *Washington Post Weekly*, 27 November-3 December 1995, 6.

[43] Bill Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 1 September 1995.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Congressman Bill Baker (R-CA) did oppose the bombing, but most members of Congress said very little. *Congressional Record*, 14 September 1995, H 8913.

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possibility for a more comprehensive peace agreement for the region. Now, the president would be called upon by U.S. allies to honor his previous peacekeeping promise.

Prior to the October 1995 peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, Clinton's chief of staff, Leon Panetta, indicated on NBC's *Meet the Press* that if a peacekeeping force were to be deployed, the president would consult with Congress. Yet Panetta also stated that the president would not give up his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief.[46] In discussing a potential deployment, Secretary of State Christopher stated: "We want Congress's approval. . . . We consult very much with them."[47] Moreover, the president indicated that he would consult with Congress over a possible deployment. He stated: "The United States will not be sending its forces into combat in Bosnia. We will not send them into a peace that cannot be maintained. But we must use our power to secure that peace. I have pledged to consult with Congress before authorizing our participation in such an action. These consultations have already begun."[48] While the peace talks were in progress, Vice President Al Gore also told some members of Congress that the president would not act unilaterally and Congress would have the opportunity to debate the deployment.[49] And Clinton sent a letter to Gingrich, indicating that Congress would be consulted after the negotiations were complete.[50]

However, once President Clinton addressed the nation on 26 November, after a comprehensive peace accord was reached, in many ways the decision to send troops to Bosnia appeared to have been made. In his address, the president stated: "I want you to know what is at stake, exactly what our troops will be asked to accomplish, and why we must carry out this mission. . . . In Bosnia we can and will succeed because our mission is clear and limited."[51] Clinton's remarks implied that the mission was essentially on its way. However, Clinton also said that if the NATO plan of action met his approval, he would "immediately send it to Congress and request its support."[52] With this statement, the president did not necessarily appear committed to sending troops abroad without Congressional support and left an opening for legislative deliberation.

[46] Carroll J. Doherty, "Clinton Vow to Provide Troops Revives War Powers Conflict," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 14 October 1995, 3158.

[47] Quoted in Steve Holland, "Christopher Says Congress Must Sign off on Bosnia," *Reuters North American Wire*, 27 September 1995.

[48] Bill Clinton, "America Must Continue to Bear the Responsibility of World Leadership," *Department of State Dispatch*, 16 October 1995.

[49] Pat Towell, "White House Tries to Head Off Hill Curbs on Peacekeeping," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 11 November 1995, 3467.

[50] Pat Towell and Donna Cassata, "House Votes to Block Clinton from Sending Peacekeepers," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 18 November 1995, 3549.

[51] Bill Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 27 November 1995.

[52] Ibid.

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Clinton's behavior strongly contrasts with George Bush's political posturing prior to Operation Desert Storm in 1991. At no time did Bush recognize any legal authority for Congress in the deployment in the Persian Gulf War. Yet, prior to, during, and in the aftermath of the Dayton Peace Accords, the Clinton administration publicly noted the alleged importance of Congress in peacekeeping deployments. Although Clinton never articulated what the administration meant by "consultation," it was clearly part of the administration's strategy to openly recognize Congress as a political player in the deployment. This strategy is new to the war powers interplay and demonstrated that the president felt some political necessity to appease Congress with promises of consultation.

Soon after Clinton's address to the nation, it became clear that the statements made by Panetta, Gore, and Clinton had only limited value. On 6 December 1995, prior to the key congressional vote on Bosnia, Clinton sent a letter to congressional leaders stating that he was sending 1,500 U.S. troops to Bosnia and Croatia to begin laying the groundwork for IFOR. Clinton noted that these decisions were made "in conjunction with our NATO allies" and that his decision met the requirements set forth by the U.S. Constitution.[53] On 21 December, Clinton again wrote to Congress indicating that 20,000 U.S. troops were on their way to Bosnia and Croatia. In the letter, Clinton noted his constitutional authority and Security Council authorization allowing for the deployment.[54]

Congressional Reactions and IFOR

After the August 1995 NATO bombings, efforts in the House were made to limit Clinton's perceived authority as commander-in-chief. The most substantial action taken collectively came two days prior to the onset of the Dayton peace talks. In a proposal introduced by Representatives Steve Buyer (R-IN) and Paul McHale (D-PA) the House passed a resolution stating that the president should not assume he could send troops abroad without authorization from Congress. This sense of the House vote passed 315-103.[55] Although the Speaker had been critical of Clinton's foreign policy in Bosnia, soon after the vote, Gingrich maintained that NATO's and America's leadership credibility could be at stake without U.S. participation. He thus appeared willing to follow President Clinton's leadership on the issue with some reservations.[56] Other high ranking Republicans were not as open to the deployment. For example, Rules Committee Chairman Gerald Solomon (R-NY) stated: "Heartwrenching as . . .

[53] Bill Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 6 December 1995.

[54] Bill Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 21 December 1995.

[55] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995*, H-214.

[56] The Speaker did not record a vote for the 30 October measure to restrict the president.

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this tragedy has been, and as despicable as the Serb aggression has been, this conflict does not justify putting one single American soldier in combat."[57] Journalistic accounts of the House Republican Conference meeting on 8 November also indicate that Republicans "overwhelmingly" called for immediate action to prevent the proposed peacekeeping deployment.[58]

At the same time the Bosnia issue was under House scrutiny, House Republicans were in an intense battle with the White House over the national budget and had threatened to shut down the federal government if Clinton did not meet their demands. One of the foremost policy objectives of the 104th Congress was a balanced budget. For the Republicans, the political problem was that polls indicated that most people would blame the GOP for the shut-down if the decision was made.[59] Thus, the Republicans were in a political predicament in that they risked being viewed as obstructionists by the American public in more than one way if they tried to force Clinton to change his policy in Bosnia as well as with the budget.

In the short term, on 17 November, the House passed a measure originally sponsored by Representative Joel Heffley (R-CO) stating that the president would not be allowed to use federal funds for the Bosnian mission unless appropriated and approved specifically by Congress.[60] However, shortly after Clinton's national address, it became increasingly apparent that the president was strongly committed to the operation. The House Committee on International Relations did hold hearings on U.S. policy towards Bosnia on 30 November 1995, but by this time it was fairly clear that Clinton's intent was to proceed with the deployment mission. While many House Republicans complained about the process, they seemed resigned in their belief that Clinton was going ahead with the operation regardless of their views. Thus the committee debate centered on the logistical specifics of IFOR, and avoided the constitutional questions of a deployment. Henry Hyde stated his frustration by noting that "the dye is cast, now we have to fall in line." Yet at the same time Hyde noted the futility of his complaints and followed with logistical questions about IFOR.[61] Two days later, 186 Republican and 15 Democratic members of the House signed a letter sent to the president, stating in its entirety, "We urge you not to send ground troops to Bosnia."[62]

Despite the large-scale opposition and some members' beliefs that the president was acting in an unconstitutional manner,[63] the House acquiesced on 13

[57] Quoted in Pat Towell, "House Opposes Peacekeeping Role, Delays Vote on Cutoff of Funds," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 4 November 1995, 3390.

[58] Holland, "Christopher Says Congress."

[59] Adam Clymer, "Big Risk for GOP," *New York Times*, 11 November 1995.

[60] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995*, H-234.

[61] Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, "U.S. Policy Towards Bosnia" 30 November 1995, 40.

[62] Pat Towell, "Congress Torn Over Response As Deployment Begins," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 9 December 1995, 3750.

[63] See, for example, the statements made by Helen Chenoweth (R-ID) and Bob Dornan (R-CA), *Congressional Record*, 7 December 1995, H 14229.

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December 1995. In a 287-141 vote, the House voted to show support for the U.S. troops, but also expressed its opposition to Clinton's policy.[64] In effect, the House admitted defeat and demonstrated that it was unwilling to test Clinton on constitutional war powers issues. The House undoubtedly had the votes to put IFOR in question, but rather chose to disassociate itself publicly from Clinton's policy and let the legal issues rest. Without Gingrich's strong support and with the battle over the budget soon to come, the political incentives were not there to challenge the president on the Bosnian deployment. When the budget issue developed in November and December of 1995, the GOP appeared to prioritize tax and spending issues over war powers issues and Bosnia. The vote crafted by the House also gave the Republicans the political cover to justify their votes back in their districts. By supporting the troops, they could appear patriotic and supportive of America's men and women soldiers in Bosnia, but could also remain critical of Clinton. Thus, the vote allowed the Republicans to hold contradictory positions. If the mission went badly, Republicans could always say that they supported the troops, but the GOP could not be blamed for a lack of patriotism. The Senate acted in much the same manner.

As a body, the Senate was less adversarial than the House, although a number of members were particularly vocal in their concern about deployment. Senator Dole initially led the charge against the president by noting that Clinton should not assume Congress's automatic support for an American deployment to Bosnia, and that Congress had not been fully consulted on the issue. Dole sent a letter to the president expressing his reservations about a potential deployment.[65] Soon after Dole's comments, the Senate passed a Sense of the Senate Resolution, calling for the president to gain prior approval before a deployment ensued. Introduced by Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH), the measure passed 94-2.[66] This mood continued as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Bosnia. At one of the hearings, one telling interchange occurred between Senator Chuck Robb (D-VA) and Secretary of State Christopher. Robb asked Christopher if the Senate passed a resolution requiring congressional approval prior to a deployment, what the administration's view would be? Christopher responded: ". . . from a fundamental standpoint, the President would have to say that he is not bound by such a resolution. I do not think he can give away his constitutional authority as commander in chief any more than President Bush was willing to do so. As you know, right up to the last, he said that if there was a resolution, he would not feel bound by it."[67]

Christopher offered these statements before the Dayton peace talks had even begun, even in light of other comments he made indicating Congress's importance. While the Clinton administration was promising consultation, at

[64] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995*, H-248.

[65] *Congressional Record*, 26 September 1995, S 14271.

[66] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995*, S-77.

[67] Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, "The Peace Process on the Former Yugoslavia," 17 October and 1 December 1995, 31.

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the same time it felt it could deploy troops independently of Congress. Senator Robb also did not follow Christopher's remarks with any rebuttal in favor of a congressional role and even prefaced his question by stating that he did not support or encourage a resolution of "that kind."[68] His comments are telling in that congressional acquiescence to the president already was at work, especially among the Democrats. Senator Jim Exon (D-NE) similarly noted that even in the hypothetical event that Congress had voted against the president's deployment, he still felt the president most probably had the constitutional authority for the deployment. He noted that often military deployment decisions are "judgment calls," and that the president's powers as commander-in-chief are broad.[69]

Not all members were resigned to the fact that the mission appeared to be proceeding without a congressional vote. Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) stated: "The president has in effect rendered Congress's role meaningless. . . . Congress is not simply supposed to be consulted on such matters or just be a rubber stamp for such actions. Congress is supposed to be an active partner in this process."[70] Yet, most senators were not interested in the legalities of the deployment.

By late November, Dole was willing to support the president on the Bosnia mission. For understanding Congress's deference, Dole's position was crucial. As the leading Republican contender to topple the Clinton administration, Dole's decision to support the president placed other Republicans in a precarious position; if rank and file Republicans challenged Clinton, they also were de facto challenging their own leadership—and the Republicans' best hope to unseat Clinton. Dole may have also been motivated to take the stance he did as a show of patriotism to the president. Like the House Republicans, he too had political incentives not to be viewed as an obstructionist during a period of near crisis in American foreign policy.[71] During the Vietnam War, many members of Congress who opposed the president were seen as divisive, which is a label that Dole was likely unwilling to risk heading into the first presidential primaries.

In the end, the Senate voted like the House to state its support for the troops, but expressed reservations about the policy in a 69-30 vote.[72] The vote demonstrated that like the House, the Senate Republican majority did not want to take legal responsibility for any casualties that might possibly occur. From a political public relations standpoint, both chambers sought to wash their hands of the policy and remain patriotic at the same time. Despite all the GOP

[68] Ibid.

[69] Interview conducted by the author, 25 March 1997.

[70] *Congressional Record*, 20 October 1995, S 15399.

[71] See Ralph Z. Hallow, "Bosnia Sharpens Choice for GOP," *Washington Times*, 29 November 1995.

[72] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1995*, S-99. Feingold also opposed Bosnia on constitutional grounds until the very end. See his comments in the *Congressional Record*, 13 December 1995, S 18449.

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policy initiatives sought in the 104th Congress, and in the cold war's aftermath when Congress theoretically would stand up to check the president more readily, the Republicans remained unwilling to exert their constitutional powers—even in light of another much despised UN endorsed peacekeeping operation that a majority of Americans opposed.[73] Because of the GOP's budget priority, the risk of being viewed as obstructionists (and consequently as unpatriotic), and with a strategically safe vote crafted in both chambers, the Republicans deferred to the president.

Conclusion

In the IFOR peace-enforcement operation, sanctioned by the United Nations and NATO, Bosnia is an especially interesting and telling case about America's use of force abroad. A number of conditions existed that appeared conducive to a reassertion of congressional war powers: a new and seemingly assertive Republican majority in both the House and Senate, public opinion polls suggesting a majority in opposition to an American deployment to Bosnia, the cold war's end, and a president who was seen as weak in foreign policy. Yet in the end, congressional deference remained the norm.

For the Clinton administration, the arguments presented over war powers were consistent from the beginning. Clinton stated in 1993 that a peacekeeping force would be deployed if a peace settlement was reached. Once the Dayton peace accords were signed, the president fulfilled his promise. What was different about Clinton's rhetoric and strategy with Congress was the extent to which he remained publicly willing to consult with Congress—implying that Congress would have a real opportunity to contribute to the deployment decision. President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Chief of Staff Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher all indicated that Congress would be consulted after the Dayton peace accords' conclusion. With Republican opposition potentially so strong, especially in the House, the Clinton administration recognized the need to use the language of consultation, and went to great lengths to have top administration officials appear at House and Senate committee hearings to defend the policy. In reality, the Clinton administration paid only lip service to the idea of consultation, since the decision to participate in IFOR appeared to have been made prior to the hearings. Clinton's strategy was very different from the one adopted by Bush, who maintained that UN Security Council Resolution 678 gave him full authority to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and that he did not need the approval of some "old goat" in Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.[74]

[73] Richard Benedetto, "Clinton Numbers Looking Up," *USA Today*, 26 July 1995. See also *Public Opinion on Line*, "Presidential Approval," 26 July 1995, Lexis Nexus, World Library, AllnwsFile.

[74] George Bush, "Statement on Signing the Resolution Authorizing the Use of Military Force Against Iraq," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 14 January 1991.

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In many respects, the 104th Congress acted very much like all other Congresses in recent history. The 104th legislature did not question the president on the constitutionality of NATO's bombings, which is interesting considering NATO's substantial use of force in late August and early September 1995. Despite Section 8 of the War Powers Resolution, which gives Congress the power to check U.S. participation in multilateral treaties, the 104th Congress avoided a constitutional debate with the president. After the NATO bombings, Congress sat on its hands and did not take any formal position on U.S. participation in these activities.

When it came to the IFOR deployment, both the Senate and the House expressed reservations over U.S. participation. Yet even with the opposition votes and other well articulated statements of opposition from members of Congress, both chambers yielded to the president and preferred not to place constitutional limits on the operation. Neither the Senate nor House leadership wanted to wage a constitutional battle with the president.

With the political cover they could take in the "support the troops—not the policy" vote, the Republicans gained a politically safe excuse for their decision, making deference an acceptable option. The Senate and House votes were reminiscent of the dominant attitude demonstrated by Congress during the Vietnam War. Once troops were stationed abroad, even those members who were opposed to the war were reluctant to vote against wartime appropriations for fear of not supporting "our boys." In 1995, a similar attitude pervaded Congress. Members did not want to appear unpatriotic to the country's military and thus avoided their own war powers' legislative tools with a politically expedient vote. With the looming battle over the budget in December 1995 and without key oppositional leadership from either the Speaker of the House or the Senate's majority leader, acquiescence to the president remained the preferred political practice. The politics of the Congress/White House interplay over IFOR demonstrated how deeply imbedded the norm of deference is in the congressional demeanor. Because of the political incentives that exist with a wait-and-see approach used by Congress, legislative changes or a norm of legal assertiveness are unlikely in the near future. Efforts have been made to change this norm, but these proposals have made little legislative progress.[75]

It may be argued that upon becoming the majority party in Congress, the Republicans were really not seriously committed to fundamental change in the U.S./UN relationship. Rather, the "Contract with America" and the Peace Powers Act were actually cases of political maneuvering designed to be received well by the electorate, instead of a substantive effort to check the president. For a number or reasons, this argument runs counter to the evidence.

[75] See Lee Hamilton, "Congress and Foreign Policy: The Case of Bosnia" and Russ Feingold, "The Role of Congress in Deploying U.S. Troops Abroad" in *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 3 (Winter/Spring, 1996): 299–312. See also Joe Biden, "Use of Force Act," *Congressional Record*, 15 March 1995, S 3969.

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The House Republicans took their seats with a deep commitment to check the president's ability to use U.S. troops in UN peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations. In the aftermath of the U.S. deaths in Somalia, the new Republican majority entered with little interest in allowing the president to deploy troops again in a controversial UN mission. The House quickly passed the National Security Revitalization Act with nearly unanimous support from the Republicans, which was indicative of their desire to rein in the United Nations. Statements from GOP Congressmen Armey, Rohrabacher, and Roth also demonstrate the Republicans' serious commitment to checking presidential powers. Speaker Gingrich did make a case for the expansion of presidential war powers when Congressman Hyde introduced his amendment to repeal the War Powers Resolution. However, there is no evidence suggesting that the Speaker showed any committed effort to lobby his party on the amendment's behalf. In a time when House Republican party cohesion was at its apex, Gingrich could have easily marshaled the rank and file in the amendment's behalf. Instead, he did not, which was indicative of the Speaker's weak commitment to expanding the commander-in-chief's powers. Moreover, the vast majority of House Republicans appeared to want to challenge the president over participation in IFOR as late as the House Republican Conference meeting on 8 November 1995 and again with Congressman Heffley's proposal on 17 November. In the end, the House leadership concluded that politically its best battle would be over budgetary politics, rather than Bosnia. Without support from the leadership, the GOP rank and file moved in behind Gingrich and voted to support the troops but not the policy.

Just as the House Republican's "Contract" appeared to sincerely reflect GOP beliefs, Dole's commitment to strict applications of Article 43 of the UN Charter and Section 6 of the UN Participation Act also appears genuine. Dole had introduced his Peace Powers Act in the previous year and also took the unusual step as Senate majority leader lobbying for the bill's passage in Senate committee hearings. Moreover Congress's discussion of Article 43 is significant in that although the article had largely become a moot point after 1945, its reinvocation demonstrates the GOP's unfeigned support for its application. In no previous time had these past legislative decisions consumed so much attention from members of Congress. Thus, to argue that the Republicans sought only to make popular political waves through the Peace Powers Act and the National Security Revitalization Act ignores the many substantive GOP legislative efforts to limit U.S. participation in UN deployments.

In sum, this case illustrates that Congress continued the practice of deference to the president over war powers, despite its earlier ideological commitment to do otherwise. If Congress remains unwilling to exercise its war powers, from the perspective of a constitutional democracy, a great risk remains. In its current status, the commander-in-chief acts nearly omnipotently with no accepted legal restraints—clearly a violation of the Founding Fathers' belief in checks and balances. Clinton avoided a constitutional crisis in Somalia by re-

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acting quickly to congressional demands after American casualties occurred in Somalia by setting a troop withdrawal date. Thus far, Clinton has fortunately been successful in Bosnia. However, in the event of American casualties or if the mission goes badly as in Vietnam, Congress and the president will again be faced with profound constitutional questions over who has war powers' authority in American foreign policy.

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Feminism, Antifeminism, and Electoral Politics in Postwar Nicaragua and El Salvador

KAREN KAMPWIRTH

National elections marking a transition from civil war to relative normality occurred in 1990 in Nicaragua and in 1994 in El Salvador. While the long process of political transformation in Central America should not be reduced to elections, these electoral moments do capture many of the dilemmas inherent in transforming guerrilla organizations into leftist parties, and in transforming gender relations from the exceptional conditions of wartime to the relatively normal, but reformulated, conditions of peacetime.

Seen from a feminist perspective, the first post-civil war election in Nicaragua was close to disastrous. Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the presidential candidate of the fourteen party UNO (Unión Nacional Opositora) coalition, ran an explicitly antifeminist campaign in 1990 and won. The gendered images drawn upon by Daniel Ortega, the incumbent from the Sandinista party (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional or FSLN) were not explicitly antifeminist, but they could hardly be labeled feminist either.

Antifeminist tactics rhetorically respond to and attack feminist organizing. This concept builds upon the work of Sonia Alvarez, who argues that gender may be politicized in two basic ways. Feminine organizing "grows out of and accepts prevailing female roles and asserts rights on the basis of those roles, [while feminist organizing] seeks to transform the roles society assigns to women, challenges existing gender power arrangements, and claims women's rights to personal autonomy and equality."[1]

[1] Sonia Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 24; a similar argument is made by Maxine Molyneux, "Mobilization Without Emancipation?" in Richard Fagen et al., eds., *Transition and Development: Problems of Third World Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press), 280–302.

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Recently, the feminine/feminist distinction has been criticized. Some of those criticisms begin with what I think is a misreading of the theory. For example, one critic claimed that the theory "tends to assume exclusionary interests, that one cannot move from one category into another."[2] Another claimed that the feminine/feminist distinction marginalizes feminine organizing by defining it as private, in contrast with public feminist organizing."[3] A third argued that the distinction is a way of promoting middle-class (feminist) groups over working-class (feminine) groups.[4]

All three critics observed that many women's groups utilize both feminine and feminist strategies. That is clearly true, though not incompatible with my reading of Alvarez. The argument is not that there are two kinds of activists (feminine and feminist) but that there are two kinds of strategies. They are both public strategies that in practice are both used by middle-class and working-class women. The main difference between the two strategies is their impact on power inequality based on gender: either directly challenging it or at best indirectly challenging it. I am still convinced that what kind of strategy is used matters. Apparently, many Latin American activists agree, as they continue to make these distinctions.[5]

So while I think the feminine/feminist distinction remains useful, I think Alvarez's two concepts are even more effective when complemented by a third concept: antifeminism. Antifeminism is not the same as feminine organizing, though both accept power differences between men and women as natural. The difference is that while feminine organizing simply reinforces the status quo, antifeminist strategies are employed in response to a threat to the status quo. In this case, the threat was the decade of the Sandinista revolution.

In Nicaragua, as antifeminist claims were made by presidential candidate Violeta Chamorro, the women's movement basically sat on the sidelines and made little effort to influence the campaign except to echo the campaign rhetoric of the Sandinistas. In contrast, in El Salvador, feminists seized the opportunity of their first post-civil war election to try to extract promises from all the political parties. The rhetoric that the parties employed in 1994 was largely gender neutral, but the two top vote-getters did endorse the feminist demands of

[2] Jennifer Schirmer, "The Seeking of Truth and the Gendering of Consciousness" in Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, eds., *Viva: Women and Popular Protest in Latin America* (New York: Routledge), 60–61.

[3] Lynn Stephen, *Women and Social Movements in Latin America* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 11–12.

[4] Amy Lind, "Power, Gender and Development" in Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez, eds., *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 137.

[5] Mariana Fernández and Graciela Freyermuth, "Migration, Organization, and Identity: The Case of a Women's Group from San Cristóbal de las Casas," *Signs* 20 (Summer 1995): 972; Comité Centroamericano, *Memorias del VI Encuentro Feminista* (Managua: Editorial UCA, 1993), 39, 43, 44, 53, 59, 117; Mercedes Olivera, "Practica Feminista en el Movimiento Zapatista de Liberación Nacional" in Rosa Rojas, ed., *Chiapas y las mujeres, que? Tomo II* (Mexico City: Editorial La Correa Feminista, 1995), 177.

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the Women '94 platform. That agreement was surprising given the divergence between the ideologies of the rightwing ARENA party (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista), which had been linked to death squads during the civil war,[6] and the leftwing Coalition, whose largest member (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional or FMLN) was a guerrilla force that fought the ARENA party as late as two years before the electoral campaign.

The election that signaled the end of the civil war in Nicaragua was highly gendered in terms of the strategies employed by the major candidates, but organized feminists had no role to play in that election and were quite dismayed by its outcome. In contrast, the election that marked the end of the Salvadoran civil war was characterized by campaign strategies with very little gendered content, but by a significant role for organized feminists. The differences in the campaigns, in countries that are otherwise very similar in cultural and historical terms, are striking.

Historically, both Nicaragua and El Salvador were characterized by economic dependency on a few agricultural products, accompanied by well entrenched political authoritarianism.[7] Elections did occur but, given the sort of power held by big landowners and politicians (who were often the same people), those elections were not terribly meaningful. This article, with its focus on electoral politics, would have made little sense as recently as a generation ago.

Several major transformations had to occur before there would be any point to analyzing electoral politics in Central America. These changes included the growth of export-oriented agriculture and the creation of the Central American Common Market in the 1950s and 1960s, which had a negative impact on the standard of living of the average Central American. Among the effects of rising land concentration and unemployment was a drop in per capita food consumption.[8]

At approximately the same time as the economies of these countries were changing, so was the Catholic Church. While parts of the traditional church continued to side with Central American elites, "[s]ome factions in the church began to weld the poor and dispossessed into a new social force, organizing base communities, and call[ing] for 'a preferential option for the poor.'"[9] These socioeconomic changes helped create the conditions for several decades of civil strife. Informed by the transformed Catholic Church and the example of the

[6] See Clifford Krauss, "U.S., Aware of Killings, Kept Ties to Salvadoran Rightists, Papers Suggest," *New York Times*, 9 November 1993.

[7] Hector Pérez-Brignoli, *A Brief History of Central America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Ralph Lee Woodward, *Central America: A Nation Divided* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

[8] T. David Mason, "Women's Participation in Central American Revolutions: A Theoretical Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies* 25 (April 1992): 68–70.

[9] Morris J. Blachman and Kenneth E. Sharpe, "The Transitions to 'Electoral' and Democratic Politics in Central America" in Louis W. Goodman, William LeoGrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Central America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 37.

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Cuban revolution, one response to increasing impoverishment and governmental violence was the emergence of guerrilla movements in the three Central American countries with the most dictatorial regimes—Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala—from the 1960s through the beginning of the 1990s.

The postwar election campaigns in Nicaragua and El Salvador in the early 1990s suggest a number of questions about the relationship between electoral and social movement politics, especially in a postwar context. How does the legacy of war shape electoral politics? Under what circumstances is antifeminism or feminism an effective campaign strategy for a candidate? And from the perspective of social movement activists, how are the opportunities and dangers presented by elections best approached to make gains, or at least not to lose disastrously?

Many have argued that social movements play critical roles in democratizing politics.[10] Recently, however, Judith Adler Hellman advised caution about asserting this connection, arguing that in the case of Mexico there is little evidence that social movements are serving to democratize national politics.[11]

One of the reasons that this assertion about the connection between social movements and democratization is frequently made (even in cases where evidence is scant) is that, with some notable exceptions,[12] writers on Latin American social movements do not devote much space to the formal mechanisms of democracy. The democratization that most concerns writers on social movements is the democratization of civil society, or economic democratization, or

[10] Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*; Susan Eckstein, *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez, *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); Joe Foweraker and Ann Craig, *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990); Jane Jaquette, *The Women's Movement in Latin America: Participation and Democracy,* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Elizabeth Jelin, *Women and Social Change in Latin America,* (London: Zed Brooks, 1990); Temma Kaplan, "Community and Resistance in Women's Political Cultures," *Dialectical Anthropology* 15 (1990); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics* (New York: Verso, 1990); Daniel Levine, *Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, *Viva: Women and Popular Protest in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 1993); William Rowe and Vivian Schelling, *Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America* (New York: Verso, 1991); Helen Safa, "Women's Social Movements in Latin America," *Gender and Society* 4 (September 1990); David Slater, "Power and Social Movements in the Other Occident: Latin America in an International Context," *Latin American Perspectives* 21 (Spring 1994).

[11] Judith Adler Hellman, "Mexican Popular Movements: Clientalism and the Process of Democratization," *Latin American Perspectives* 21 (Spring 1994).

[12] Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil*; Eckstein, *Power and Popular Protest*; Escobar and Alvarez, *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America*; Foweraker and Craig, *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico*; Jaquette, *The Women's Movement in Latin America*; Safa, "Women's Social Movements in Latin America"; Alfred Stepan, ed., *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

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the rise of more democratic identities. In this view, "[t]he process of democratization of society . . . goes beyond the boundaries of political democracy."[13]

While political analysis may be sharpened by thinking beyond the boundaries of political democracy, analysis also has to happen within those boundaries. Unfortunately, the social movement literature tends to downplay or ignore the formal mechanisms of democracy, including elections, that are the focus of the literature on transitions to democracy in Latin America.[14] Too often, the literatures on social movements and formal democratization address similar issues but talk past each other, making it difficult to evaluate the assertion that the actions of social movements play a significant role in shaping formal politics. Jane Jaquette expressed this dilemma well, noting that "few who study Latin American politics have thought about the growing impact of women's participation, and few who study women's movements have cared about political parties or the state. Democracy, and women, deserve better."[15]

This article is an attempt to meet Jaquette's challenge. The first two sections of the article analyze the election campaigns of 1990 in Nicaragua and 1994 in El Salvador, focusing on the role gender images and organized feminists played. The final section shows why the electoral campaigns took the shape that they did. I argue that the differences in the way women were integrated into national politics during the 1970s and 1980s explain how they were integrated into the electoral processes of the 1990s.

Analyzing the electoral role of feminism as an organized movement (rather than feminists as individual voters) means that the questions I will ask and the data I will use to answer them differ from many other studies of electoral politics. The polling data that informs most electoral studies is well suited to explain electoral outcomes or voting behavior, but often poorly suited to analyze the participation of social movements or the shape of campaigns. Since my main questions concern process (the unfolding of the electoral campaigns) rather than outcome (which candidate won or what sort of people voted), my answers are based on qualitative data (interviews, media analysis, participant-observation) rather than quantitative data.[16]

[13] Slater, "Power and Social Movements," 24.

[14] See Guiseppe Di Palma and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., *The Central American Impasse* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); L. Diamond et al., eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990); Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994); George López and Michael Stohl, eds., *Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin America* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Robert Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1989).

[15] Jaquette, *The Women's Movement in Latin America*, 235.

[16] I collected this data in Nicaragua from October 1990 to July 1991 and in El Salvador in March 1994 and in July to August 1994.

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1990 IN NICARAGUA: ANTIFEMINISM WINS

Having presented herself as a traditional, long-suffering mother who would reunite the Nicaraguan family, Violeta Chamorro was elected president. The antifeminist image of womanhood that she presented in her campaign illustrates a view of gender that apparently still resonates with large sectors of the Nicaraguan population, despite a decade of revolutionary transformation. It is worth asking why those antifeminist images were not directly challenged, either by her main rival for the presidency, Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega, or by Nicaraguan feminists.

The image of womanhood that doña Violeta[17] projected was a multifaceted one. Principally, those facets were doña Violeta as loyal wife and widow, reconciling mother, and Virgin Mary. Throughout the campaign, doña Violeta reminded voters that she was the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, a well known hero of the struggle against the Somoza dictatorship, who was assassinated in 1978. Not only was her widowhood emphasized, but the type of wife she had been was important as well. As she told a reporter: "'I am not a feminist nor do I wish to be one. I am a women dedicated to my home, like Pedro taught me.' Later she would claim 'to be marked with the branding iron of the Chamorros.'"[18]

Not only did doña Violeta present herself as an exemplary wife and widow but also as an exemplary mother who managed to keep her children united against the odds.[19] The message was that she could also reunite the whole Nicaraguan family, which had been divided by more than a decade of civil war. In a "New Year's Message from doña Violeta" she promised that: "[In 1990] the Nicaraguan family will return to reunite with joy. In 1990 the people are going to choose our moral option and there will not be any more war nor misery nor hate because we will all be brothers."[20]

Consistent with the first two facets of the doña Violeta symbol, those of loyal wife/widow and reconciling mother, was a third facet—that of the Virgin Mary. Throughout doña Violeta's presidential campaign, she was photographed in white, a symbol of purity, in this case of her lack of taint with the filth of politics. This symbolism is powerful in a predominantly Catholic country like Nicaragua. And doña Violeta played on the Virgin Mary symbol in a num-

[17] I will call her doña Violeta, for that is what she is most commonly called, and it is what she calls herself. Doña is an honorific that is used before the first name of an older woman.

[18] Scarlet Cuadra, "Electorado Feminino por la Revolución," *Barricada*, Managua, 13 January 1990.

[19] Those odds are considerable. Her four children are politically divided: two are Sandinista activists and two are committed anti-Sandinistas like Violeta herself. On the Chamorro family, see Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family* (New York: Vintage Books, 1986); Patricia Taylor Edmisten, *Nicaragua Divided: La Prensa and the Chamorro Legacy* (Pensacola: University of West Florida Press, 1990); Denis Lynn Daly Heyck, *Life Stories of the Nicaraguan Revolution* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Brook Larmer, "Struggle to Rule Nicaragua Begins: Hints of Dynasty," *Christian Science Monitor,* 1 March 1990.

[20] *La Prensa,* Managua, 5 January 1990.

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ber of ways. Like the Virgin, who suffered the murder of her son, doña Violeta suffered the murder of her husband. While the Virgin was the mother of a martyred savior, doña Violeta is the widow of such a savior.

The Virgin Mary image provided an alternative to the most radical Sandinista image of womanhood, that of the woman guerrilla. Doña Violeta made it clear that she was not a guerrilla or even knowledgeable about politics; and precisely because of that distance from politics, she would be able to end the contra war. Through these images of traditional womanhood, what normally would be a liability for a politician—lack of political experience—was presented as an asset.[21]

Doña Violeta's main rival in the race for the presidency in 1990, Sandinista Daniel Ortega, also faced a number of challenges that he, less successfully, tried to overcome through a variety of gendered images. During the campaign, posters of Daniel embracing his baby daughter Camila were plastered across the country. Juxtaposed with the image of Daniel, the good father, was Daniel as a cowboy and Daniel dancing at political rallies with young women to the beat of the Beatles' "All You Need is Love."

These images did not mesh well with the policy promises of the FSLN. Symbolically, Daniel Ortega took various forms—a loving father, a sex symbol surrounded by young women, a cowboy leading a charging herd of men on horses. Practically, the Sandinistas could not promise an end to the war; that decision was in the hands of the UNO's ally, the U.S. Government. So what they promised was dignity, solidarity, and further anti-imperialist struggle, loosely tied together with the slogan, "Everything Will Be Better."

While these highly gendered images were projected, the social movement that might be expected to be most engaged with such a campaign—the women's movement—largely watched from the sidelines. To the extent that the women's movement was an actor in the campaign, it was largely as a cheerleader for the Sandinistas. For instance, a mural painted by the Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza (AMNLAE) read "Women and Daniel in One Love." It was illustrated with a big red heart pierced by an arrow.

During the campaign, the broad-based women's movement (and self-identified feminists within that movement) did nothing to directly counter the gendered images of the major candidates. This left doña Violeta free to promise to reunite and reimpose the traditional Nicaraguan family, and left Daniel to project a mishmash of masculine images. Doña Violeta's maternal reconciliation message would carry the election, as she was elected president with nearly 55 percent of the vote.

[21] For more on the campaign and its policy implications, see Karen Kampwirth, "The Mother of the Nicaraguans: Doña Violeta and the UNO's Gender Agenda," *Latin American Perspectives* 23 (Winter 1996).

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1994 In El Salvador: "Women Decide for Ourselves"

The relationship between electoral politics and feminist mobilization was reversed in the Salvadoran election, where a campaign with little overt gender content was met with a loud and persistent response from feminists. The lack of gender politics in campaign discourse was consistent with the near absence of political debate of any sort in campaign advertising. While the nine parties were far from indistinguishable, all the major parties chose the strategy of bland, feel-good television advertisements.[22]

But as the major parties seemingly tried to sweep the political battles of the previous decade under the electoral rug, organized feminists tried to shake that rug. In January 1993, over a year before the election, a number of women's organizations joined forces to gain a voice in national politics. The result was a coalition known as "Women '94."[23]

While there are disagreements about what really happened in the development of the Women '94 coalition, there is remarkable agreement over its origins. Every activist who discussed those origins with me noted that it was the most autonomous and most radically feminist current with the movement (*Concertacion de Mujeres por la Paz, la Dignidad, y la Igualdad* or Women's Coalition for Peace, Dignity, and Equality) that was responsible for initiating the effort. I would suggest that this was due to the greater autonomy of that current in relationship to the political parties, particularly the FMLN. The feminist organizations that belonged to this current had already waged sometimes nasty battles for autonomy and so enjoyed the necessary space to try to influence the political parties.[24]

The coalition spent the first eight months of its existence (January 1993 to August 1993) developing a platform through working groups on women and violence, health, education, environment, work, legislation, development, land, and political parties. About fifty women were involved in each group, and they were women who felt the direct impact of policies in these areas. For instance,

[22] Advertisements mainly consisted of flying flags, and brief endorsements from smiling men and women. The exception was a series of advertisements, sponsored by the rightwing Freedom and Democracy Institute (ILYD) or by unidentified sources, in which the Left coalition was blamed for the civil war of the 1980s. See Jack Spence et al., *El Salvador: Elections of the Century, Results, Recommendations, Analysis* (Cambridge, MA: Hemisphere Initiatives, July 1994), 18–27. The Left might have responded with "anonymous" advertisements of its own, pointing out the well-documented links between ARENA and the death squads. Perhaps fearing further polarization, it did not run such advertisements.

[23] The exact number of members of the coalition is disputed. Twenty-eight organizations and numerous individuals officially formed the coalition. See Mujeres 94, "Plataforma de las Mujeres Salvadoreñas: Edición Popular," unpublished document, August 1993. But in separate interviews, Mirna Rodríguez and Lorena Peña told me that forty groups participated. The disagreement may be due to the difficulty of defining membership.

[24] Mujeres por la Dignidad y la Vida, *Hacer Política Desde Las Mujeres: Una propuesta feminista para la participacíon política de las mujeres salvadoreñas* (San Salvador: Doble G Impresores, 1993), 115–132.

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the majority of the members of the working group on land and credit were peasants.

In August 1993 the platform was officially presented to the political parties in a ceremony that began with a march of 5,000 or 6,000 women and ended in a fancy hotel in San Salvador. But only two major candidates attended, both from the leftist coalition: presidential candidate Rubén Zamora and Shafik Handal, the candidate for mayor of San Salvador. Individual women from ARENA and secondary representatives from the Christian Democrats (PDC) also attended the presentation of the platform.

There were fourteen demands in the main version of the platform.[25] Of those, nine could be considered feminist, as they represented a direct challenge to power dynamics between men and women. Those points included demands for "comprehensive sex education without prejudice," "free and voluntary motherhood" (a euphemism for contraception and abortion rights), and "fifty percent of leadership positions for women." Another three of the fourteen demands could be called feminine, for they addressed women's interests within the gender division of labor in El Salvador, but without directly challenging male power. These included a call for "stabilization of food prices" and "more and better public hospitals." The final two demands could be either feminist or feminine, depending on the interpretation.

The parties were left to consider these demands until the beginning of the new year, when they were called to a public debate. Partisan response to that debate, like the response to the initial presentation, was lukewarm. Once again, the Left coalition and the PDC were the only parties to send official representatives.

Finally, the parties were asked to commit to the platform in a signing ceremony held on 8 March 1994, International Women's Day. This time, the PDC did not send an official representative, but ARENA did. So the final version of the platform was signed by Rubén Zamora, of the left-wing coalition and Gloria Salguero Gross, of the right-wing ARENA party.

While it is undeniable that the partisan response to the platform was less than ecstatic, the two parties that endorsed the platform were the two top vote getters. The Coalition and ARENA won 73.9 percent of the votes cast in the election of March 1994. They were the two participants in the run-off election

[25] Not surprisingly, the platform is very long. One version of the platform lists seventy-eight demands, another lists sixty-three demands. An illustrated popular education booklet lists thirty-three demands. Posters were distributed with a list of fourteen demands. Finally, an even more reduced list of ten demands was presented to the parties. Mujeres 94, "Plataforma de las Mujeres Salvadoreñas: Edición Popular"; Mujeres 94, "Plataforma de las Mujeres Salvadoreñas," unpublished document, (31 August 1993); Mujeres 94, "Compromisos De Los Candidatos(as) Con El Movimiento De Mujeres De El Salvador," unpublished document, 8 March 1994; Julio Soro et al., *Como Los Partidos Políticos Incluyen A Las Mujeres En Sus Plataformas Políticas* (San Salvador: Red por la Unidad y el Desarollo de las Mujeres Salvadoreñas, 1994); U.S.–El Salvador Institute for Democratic Development, "Platform of the Women of El Salvador," unpublished document, 1994.

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held in April of that year, which ARENA won easily.[26] Arguably, Women '94 achieved its partisan goals by gaining the endorsement of the two biggest parties in the country.

But that begs the question: what did endorsement mean? In the case of ARENA, the answer seems to be not much, at least in the short term. One week after Gloria Salguero Gross signed the platform in the name of ARENA and four days before the election, ARENA celebrated the "grand closing" of the "women's crusade." At this "very important event," the wives of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates presented a document that contained "the principal necessities and aspirations of the Salvadoran woman."[27]

ARENA's document on women was presented by women whose status within the party was that of wife, rather than by any of ARENA's female candidates. The symbolism of this choice is fairly straightforward and was reinforced by ARENA's platform, which mentions women only three times. Women were promised subsidies to "mother-infant programs," implementation of a new family code to "protect women, children and old people," and nutritious rations for "pregnant mothers and children."[28] The authors of a study of the platforms conclude that the "analysis that we have done of ARENA's platform, both in its general proposals for society, and its specific proposals for women, demonstrates a profound opposition to all that is demanded in the Women '94 platform."[29]

The impact of the Women '94 platform on ARENA's platform was quite limited at best. Still, it would have been too much to expect a far-right party like ARENA to give a strong endorsement to a feminist platform. In fact, personal animosities between most members of the women's movement and ARENA that had built up over the course of the war could have led ARENA to conduct an anti-feminist campaign like Violeta Chamorro did. That ARENA conducted a fairly gender-neutral campaign and that it signed the Women '94 platform represents a small step forward in feminist influence within right-wing party politics in El Salvador.

But what of feminists' relationships with the left-wing coalition, and especially the largest coalition member, the FMLN? To what extent did feminists have an impact on the coalition's campaign? The official platforms of the parties that made up the coalition were almost all more feminist-friendly than ARENA's platform. Those platforms referred to women more frequently than did ARENA's and, most importantly, the platforms of the three members of the leftist coalition and that of the Christian Democrats explicitly addressed the problem of discrimination against women, which ARENA's platform did not.[30]

[26] Spence et al., *El Salvador*, 37.
[27] Advertisement, *El Diario de Hoy*, 15 March 1994.
[28] Julio Soro et al., *Como Los Partidos Políticos Incluyen A Las Mujeres*, 31–32.
[29] Ibid., 80.
[30] Ibid., 42.

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Given that these platforms were not widely read, a better measure of feminist success may be what occurred at public events during the campaign. Women '94 was a very visible presence at some of the coalition's rallies through booths in which information was provided and Women '94 T-shirts were sold. Furthermore, the leaflets distributed by the FMLN at these rallies promised to fulfill many of the feminist's demands. In one pamphlet, entitled "Now's the Time for Real Solutions," ten promises were made that included combating delinquency, increasing employment, stabilizing prices, improving health and education, and promoting "the rights and participation of women." Another pamphlet was focused directly at women. Entitled "First our Demands: Woman, Vote for Yourself, Vote FMLN," the pamphlet outlined seven ways in which the FMLN would improve women's lives, all of which may have been taken directly from the Women '94 platform.

Most importantly, given the high levels of illiteracy in El Salvador, both pamphlets were illustrated with progressive images of gender relations including a little boy standing on a box to cook, two women working as carpenters, women and men receiving land, and a female member of the new National Civilian Police stopping a knife-wielding delinquent. Through words and images, the leftist coalition (and especially the FMLN) identified themselves with organized feminism.

Explaining the Electoral Differences

The national elections that marked the end of the civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador were both highly gendered, but in ways that could not have been more different. In Nicaragua, an electoral campaign with a strong gender content was greeted with feminist silence, while in El Salvador, a campaign with little overt gender content was met with a loud and persistent response from feminists.

Why were such different choices made during these transitional electoral campaigns? One possible explanation might be that the Nicaraguan women's movement did not wish to play a greater role, because it is inherently less feminist and more partisan than the Salvadoran women's movement. But that theory was disproved by events following the 1990 elections, when independent, nonpartisan feminism fairly exploded in Nicaragua.[31] I will argue that the differences were not because of inherent differences in the political culture of the two

[31] On the women's movement after 1990, see Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, "Feminism, Revolution, and Democratic Transitions in Nicaragua" in Jaquette, ed., *The Women's Movement in Latin America*; Ana Criquillon, "The Nicaraguan Women's Movement: Feminist Reflections from Within" in Minor Sinclair, ed., *The New Politics of Survival: Grassroots Movements in Central America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995); Margaret Randall, *Sandino's Daughters Revisited: Feminism in Nicaragua* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994); Margaret Randall, *Gathering Rage: The Failure of 20th Century Revolutions to Develop a Feminist Agenda* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992).

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countries or their movements. Rather, they were a legacy of Central American politics in the 1970s and 1980s.

The two countries have much in common. Both the FSLN and the FMLN began their political lives as guerrilla movements that mobilized large numbers of women (and men) as armed combatants and in support work.[32] But there was one crucial difference. The FSLN of Nicaragua overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in 1979 and then governed the country for over a decade until it lost the election of 1990. While the FMLN represented a significant threat to the military-dominated government of El Salvador (holding up to a third of the national territory for a period of years[33]), it never managed to overthrow the national government.

First, the central factor that explains the differences in the role of organized feminists in the first post-civil war elections is the history of the revolutionary organizations in the previous decades, only one of which benefited from the economic and political power that is inherent in controlling the state.

My second argument is that because the FSLN controlled the state for over a decade, it had considerable control over would-be feminist dissidents within the revolutionary coalition. Feminism existed as an undercurrent in social movement politics within Nicaragua throughout the revolutionary decade. But it could not break the surface (feminists could not seek autonomy), because the Sandinista party had enough political and economic power to keep possibly threatening feminist currents submerged. In contrast, the FMLN never had control of the state and its concomitant economic and political power. Therefore, the FMLN was forced to reach out to its feminist base during the first post-civil war election campaign through ideological appeals. The FSLN felt the need to make no such appeal.

[32] Compared with previous guerrilla movements in Latin America, women participated in the guerrilla struggles in Nicaragua (1961–1979) and El Salvador (1970–1992) in unusually large numbers. Within the FSLN of Nicaragua, an estimated 30 percent of the combatants and many guerrilla leaders were women. See Helen Collinson, ed., *Women and Revolution in Nicaragua* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1990), 154; Patricia Flynn, "Women Challenge the Myth" in Stanford Central American Network, ed., *Revolution in Central America*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 416; Linda Lobao Reif, "Women in Latin American Guerrilla Movements," *Comparative Politics* 18 (January 1986): 158. In contrast, Carlos Vilas disputes the widespread belief that women comprised 30 percent of the FSLN's combatants, suggesting that the figure was closer to 6.6 percent. Carlos Vilas, *The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986), 108–109. Approximately 40 percent of the FMLN membership, 30 percent of the combatants, and 20 percent of the military leadership were women. See Mason, "Women's Participation in Central American Revolutions," 65; Tommie Sue Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 123. In the case of the FMLN, these estimates were confirmed during the process of demobilization, which was supervised by the United Nations Observor Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL). 29.2 percent of the 8,506 combatants and 35.5 percent of the 4,093 FMLN *políticos* (political personnel) that were registered by ONUSAL were women. See Ilja Luciak, "Women in the Transition: The Case of the Female FMLN Combatants in El Salvador" (paper presented at the conference of the Latin American Studies Association in Washington DC, 28–30 September 1995), 3.

[33] Eric Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 145.

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Finally, the third factor that helps explain the role played by feminism and antifeminism in the first post-civil war elections also flows out of the political history of the previous two decades. The personal histories of the candidates, especially the role they had played during the civil wars, limited their abilities to launch certain kinds of campaigns, and made it possible for them to launch other kinds.

The Importance of Controlling the State

While women were active participants in the struggle to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship, the guerrilla struggle was not a feminist one. Initially, women tended to justify their active involvement in the guerrilla movement in terms of feminine interests. Armed struggle was a new way of fulfilling an old female role: the protection of children. As Gloria Carrión explained: "The widespread repression, and particularly the way this repression centered on our youth, outraged women of all classes. The repression was so bad that it was a crime just to be young. . . . We had outright political assassinations of children eight, nine, ten years old."[34] Out of such early defenses of feminine interests, feminist thinking would sometimes develop. For instance, Ana Criquillon, a long-time feminist activist, talked about her work with women in the eastern neighborhoods of Managua: "I was not a feminist when I arrived in Nicaragua [in 1972]; I worked with Christian women. . . . They were housewives, almost none of them had graduated from high school. . . . Afterwards I realized that the majority had safe houses. It was the first case of consciousness raising without our realizing what we were doing."[35]

With the Sandinista's triumphant march into Managua on 19 July 1979, the transformation of Nicaraguan society expanded. In recognition of their role in the guerrilla struggle, women were a central part of that transformation, especially in the early 1980s. One important channel for women's participation was through the women's movement, which underwent some changes after the Sandinistas took power. AMPRONAC,[36] the women's organization affiliated with the Sandinistas during the guerrilla struggle, changed its name to AMNLAE,[37] and went public. State-movement relations represented a break with the past. Instead of the antagonism between AMPRONAC and the Somocista state, there was cooperation between AMNLAE and the Sandinista state.

Starting in July 1979, the state was transformed in multiple ways, many of which directly affected women. This transformation included legal reform, the expansion of adult education and formal education, the opening of state-funded day care centers, the beginning of a campaign against domestic vio-

[34] Quoted in Randall, *Sandino's Daughters*, 13.
[35] Ana Criquillon, interview with author, 6 June 1991.
[36] AMPRONAC stood for the Asociación de Mujeres Ante La Problemática Nacional.
[37] AMNLAE stood for the Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza.

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lence, and the nationalization of health care.[38] While most of the reforms that transformed women's conditions could be called feminine (that is, they improved women's lives without challenging power dynamics between men and women), some Sandinista reforms, especially in the first few years of the revolution, were genuinely feminist and therefore very controversial.[39]

Close ties to the FSLN meant that AMNLAE rightfully shared some of the credit for Sandinista reforms. Early in the Sandinista period, the organization's main goal was to provide support for the government's programs. AMNLAE provided support for the male-dominated FSLN, without directly challenging sexual inequality. In 1980, AMNLAE hoped that its 25,000 members would "defend the revolution by joining the popular militias; participate in organizations that directed state policy in areas like education, health, supplies, employment and salaries; fight for legal equality and the creation of childcare centers; join the literacy campaign; create health brigades, control contraband and hoarding and encourage productive collectives of women."[40]

One of the ways that AMNLAE sought to put many government policies into practice was through Women's Houses that were built in all the regions of Nicaragua, fifty-two by the early 1990s. These houses served as intermediaries between the state and individuals by providing services in the areas of health, psychological counseling, and legal counseling, as well as workshops in areas such as sexuality, contraception, and job training.[41] AMNLAE played a crucial role as a link between the state and the population in all of these endeavors.

But in this link a contradiction arose, which became more acute over time. AMNLAE ended up devoting tremendous resources to preserving the power and legitimacy of the Sandinista-controlled state. What might have been a reasonable assumption that the further emancipation of women was dependent on the well-being of their emancipator, the FSLN, was to eventually undermine the movement. The contra war that dominated the mid-1980s exposed the contradictions inherent in the assumption.[42]

[38] Collinson, *Women and Revolution in Nicaragua*; Maxine Molyneux, "The Politics of Abortion in Nicaragua: Revolutionary Pragmatism—or Feminism in the Realm of Necessity?" *Feminist Review* 29 (May 1988); Maxine Molyneux, "Mobilization without Emancipation? Women's Interests, the State, and Revolution" in Richard Fagen et al., eds., *Transition and Development: Problems of Third World Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986); Martha Luz Padilla et al., "Impact of the Sandinista Agrarian Reform on Rural Women's Subordination" in Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena León, eds., *Rural Women and State Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); Lois Wessel, "Reproductive Rights in Nicaragua: From the Sandinistas to the Government of Violeta Chamorro," *Feminist Studies* 17 (Fall 1991).

[39] Karen Kampwirth, "Legislating Personal Politics in Sandinista Nicaragua, 1979–1992," *Women's Studies International Forum* 21 (Winter 1998).

[40] Clara Murguialday, *Nicaragua, revolución y feminismo (1977–89)* (Madrid: Editorial Revolución, 1990), 104.

[41] María Dolores Alvarez (director of AMNLAE's Documentation Center), interview with author, November 1990; Irene Rojas (director of AMNLAE's Erlinda López house), interview with author, 26 March 1991.

[42] Peter Rosset and John Vandermeer, eds., *Nicaragua: Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Grove Press, 1986); Edgar Chamorro, *Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation* (New York:

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Some activists who continued to work within AMNLAE in the early 1990s admitted that they made mistakes in their relationship with the party. Too often, they said, AMNLAE played the role of the "submissive wife of the FSLN." This submission may have been the legacy of the movement's origin as a semiclandestine FSLN affiliate. It was certainly enhanced by the dual crises of war and economic embargo.

Klemen Altamirano, a sociologist from the Masaya Women's Center, suggested that the mobilization of older mothers to the exclusion of others, the caution which characterized their mobilization and, more generally, AMNLAE's relationship with the state were all products of the contra war. "Because of the war it was necessary to use up many resources, resources that were not just material but also ideological. That was part of the fall of the FSLN."[43]

One of the ideological resources that might have been lost in the war was the political courage to mobilize older women to challenge their vulnerability rather than to glorify it. They might have mobilized them in a way that questioned rather than reinforced women's traditional submission. In other words, had the party felt less vulnerable, it might have been willing to take some feminist risks. Those risks could have had the ultimate benefit, from the party's perspective, of building the commitment of older mothers for a revolutionary agenda. Instead, by reinforcing the traditional role of mothers, the FSLN unwittingly supported the logic used effectively by the UNO in the 1990 election. According to the UNO's position, good mothers should protect their children from war and that meant voting against the FSLN. Ironically, measures that were taken to ensure the longevity of the FSLN ultimately may have contributed to its electoral loss.

AMNLAE and, indirectly, the FSLN helped to create the feminist movement by opening a space for it to develop that had been closed before 1979. But the FSLN was unwilling to grant feminists the autonomy they would have needed to lead a campaign like Women '94 in El Salvador. The Sandinista party made the common assumption that feminists had nowhere to go and so would never desert them in 1990. The party assumed that its ability to control and coopt feminists meant that it was free to lead an electoral campaign that was not meant to appeal to feminists but rather to the elusive middle-of-the-road voter.

The FSLN had been publicly committed to ending gender inequality from as early as 1969. It then presided over more than a decade of revolutionary rule in which women were actively mobilized and some feminist reforms were enacted. That led many Nicaraguans to associate feminism with Sandinismo and antifeminism with anti-Sandinismo. Ironically, limited but real feminist successes over the course of the previous decades left the Nicaraguan public open

Institute for Media Analysis, 1987); Roger N. Lancaster, *Life Is Hard: Machismo, Danger, and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

[43] Klemen Altamirano, interview with author, 3 February 1991.

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to an antifeminist campaign, which forced feminists into silent support for the Sandinistas, just at the time when many of them wanted to break away from the FSLN.

In contrast, the FMLN did not enter its first post-civil war election at the end of over a decade of political rule. Instead, it entered that electoral campaign at the end of over a decade of guerrilla war, which had resulted in stalemate. The FMLN did not have the ability to coopt and control feminists that its Nicaraguan counterpart had. So it was in its interest to try a different electoral strategy. Rather than try to mobilize middle-of-the-road voters over gender issues, it tried to mobilize its base (including feminists and other women's movement activists) with ideological promises.

But having a party that is receptive to social movement appeals is not enough. Social movements needs to be capable of making those appeals. In El Salvador, they were. Salvadoran feminists did have the autonomy they needed to participate in electoral politics

Organizational Legacies of the Civil Wars

The relationship between the political parties and women's organizations, some of which later became feminist organizations, first took shape during the guerrilla struggle. Since many of the political parties and most of the social movements that are active today first emerged out of the civil wars, they have particular characteristics that differ from parties and movements in many other countries. One is that social movements have had a hard time influencing these parties from within. This difficulty is rooted in hierarchical decision-making traditions developed over years of guerrilla struggle, which may have been appropriate in wartime, but which are quite inappropriate once the war is over.

The simple declaration of political party status does not always equip former guerrilla organizations to face the challenges of competitive politics. After the transformation of these guerrilla movements into political parties in 1979 in Nicaragua and in 1992 in El Salvador, tensions which had been submerged during the guerrilla wars reemerged, as the wildly differing agendas within the revolutionary coalitions became apparent. One of the tensions that had been submerged by these wars was the debate over feminist reform.

A further factor that shaped the relationship between feminist movements and the leftwing parties was the priority given to work against inequalities rooted in class, rather than inequalities rooted in gender. Most obviously, this tendency derived from the influence of Marxism both as theory and as experienced in socialist countries. This preferential option for the poor (and not for women, or for gays, or for indigenous people) also emerged out of radical Catholicism. Whatever the origins of the tendency, it made it harder for feminist movements to gain a voice within these parties than for other kinds of social movements, such as unions. The FSLN's and FMLN's self-image was of parties

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that sided with the most vulnerable, generally understood in class terms. This created difficulties for those social movements, such as the feminist movements, which often incorporated class concerns into their work but were not fundamentally class-based movements.

To gain a voice within their parties, many social movements found it necessary to seek autonomy from the parties. In Nicaragua, the quest for autonomy came years after the transformation of the FSLN into a party; in El Salvador it came nearly at the same time as the FMLN became a party. In 1990, Nicaraguan feminist activists faced the dilemma that universally faces radicals within coalitional political parties—those on the left end of left-center coalitions like the FSLN, or those on the right end of right-center coalitions.[44] In the absence of another politically viable option, leaving the party is not a very plausible threat.[45] On the other hand, staying within the coalition but vocally criticizing it is also a risky strategy. It might mainly benefit the coalition's opponents. Given the tone of the UNO's campaign, feminists may well have thought the risk of a UNO victory was simply too high; better to support the FSLN, despite its imperfections.

This explanation however, implies that Salvadoran feminists should have been equally cautious during their first postwar election in 1994. They, too, represented the left wing (measured in terms of gender politics) within a left-center coalition. Yet they chose to vocally criticize and pressure the political parties. For even though Salvadoran feminists faced the same electoral dilemma faced by Nicaraguan feminists, they faced it with a considerably greater degree of movement autonomy.

While a few independent feminists groups broke off from the Sandinista-affiliated women's movement in the late 1980s, the vast majority of Nicaraguan feminists remained in organizations that were closely tied to the Sandinista party.[46] In Nicaragua, the height of the autonomy struggle took place in 1991 and 1992. The autonomy struggle was important, for it reshaped social movement/party relations, but it was too late to influence the 1990 election and possibly too early to influence the 1996 election.

[44] See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Duane Oldfield, *The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); Ronald Walters, *Black Presidential Politics in America: A Strategic Approach* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

[45] Arguably, this thesis that radicals will tend to stay in large parties only applies in a simple-majority single ballot system. Proportional representation favors multiple parties, since small radical parties may plausibly win some offices. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization in the Modern State* (New York: John Wiley, 1963), 239. In Nicaragua and El Salvador, these arguments are far less clear-cut, since the electoral systems are amalgams of simple-majority and proportional representation, with different rules for presidential, congressional, and municipal offices, all of which may be determined in a single election.

[46] Randall, *Sandino's Daughters Revisited*; Midge Quandt, *Unbinding The Ties: The Popular Organizations And The FSLN In Nicaragua*, (Washington, DC: Nicaragua Network Education Fund, 1993).

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In El Salvador the height of the autonomy struggle took place between 1990 and 1992. But while the two autonomy struggles took place at about the same time if measured in real time, they did not occur simultaneously if measured in electoral time. In contrast to the Nicaraguan case, the Salvadoran feminist autonomy struggle occurred at a very propitious time to influence the first post-war election in El Salvador.

The Salvadoran autonomy battle was early enough but not too early in relation to the 1994 election, so that a number of organizations had enough autonomy to speak to the political parties from without. But the energy generated in the autonomy battle might have been dissipated had that battle occurred years before the election. The lost resources that are the price of autonomy catch up with organizers in the conditions of extreme poverty that characterize Central America.

The role of social movement autonomy in electoral politics (and, by implication, in democratization) is contradictory. In El Salvador, the increased autonomy of feminist organizations had some democratizing effects upon national politics. Feminist demands for improvements in the quality of life of the majority of the population were inserted into party discourse, if sometimes unenthusiastically. If any of those demands are met, then women will have increased opportunities for participation in national politics and for gaining influence over the future development of those politics. The promise of democratic participation will have been realized to a greater extent than if feminists had remained silent.

But autonomy is not an unmitigated good. Despite the inherent disadvantages, there are many advantages to affiliation with a political party. Parties can provide a space for gaining organizing experience, and they can provide critical material resources. The same guerrillas-converted-into-parties that eventually constrained these Central American feminists were also to a large degree initially responsible for the emergence of feminism within what remained profoundly sexist societies. Cutting the ties that constrained feminists also meant cutting some of the resources that sustained them. At the height of the autonomy struggle, the advantage of autonomy probably outweighed the costs of lost resources; after the initial autonomy struggle, the costs of those lost resources become more apparent.

A number of Nicaraguan feminists observers suggested to me in 1994 and 1995 that the energy of the autonomy battle might have worn off, as groups were torn apart by infighting over limited resources. The campaign leading up to the October 1996 election in Nicaragua reenergized the feminist movement to a limited extent. But political divisions within Nicaragua, within the parties as well as the social movements, also created an opportunity for another anti-politics candidate similar to doña Violeta, far-right populist, Arnoldo Alemán, now president of Nicaragua. The case of Nicaragua suggests that there is a thin line between political autonomy and political fragmentation.

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Personal Histories of the Candidates

The history of guerrilla war and revolutionary government that shaped the ideological reputation of the parties and the relationship of the social movements with those parties also shaped the sorts of people that candidates were. That legacy created strategic opportunities for some candidates and limited the options of others.

Violeta Chamorro was in a better position than any of the other major presidential candidates to run an antifeminist, antiwar campaign. All the other presidential candidates, with the exception of one minor candidate in El Salvador, were men. While in theory, male candidates could run on an antifeminist platform, they could easily be accused of being antiwoman, something no candidate wants, since women are allowed to vote. But making an antiwoman accusation stick on Violeta Chamorro would have been difficult. Another reason why only Violeta Chamorro could have run this sort of campaign against the civil war (and the implied link between war and feminism) was that she was the only major candidate in either country who had not been directly involved in the civil war.

Finally, doña Violeta's near total lack of political experience meant that her best option was to run on her record as a mother. Daniel Ortega's strategy, while also gendered, was not an attempt to express a gendered message but was instead an effort to run away from the economic disaster and civil war of the 1980s. It could be argued that a more confrontational campaign emphasizing the many positive aspects of the Sandinista record, including the feminist elements of that record, might have been more effective. But it would have been very hard for Daniel to attack doña Violeta (an older women who spent most of her campaign in a wheelchair with her leg in a cast) without coming across as a bully, a typical *machista* man.

In the Salvadoran case, both the leftwing coalition and the rightwing ARENA party had many members who had been directly involved in the civil war. The main member of the coalition, the FMLN, had been a guerrilla group only two years earlier, while the ARENA party and its presidential candidate Armando Calderón Sol were closely linked to the death squads responsible for most of the violence of the war. So neither party could convincingly run on a pacifist antiwar platform. Instead, both tried to downplay the legacy of the civil war.

But either party might have utilized a gendered campaign instead of the bland politically empty campaigns that both chose. They did not, because an antifeminist campaign would have seemed vulgar to many and because neither of the major parties was particularly feminist. Furthermore, ARENA members assumed, correctly I believe, that few if any feminists would consider voting for ARENA, and coalition members assumed that they could count on feminist votes in exchange for very little.

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Conclusions

I have argued that the gendered differences in these elections were principally due to three factors. The main difference between the two cases is that the FSLN of Nicaragua succeeded in overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship and governing for over a decade. In contrast, the FMLN never succeeded in overthrowing the militarized government of El Salvador. The other two factors flow out of this central difference. Because of the long period of Sandinista rule, organized feminists in Nicaragua were much less autonomous and much less able to organize independently than their counterparts in El Salvador at the time of the first post-civil war elections. Finally, the electoral strategies that candidates chose were shaped by their personal histories. Because she had not participated actively in the war, Violeta Chamorro had the option of running on the image of a long-suffering mother who preferred familial reconciliation to war. In El Salvador, members of both major parties were actively involved in the civil war and so could not take pacifist, antiwar positions, but instead had to downplay the war's legacy.

The legacy of the civil war years in both cases severely constrained the electoral strategies of certain actors and opened up opportunities for others. Social movements helped set the stage for the elections, both as organizations with relations to the guerrillas and the political parties, and as carriers of ideas that then became associated with certain parties. Yet, once the election campaigns began in each country, the formerly fluid rules of politics began to solidify. The gendered outcomes in both cases were as much a function of relations between the women's movements, the guerrillas, and the political parties in the period leading up to the elections as they were due to the role of women's movements in the election campaigns themselves.

Election campaigns are dynamic events in which social movements may play significant roles. However, as this comparison showed, there is no guarantee that social movements will choose to or be able to participate in these events. If they do not do so, the extent to which they will be a democratizing force is necessarily limited. So those who assert the democratizing potential of social movements need to pay more attention to the mechanisms of formal politics. It is often through these mechanisms that a potential becomes a reality.

These cases also suggest room for improvement in the way elections are studied by political scientists. Mainstream election studies, with their emphasis on numerical results and polling data, do a good job of analyzing formal shifts of power as parties are voted in and out of office. But they often do a poor job of analyzing more informal shifts of power. Here attention to social movements could enhance our understanding of electoral politics. The informal shifts in societal power that often result from campaigns have as much to do with the role of social movements throughout the campaign and the images and rhetoric utilized by candidates as they do with the final vote.

This distinction between formal shifts and informal shifts was illustrated in comparing the first post-civil war elections in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In

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both of those elections, the right-wing parties won. And yet the power dynamics that resulted from the campaigns were quite different, if seen from the perspective of organized feminists. A better nuanced view of power dynamics will be gained by students of both social movements and elections if the interactions between movements and parties are located at the center of more of our studies.*

*I am grateful to Cynthia Enloe, Duane Oldfield, Eric Selbin, and Jack Spence for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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

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

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Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining

WILLIAM P. AVERY

It is usually the case in trade negotiations that political leaders are caught between the strong concerns of domestic interests and equally strong international interests of the state. Leaders and trade negotiators attempt to cope with this dilemma by employing what Robert Putnam has conceptualized as "two-level bargaining games."[1] The result is a dynamic process in which negotiators try to forge agreements with their negotiating counterparts at the international level that will serve both the broad international interests of their state and gain sufficient support from domestic constituencies whose concurrence is needed to ratify the agreement. Thus trade negotiators must constantly look over their shoulders in trade talks in order to fashion the best possible agreement that will win support at home.

The recently ratified North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is particularly well suited to test the analytic utility of Putnam's framework. During the negotiation and ratification processes, political leaders were subjected to the push and pull of powerful and often contradictory political pressures so intense that agreement on the various trade issues was nearly impossible. This article employs Putnam's approach to analyze the role of U.S. domestic interests in the negotiations leading to the agreement.[2] The objective is to evaluate

[1] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42(Summer 1988): 427–460.

[2] A useful discussion of domestic influences on international negotiation, including an extension of Putnam's scheme, is provided by Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side- Payments," *International Organization* 46 (Autumn 1992): 793–818. See also, H. R. Friman, "Side-Payments Versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations," *International Organization* 47 (Summer 1993): 387-410. For an extensive application of Putnam's framework in analyzing agriculture in the Uruguay Round, see William P. Avery, ed., *World Agriculture and the GATT, International Political Economy Yearbook*, vol. 7 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

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Putnam's model by exposing it to a rigorous empirical application. In the process, the analysis determines the extent to which interaction between the two bargaining levels helped to shape the free trade agreement and shows how this interaction influenced the prospects for ultimate ratification of the agreement.

Although the negotiations created a trilateral market, most of the debate and controversy concerned U.S. trade terms with Mexico. The United States had previously negotiated a free trade agreement with Canada in 1988 that generated comparatively much less controversy. Incorporating Canada into NAFTA, therefore, did not pose major problems for the negotiators. Free trade with Mexico, on the other hand, raised a host of thorny issues—such as possible U.S. job flight to the lower-wage labor market in Mexico—that were not present in the U.S.–Canada negotiations. This study thus emphasizes the U.S.–Mexican portion of the negotiations.

Two-Level Bargaining

Three sets of issues were particularly contentious in the U.S.–Mexican negotiations. One was the treatment of agriculture, a highly protected and heavily subsidized sector in both countries. Another involved labor, because of fear in the United States of possible job losses and depression of U.S. wages. The third dealt with environmental issues. In each of these areas, entrenched and well established groups comprise some of Washington's most powerful organized lobbies. It is not surprising, therefore, that these groups became formidable forces in both the negotiation and ratification of the agreement.

American trade negotiators were presented with the difficult task of reconciling these diverse domestic interests with the state's sometimes conflicting larger international trade interests. At the international level, which Putnam calls Level I, bargaining takes place among representatives of states in order to conclude an agreement. Level II bargaining involves attempts to gain support from those domestic constituencies who must concur with the terms of the agreement if it is to be ratified. Often, what may be in the interests of the state at Level I collides head-on with the interests of entrenched domestic groups at Level II.

The two levels are highly interactive. Level II interests usually mold the bargaining positions and strategies of negotiators at Level I. Expectations by Level I actors about prospects for ratification also determine the parameters within which potential agreements are considered. Conversely, Level I developments can affect politics at Level II, sometimes increasing the prospects for ratification and at other times diminishing them.

One difficulty of such two-level bargaining is that failure to gain acceptance of the agreement at Level II can doom the agreement altogether, because the agreement cannot be amended at Level II without reopening the negotiations at Level I. Knowing this, negotiators must always be aware of the constraints imposed on them in Level I deliberations by Level II constituencies. However,

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it is possible for Level II constraints to work to the advantage of negotiators at Level I. When these constraints are perceived to be especially restrictive, one's negotiating counterparts may extend an additional degree of bargaining latitude.

In the language of game theory, the outcome of interactions between the two levels defines the "win-set" of the domestic constituencies (Level II) for each of the parties in the negotiations. A win-set consists of the set of all possible Level I agreements that would win ratification at Level II. Wider win-sets enhance the prospects for ratification, because the win-sets of each side are more likely to overlap. Ratification is impossible if no overlap exists. Just as negotiators with narrow win-sets may garner some bargaining space from their counterparts, negotiators whose win-sets are perceived to be large may be pressed to make concessions. Rational bargaining strategies would refrain from pressing negotiators to make concessions that threaten ratification (that is, restrict or eliminate the overlap between the win-sets).

In the sections that follow, the analytic utility of this two-level game approach is demonstrated in an application to the North American trade negotiations. The analysis focuses on factors in the negotiations that affect the size of the win-sets and how these win-sets are manipulated to influence negotiating outcomes.

Distribution of Level II Preferences

Putnam contends that one determinant of the size of the win-set for a Level I agreement is the particular distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents. He notes that ratification usually "pits the proposed agreement, not against an array of other (possibly attractive) alternatives, but only against 'no agreement.'"[3] Such was the case with NAFTA, which pitted the advocates of open markets against supporters of the status quo. Each of these sides is examined in this section.

The Market-Opening Coalition

In the early stages, attitudes toward the agreement were mixed within the Bush administration. The National Security Council and Department of State were strong backers, but U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills feared NAFTA might interfere with negotiations in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Hills eventually concluded that the NAFTA negotiations might actually strengthen the U.S. hand in the GATT talk, where U.S. negotiating positions had experienced some rough sledding. In the end, the major players on trade in the Bush administration formed a solid bloc of NAFTA support.

[3] Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," 442.

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Outside the Bush administration, support for the agreement was strongest among American business leaders. A survey conducted just after the agreement was signed showed that 72 percent of business executives supported NAFTA.[4] A broad coalition of business leaders joined the administration in promoting the agreement, led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, congressional supporters (largely Republicans), a variety of agricultural groups, and even some environmentalists. The market-opening coalition actually had formed a year earlier during the battle over congressional approval for the extension of fast-track authority for NAFTA. Such authority in a trade agreement requires Congress to consider the treaty in an up or down vote, without amendment, and within a specific period of time. Defeat on fast-track probably would have doomed the negotiations even before they got underway. Thus, for supporters of a free trade agreement, the fast-track vote in effect became a referendum on the agreement itself.

In recognition of the importance of the fast-track vote, "corporate America assembled a virtual lobbying Who's Who, including corporate chiefs from American Express Co., Eastman Kodak Co., Procter & Gamble Co. and many other blue-chip concerns."[5] Business supporters formed an umbrella organization called the Coalition for Trade Expansion that included more than 500 corporations and lobbyists. Five key business trade associations were represented in this coalition: the Business Roundtable, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Emergency Committee for American Trade, National Association of Manufacturers, and National Foreign Trade Council.[6]

Much of the supportive infrastructure for NAFTA was provided by an extensive private-sector advisory system, first mandated by Congress in the Trade Act of 1974. The purpose of the advisory system was to facilitate consultation between the executive and domestic interests in shaping trade policy and to provide a base of support for the policies formulated. Coordinated by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), approximately 1,000 advisers are involved in a system that is similar to Stephen Cohen's description of U.S. trade policy making as a "multilayered pyramid of lobbying activity."[7]

At the top of the pyramid is the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations. The ACTPN has forty-four members, mostly top business leaders, representing a cross-section of America's major economic sectors. The second level has seven committees that provide sector-specific advice from industry, agriculture, labor, and so on. A third level includes the numerous technical and sectoral advisory committees that provide the detailed information needed

[4] "Survey Finds NAFTA Favored by 72% of U.S. Executives," *Journal of Commerce,* 24 September 1992, 12A.

[5] Jill Abramson, "U.S.–Mexico Trade Pact Is Pitting Vast Armies of Capitol Hill Lobbyists against Each Other," *Wall Street Journal,* 25 April 1991.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Stephen D. Cohen, *The Making of United States International Economic Policy: Principles, Problems, and Proposals for Reform,* 4th ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 125.

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to assess the likely impact of trade policy on specific sectors. Although the USTR need not follow their recommendations, the committees must be informed of all "significant departures," and their views are communicated to Congress.

Altogether, this advisory system submitted thirty-seven reports on NAFTA. The report of the most senior panel, the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, strongly endorsed NAFTA, with only the labor representatives dissenting. James Robinson III, chair of the panel and head of American Express, said the trade agreement would "enhance the international competitiveness of U.S. companies."[8] He praised the Bush administration for working closely with the private sector in the NAFTA negotiations, noting that nearly 1,000 meetings had been held with trade negotiators and government officials.[9]

In Congress, a bipartisan coalition formed in both chambers to provide majority backing for fast-track authority. Although predominantly Republican, key members of the Democratic leadership also voted for the extension. In the House of Representatives, Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA), Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO), and Ways and Means Committee Chair Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) all supported fast-track. Gephardt, whose support for NAFTA was never very firm, later defected on final ratification. Strong support in the Senate came from Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) and Finance Committee Chair Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX). The House vote was 231-192, with only ninety-one Democrats voting in the majority. On the Senate side, twenty-three Democrats joined thirty-six Republicans in a 59-36 vote to defeat a resolution to deny fast-track authority.[10]

Support for NAFTA among agricultural groups was mixed throughout the negotiations, reflecting the great diversity of interests in American agriculture. Perhaps nowhere was this diversity more evident than in the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC), one of the sector-specific advisory committees within the president's private sector advisory system. APAC played an important role in the negotiations, largely because of the broad range of farm interests and groups it represented. It served as a forum where farms groups could express their views on the agricultural issues that emerged in the negotiations.[11] And while APAC could never speak with one voice on all issues, reflecting as it does the fragmented nature of American agricultural interests, it did provide a significant base of support for the agreement. In its report to the USTR, APAC concluded that "the proposed NAFTA agreement provides long term net export growth opportunities for U.S. agriculture and is in the eco-

[8] Japan Economic Institute, "Participation of the Private Sector in U.S. Trade Policymaking: The North American Free Trade Agreement as Case Study," *JEI Report* 39A (16 October 1992): 4.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Guy Gugliotta, "House Vote Backs Bush on Trade," *Washington Post,* 24 May 1991.

[11] W. A. Boutwell, president of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, interview with author, 4 February 1993.

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nomic interest of the United States."[12] Recognizing that all trade agreements have winners and losers, APAC acknowledged that its objective of export growth opportunities could not be achieved for every commodity.

Grain producers were among NAFTA's strongest agricultural supporters for simple and straightforward reasons. In virtually every grain commodity, American farmers already had a commanding lead in trade with Mexico. Lowering trade barriers was expected to produce even more opportunities for grain exports. Wesley Peterson claims that NAFTA may lead to increased U.S. grain exports "even if . . . markets are only partially liberalized."[13] According to the *Wall Street Journal*, U.S. corn exports to Mexico "could easily double under free trade."[14] It is no surprise that two of the staunchest members of the market-opening coalition were the National Corn Growers Association and the U.S. Feed Grains Council.

One of America's largest farm organizations, the American Farm Bureau Federation, invested considerable time and effort in support of the agreement. The bureau commissioned a four-volume study of NAFTA's impact on various agricultural sectors[15] and sponsored four study missions to Mexico by about twenty representatives of their state organizations. The conclusion reached was that American agriculture "had less to fear than some people thought."[16] The bureau became an active supporter of fast-track authority and ratification, even organizing a coalition of supportive groups to lobby Congress.

A key decision by the bureau early in the negotiations was to oppose all exemptions in the accord. Farm Bureau officials wanted to avoid what had happened in the free trade agreement with Canada, where large product groups (dairy, peanuts, cotton, sugar, and sweeteners, known as Section 22 products) were excluded from free trade provisions. They argued that if the United States tried to exempt such products, for example, as fresh fruits and vegetables, Mexico would almost certainly protect corn. The bureau opposed all exemptions in order to gain access to Mexico's grain markets. As a spokesman for the bureau told this writer, "We wouldn't have much of an agreement, if we allowed the exceptions."[17]

[12] Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee (APAC), "Report of the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee Regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement," unpublished document, n.d.

[13] E. Wesley F. Peterson, "The Implications of a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico for U.S. Grain and Oilseed Exports" in American Farm Bureau Federation, *NAFTA: Effects on Agriculture*, vol. 3 (Park Ridge, IL: American Farm Bureau Research Foundation, 1991), 27.

[14] Bob Davis, "U.S., Mexico on Verge of Agreement on Crops, Computers in Trade Talks," *Wall Street Journal,* 17 July 1992, A2. Trade in corn, which is probably Mexico's most politically sensitive commodity, would gradually become duty free over a fifteen-year period, as Mexican licenses are removed and U.S. export quotas expanded.

[15] See American Farm Bureau Federation, *NAFTA: Effects on Agriculture*, 4 vols.

[16] Paul A. Drazek, director of governmental relations, American Farm Bureau Federation, interview with author, 3 February 1993.

[17] Ibid.

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The market-opening coalition included two more sources of support that warrant mention: the American consumer (or public opinion) and some environmental groups. Most public opinion polls revealed fairly broad support for free trade with Mexico, although that support slipped some as the recession tightened in 1992 and opponents became more vocal.[18] Favorable public opinion probably created some space within which congressional support could be built in the crucial battle for fast-track authority and later in the vote on the agreement itself.

As for the environmental groups, many opposed the treaty, but some did not. America's largest environmental group, the National Wildlife Federation, voiced qualified support early on for fast-tracking the agreement. In fact, as a member of one of the seven sector advisory groups (investment), the federation worked closely with the Bush administration to ensure the agreement would have adequate environmental safeguards.

The federation and other environmental groups were concerned about Mexico's existing environmental problems, especially in Mexico City and along the U.S.–Mexico border. The *New York Times* described the air in Mexico City as "an unequaled collection of atmospheric poisons."[19] Along the border, rapid and unplanned industrial development spurred by Mexico's expanding *maquiladora* program has produced contaminated water, careless and improper toxic waste disposal, and extensive degradation of air quality.[20] Environmentalists feared the free trade agreement would accelerate investment and production along the border and in Mexico City, exacerbating an already serious problem. Concern also was expressed about Mexico's lax enforcement of its environmental laws. It was argued that firms would move south to avoid tougher laws and enforcement in the United States and Canada.

President George Bush sought to assuage these concerns early on by promising to address environmental issues directly in the treaty itself and in cooperative bilateral agreements. In the end, six environmental groups, representing about seven million members, became part of the market-opening coalition. Joining the National Wildlife Federation were the Natural Resources Defense Council, World Wildlife Fund, National Audubon Society, Environmental Defense Fund, and Conservation International.[21]

[18] "US, Canada, Mexico Reach North American Trade Agreement," *Facts on File,* 13 August 1992, 582.

[19] Mark Uhlig, "Mexico City's Toxic Residue Worsens Already Filthy Air," 12 May 1991, 1.

[20] Mexico's *maquiladora* program was set up in the 1960s to improve the nation's export performance. The program provides government incentives for assembly-oriented manufacturing plants that export most or all of the production. For instance, the plants are permitted to import components duty-free if the products are then exported. *Maquiladoras* were required to locate along the border with the United States.

[21] Keith Schneider, "Environment Groups Are Split on Support for Free-Trade Pact," *New York Times*, 16 September 1993.

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The Status Quo Coalition

Opposition to the agreement formed early and strong. Organized under the name Citizen Trade Campaign, the status quo coalition included more than sixty organizations representing labor unions, environmental and consumer advocacy groups, some segments of agriculture, Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, and some religious and civic groups. The coalition claimed to represent more than 45 million people in all fifty states, with operations in thirty-eight states, including field staff in twenty-five states.[22] Led by organized labor, in particular the AFL-CIO, opponents began lobbying Congress against fast-track as early as autumn 1990, long before the pro-NAFTA coalition began its push. Arguments against the agreement ranged from loss of American jobs to concern about the reappearance of screwworm infestation in cattle.

By far the strongest opposition to NAFTA came from U.S. labor unions. The AFL-CIO disputed White House claims that free trade would create 44,000 to 150,000 new American jobs, charging that "tens of thousands" of jobs would flow to low-wage Mexico.[23] Economists for the labor-supported Economic Policy Institute claimed that because of increased investment in Mexico, "550,000 fewer high-paying jobs will be created in the United States with the trade pact than without it during the next 10 years."[24] At one point, the institute issued a report claiming "that 7.4 million manufacturing jobs currently located in the United States are *vulnerable* to relocation to Mexico. . . ."[25] A top AFL-CIO official called the agreement "a bad deal for American workers, consumers, and the long-term health of the American economy."[26]

Although not directly linked to the Citizens Trade Campaign, Ross Perot and his organization, United We Stand America, echoed many of the arguments put forward by organized labor. In a book co-written with Pat Choate in 1993, Perot criticized the agreement because among other things he believed American jobs would be lost to Mexico partly because of large differentials in wages. In a published debate between Choate and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa, Choate cited figures showing Mexican workers earning one-seventh the wages of American workers. Choate also said that "by Mexico's own estimates, investors gain $15,000 or more per U.S. job that is shifted to Mexico." Choate concluded that "for U.S. companies undecided about moving to Mexico, NAFTA removes the remaining impediments and doubts."[27]

[22] Citizens Trade Campaign, "An Introduction to the Citizens Trade Campaign," Washington, DC, Mimeographed.

[23] Peter Truell and Eduardo Lachica, "Administration Gets Tough on Trade as Congress Gets Set to Vote on Extending Negotiating Power," *Wall Street Journal,* 29 April 1991.

[24] Stuart Auerbach, "Accord's Losers, Winners," *Washington Post,* 13 August 1992.

[25] T. Lee, "Jobs Vulnerable to Relocation Due to NAFTA: A State-by-State Breakdown," *Economic Policy Institute* (23 October 1992): 3.

[26] Stuart Auerbach, "US, Canada and Mexico Agree to Form Trade Bloc," *Washington Post,* 13 August 1992.

[27] Rufus Yerxa and Pat Choate, "The Great NAFTA Debate," *Washington Post,* 3 October 1993.

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In addition to fears of job losses, labor leaders also charged that NAFTA did not protect worker rights and workplace standards in Mexico. They insisted that the agreement allow for trade sanctions should Mexico fail to respect workers' rights to organize and bargain collectively. Labor also demanded that sanctions be permitted to force "the establishment of strong workplace health and safety standards, appropriate minimum wage structures, the elimination of child labor, a prohibition on forced labor, and guarantees of nondiscrimination in employment."[28] Among other labor demands was "a prohibition on transferring work or workers across borders in the event of a labor dispute, and a prohibition on trade while a labor dispute is in progress."[29]

Many of the major environmental groups in the United States opposed the agreement on grounds that most Mexican environmental laws are weak or nonexistent and not vigorously enforced. Such groups as the Sierra Club and Greenpeace pointed out that, for example, Mexico has no standards regulating emissions from paint coatings and solvents, while tough rules in California require cutting solvents by 93 percent in 1996.[30]

Such differences in environmental standards, they contend, would greatly accelerate job flight from U.S. companies under free trade. A spokesman for Friends of the Earth, responding to the Bush administration's claim that tougher Mexican environmental standards will follow economic growth, said: "The president's plan is flawed. What he is saying is that Mexico's environment will get better only as they get rich. . . . The president is throwing a party and hoping you collect enough at the door to buy a vacuum cleaner."[31]

Advocacy groups such as Ralph Nader's Public Citizen and the Child Labor Coalition also opposed the agreement. In fact, Public Citizen was one of the most active leaders of the status quo coalition. Nader's opposition was based largely on environmental concerns. He claimed that the trade pact would force the United States to abandon its own laws protecting health and the environment. He warned that American "laws on pesticide residues in food, contaminated food, and disposal of hazardous waste" would be victimized by free trade with Mexico.[32] Lori Wallach, a staff attorney for Public Citizen, raised another objection to the agreement in congressional testimony on NAFTA. She argued against the treaty because "rules are set and disputes are settled in an entirely anti-democratic fashion by unelected, unaccountable trade bureaucrats lobbied heavily by industry interests."[33] The Child Labor Coalition expressed concerns about exploitation of child labor under poorly enforced laws in Mexico.

[28] AFL-CIO, *NAFTA Action Source Book* (Washington, DC: AFL-CIO Task Force on Trade, n.d.), 3.

[29] Ibid., 5.

[30] John Dillin, "Mexico's Pollution Threatens Free Trade," *Christian Science Monitor,* 13 May 1991.

[31] Ibid.

[32] "Review & Outlook," *Wall Street Journal,* 29 April 1991.

[33] U.S. House of Representatives, *North American Free Trade Agreement: American Jobs and Environmental Protection,* Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., 9 December 1991, 39.

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Agricultural groups in the status quo coalition tended to be linked to specific commodities. Among those most opposed were sugar, dairy, cotton, and peanut producers. In the agreement with Canada, they won a hard-fought battle for exemption from liberalization. In NAFTA, however, they will be subjected to gradual market-opening requirements that over some years will completely liberalize trade with Mexico in these products. Even though peanut and sugar producers are given the longest transition time (fifteen years), their opposition to the accord remained strong. Peanut growers even threatened an expensive television campaign to warn U.S. consumers of "danger" from imported peanuts.[34]

U.S. sugar producers long have been shielded from foreign competition under a GATT arrangement that permits only a small quota of sugar to be imported. The result is that American sugar producers receive 21 cents per pound for a commodity that sells on the world market for less than half that price. The U.S. sugar quota is currently at 1.5 million tons, which makes up the difference between domestic annual production and demand. Early in the negotiations, Mexico, also a net importer of sugar, sought to acquire all of this quota. Opponents of this proposal argued that since Mexican sugar production does not even cover domestic demand, Mexico would merely import cheap Cuban sugar to meet domestic demand and export its crop to the United States and reap huge profits. A spokesman for the National Farmers Union accused Mexico of already "going through the paperwork to be an exporter [of sugar]."[35]

American farmers most threatened by trade liberalization were fresh fruit and vegetable growers. The old system of complementary tariffs imposed duties on Mexican imports during the U.S. harvest season that dropped off to little or nothing for the rest of the year, thus protecting American growers from head-to-head competition with cheaper Mexican fruit and vegetables. NAFTA eventually uproots this protective tariff arrangement. For this reason, Florida farmers, especially those who grow oranges for juice concentrate, fiercely opposed the trade agreement, insisting that all winter fruit and vegetables be exempted. They provide more than half the nation's supply of winter produce crops, but share a growing season with Mexico. Dan Gunter, head of the Department of Citrus for the State of Florida, said: "if Mexico is given duty-free entry into the U.S., Florida orange juice will be but a memory."[36]

California's produce growers shared many of the Florida growers' concerns. California accounts for about 90 percent of U.S. processed tomatoes, but could be damaged by imports from Mexico, where farm laborers are paid only about $4 per day. The California Tomato Growers Association claimed that Mexico already places tomatoes in the U.S. market at prices far below what

[34] "NAFTA Watch," *Business Latin America,* 7 September 1992, 316.

[35] Scott Pendleton, "NAFTA Will Benefit US Agriculture in the Long Run," *Christian Science Monitor,* 13 August 1992.

[36] Scott Armstrong and Daniel D. Wood, "US Farmers Wary of Trade Pact with Mexicans," *Christian Science Monitor,* 28 May 1991.

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American growers can match. Other similarly situated products are broccoli, cucumbers, table grapes, and peppers.[37] Data reported by the American Farm Bureau Federation suggest this may be true. After trade barriers between Mexico and the United States began to fall in the mid-1980s, Mexican vegetable exports to the United States increased substantially.[38] Fearing this trend would grow, California tomato growers pressed for a transition period of more than twenty years, including "snap-back" protection.[39]

Avocado growers in California also mounted stiff opposition to the trade pact. The issue for them was not loss of tariff protection, but loss of a total ban on avocado imports from Mexico dating back to 1914. The ban existed because U.S. growers had claimed that Mexican avocados were infested with seed weevils and other pests that could destroy the entire American avocado industry. Mexico disputed this and countered that U.S. growers were merely protecting their market from a more competitively priced product. Lifting the ban would mean about $100 million in Mexican avocado exports to the United States and that the American consumer would see an immediate and dramatic drop in price. During NAFTA negotiations, California avocado farmers insisted on retaining the ban, saying that no transition period was slow enough for them.[40]

Agricultural opponents to free trade with Mexico had two important allies: a majority of congressional Democrats and the National Farmers Union, an organization representing about two million family farmers. The Farmers Union also provides a fairly solid base of electoral support for the Democratic party and its candidates among farm constituencies. Although some prominent Democrats gave qualified support for the agreement, most Democrats in the House and Senate did not. They sided with the objections raised by labor and other opponents of the agreement. In general, the Democratic party is not as likely to extend unqualified support to free trade as a matter of economic principle as is the Republican party. Moreover, Democrats were reluctant to go against unified labor opposition to NAFTA, because labor forms an important part of their financial and electoral support. During the congressional debate over fast-track, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) issued a formal statement opposing the agreement.[41]

The Farmers Union was an eager participant in the status quo coalition, although a spokesman was reluctant to characterize its position as protectionist. In an interview with this writer, the Union's chief Washington lobbyist rarely mentioned direct economic objections to agricultural provisions of the NAFTA.

[37] Ibid., 2.

[38] American Farm Bureau Federation, *NAFTA,* vol. 4, 28.

[39] "Snapback" was designed as a special safeguard provision to protect against the damaging effects of import surges. When duty-free imports of certain products rise above pre-established trigger levels, the previous tariffs on those products could be reimposed by the importing country.

[40] Juanita Darling, "Fearing a Bitter Harvest," *Los Angeles Times,* 16 March 1992.

[41] Ronald Brownstein and Karen Tumulty, "Mexico Free-Trade Pact Faces Hard Sell in Congress," *Los Angeles Times,* 6 April 1991.

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Instead, repeated references were made to the familiar arguments advanced by labor and environmental groups.[42] One analyst suggested that "since the arguments in favor of an agreement are compelling, opponents are casting about for noneconomic arguments to torpedo (the agreement)."[43] Whether this was the case with the Farmers Union is not clear, although it would appear far easier to base one's objection on protection of American health, jobs, and the environment than on more narrowly defined self interests.

The configuration of preferences and coalitions at the domestic level (Level II) divided along distinct lines, separating those who favored market opening and those who did not. As Putnam's analysis anticipated, the most significant disagreement among Level II constituencies was over whether the trade agreement with Mexico was better than no agreement at all. A spokesman for the Farm Bureau put it in precisely those terms: "NAFTA may not be perfect, but it is much better than no agreement at all."[44] Others took the opposite position. For them, the agreement suffered "fatal flaws" and was worse than no agreement.[45]

Putnam sees negotiators at Level I using such preference divisions to strengthen their hands in the negotiations. By constantly "looking over their shoulder" at Level II opponents, negotiators may try to squeeze additional concessions from the other side.[46] He cautions, however, that the effect of such Level II divisions may be reduction of the prospects for reaching a Level I agreement. If either side in the negotiations comes to doubt the ability of the other to deliver on promises made, it can undermine potential for agreement. "Credibility," Putnam argues, "(and thus the ability to strike deals) at Level I is enhanced by a negotiator's (demonstrated) ability to 'deliver' at Level II."[47]

Structure of Level II Ratification Process

Ratification of international agreements takes place within an institutional context of norms, rules, and procedures that affect the size of the win-set. For example, as Putnam points out, the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority in the U.S Senate to ratify treaties produces a smaller win-set than does a mere majority. He maintains that "this increases the bargaining power of American negotiators, but it also reduces the scope for international cooperation."[48] This is so, Putnam argues, because the odds are greater that American negotiators may not be able to deliver on the deal, a development he calls "in-

[42] Michael V. Dunn, vice president for legislative services, National Farmers Union, interview with author, 4 February 1993.

[43] M. D. Baer, "Salinas's Achilles' Heel," *Christian Science Monitor,* 5 December 1990.

[44] Drazek interview with author.

[45] Dunn interview with author.

[46] Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," 444.

[47] Ibid., 439.

[48] Ibid., 448.

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voluntary defection."[49] Thus, win-sets are larger for Level I negotiators who have more autonomy from their Level II constituents.

Congress and the president have designed elaborate procedures to allow congressional input on trade agreements in such a way that minimizes the impact on size of the win-set. Under fast-track procedures, the treaty is submitted for ratification to the entire Congress, which is required "to say 'yes' or 'no' to the whole agreement, in a deadline-driven, limited debate, no-amendment-up-or-down vote."[50] Fast-track is intended to protect trade packages from being nibbled away bit-by-bit in long, drawn-out debate.

Fast-track follows a prescribed sequence of steps leading to formal considerations by Congress. First, though not required, the president may announce a handshake agreement, allowing him to declare a deal and claim credit before all the actual terms are settled. Second, the initialing of the agreement launches the formal beginning of fast-track consideration. This serves as official notification to Congress that the president intends to sign an agreement. Third, the final agreement must be signed no sooner than ninety days after initialing, allowing some time for additional congressional input. Fourth, consideration by Congress begins after the president has submitted three documents: the actual trade agreement, a draft bill changing existing law to comply with the agreement, and necessary regulatory changes. The president may submit these documents anytime after signing the final agreement, but once they are submitted, Congress has no more than ninety legislative days to act.[51]

Although these procedures are said to put trade agreements on a fast legislative track, in fact they lay out a slow and deliberate process. The ninety legislative days within which Congress must act include only those days when Congress is actually in session, which could amount to half a year. The first forty-five days are reserved for consideration by House committees, after which the House is given fifteen days to take a floor vote. On the Senate side, fifteen days are set aside for committee consideration, with the floor vote coming within the next fifteen days. Passage of the agreement requires a simple majority vote in both houses.

Returning to Putnam's argument about the size of win-sets in relation to the autonomy of negotiators from Level II constituents, we can conclude that the unique fast-track procedures do render U.S. trade negotiators a margin of autonomy that they otherwise would not have had. The simple majority vote alone is a significant advantage over the two-thirds Senate rule for formal, non-trade treaties. In trade negotiations, therefore, U.S. negotiating counterparts are likely to be less wary of commitments made by American negotiators and of their ability to avoid involuntary defection on those commitments.

[49] Ibid., 438–39.

[50] Robert L. Paarlberg, "Why Agriculture Blocked the Uruguay Round: Evolving Strategies in a Two-Level Game," W. P. Avery, ed., *World Agriculture and the GATT* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 44.

[51] President Bush submitted the final agreement to Congress on 17 December 1992.

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Together with the Level II coalitions and preferences described earlier, these ratification procedures help shape the behavior of negotiators at Level I. The strategies employed in the negotiations—that is, the skill employed in the manipulation of the two-level bargaining game—affect the shape of the agreement and the prospects for ratification.

Level I Negotiating Strategies

In international negotiations, the Level I negotiators seek strategies that expand their win-set and thus the prospects for ratification of the agreement. Putnam discusses the use of "side-payments" and "generic good will" to win support. Side-payments involve inducements to persuade waverers and to win over marginal opponents. "What counts at Level II," Putnam maintains, "is not total national costs and benefits, but their *incidence, relative to existing coalitions and proto-coalitions.*"[52] That is to say, the skilled Level I strategist will offer side-payments (trade concessions) not to the already committed, such as confirmed free traders or die-hard protectionists, but to the marginally committed or the uncommitted. These individuals and groups comprise the swing votes that can provide the margin of victory in the ratification process.

Targeted Side-Payments

The Bush administration adopted a classic two-level bargaining strategy of carefully targeted side-payments in the form of concessions to groups perceived as able to provide swing support for the agreement. In making such concessional side-payments, care must be taken not to relinquish core values in the negotiations. For example, a decision was made early on that pressures for agricultural exemptions would be vigorously resisted. This resulted in an agreement representing the first trade pact that calls for complete, albeit gradual elimination of all barriers to agricultural trade.

During the congressional debate on fast-track, most of the opposition was focused on labor and environmental objections to the agreement. To win over wavering members of Congress, Bush sent a ninety-page letter to Representatives Dan Rostenkowski and Richard Gephardt and to Senator Lloyd Bentsen specifying a number of concessions.[53] On labor issues, Bush promised in the trade talks to push for longer transition periods than those in the free trade agreement (FTA) with Canada, in order to minimize dislocation of U.S. workers in trade-sensitive sectors. He promised not to negotiate the issues of labor mobility and existing U.S. immigration laws. Additionally, Bush committed to work with Congress to ensure an adequately funded worker adjustment pro-

[52] Putman, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," 450–451. (Emphasis in original.)

[53] U.S. Trade Representative, "Response to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement," unpublished document, n.d., 1–5.

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gram for displaced workers and to sign a memorandum of understanding with Mexico providing for joint action on labor standards, health and working conditions, and child labor.

To a considerable extent, President Bush was able to deliver on all these pledges. In the treaty, U.S. negotiators won fifteen-year phase-in periods for the most sensitive products to ease the transition for U.S. workers. They also were able to get agreement on snap-back to pre-NAFTA tariff levels on sensitive products, where serious injury was present or threatened. Binational cooperation resulted in several comparative studies relating to labor laws and work conditions in the two countries. A new Consultative Commission on Labor Matters was formed to deal with enforcement of labor laws and regulations. The two countries also agreed to create new standards for workplace safety and sanitation. And perhaps most important, Bush launched a new $10 billion worker adjustment program to provide training and assistance for displaced U.S. workers.[54]

On the environment, President Bush pledged to retain the right to exclude any products that do not meet U.S. health and safety standards. He also pledged to maintain the right to impose stringent controls on pesticide use, energy conservation, and toxic waste. Moreover, he promised to pursue in parallel negotiations with Mexico a series of joint environmental initiatives ranging from technical cooperation to an integrated environmental plan to clean up pollution along the U.S.–Mexico border. One concession the president did not make, however, was to require Mexico to clean up its own environment, as some environmentalists had demanded.

Clearly, these efforts were designed to widen the administration's win-set in the negotiations. Responding to reporters' questions about the concessions, President Bush stated: "We're determined to work with Mexico to address the labor and environmental issues that are of common concern."[55] U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills was even more explicit about the objective of the pledges. She told reporters: "We have listened . . . we have reached out. I have met with groups that have expressed their concern. . . . Our action plan is shaped to respond to those concerns."[56]

The concessions on labor issues amounted to a complete reversal of the Reagan administration policy against special adjustment programs for displaced workers. Representative Rostenkowski promptly expressed his support for extending fast-track authority and stated his belief that many uncommitted members of the House Ways and Means Committee also were impressed with the president's response.[57] Senator Bentsen responded by applauding Bush for

[54] Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, *NAFTA: An Assessment,* rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993), 27–30.

[55] John E. Yang and Guy Gugliotta, "Bush Seeks to Allay Hill Fears on Free Trade Pact," *Washington Post,* 2 May 1991.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

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making "significant concessions."[58] Rostenkowski and Bentsen chaired the key trade committees in their respective chambers, and their support was considered crucial. Although under intense pressure from labor organizations, Representative Gephardt supported fast-track authority, but with reservations. "I think we should try to do a treaty," he said. But "we retain the right to amend or reject it, if it's not agreeable to us."[59]

Not every source of opposition, however, was won over by the administration's strategy. Organized labor, especially the AFL-CIO, continued to oppose the agreement. Senator Donald Riegle (D-MI), a strong labor supporter whose state has experienced high unemployment, dismissed the Bush concessions as inadequate. In reference to the president's letter, he said that it shows the administration "fully intends to side-step these issues. What you've got is the generalizations and sophistry that you get when you have a tough problem that they don't have any intention of dealing with."[60] Some environmental groups, on the other hand, were softened up by the White House strategy. Leaders of several such groups, including the Nature Conservancy and the Natural Resources Defense Council, agreed to meet with President Bush to discuss their concerns, prompting Ralph Nader to accuse them of selling out.[61]

The president's Level I strategy was severely tested in the area of agriculture. An official in the office of the USTR, who worked directly on the agricultural negotiations, told this writer: "American agriculture is so fragmented that it is hard to get agreement no matter what you do."[62] Certainly, this seems to have been true with regard to sugar. After months of haggling over liberalizing sugar trade, U.S. negotiators offered a generous concession, but one that did not meet the sugar producers' demand for exemption. The American Sugarbeet Growers Association promptly rejected it. Their vice president stated: "I can't see how the safeguards are going to work."[63] A representative of a large agricultural group, who requested not to be identified, told this writer that sugar producers could have ended up with a better deal if they had cooperated with the administration. In his opinion, "they were uncooperative because they wanted to be able to oppose the final draft, which is precisely where they are now."

Florida fruit and vegetable producers reacted to concessions in much the same manner. The Florida orange juice industry was particularly unhappy. Or-

[58] "A Political Tap Dance to Preserve Fast Track," *Los Angeles Times,* 2 May 1991.

[59] Guy Lee, "'Fast Track' Sprint: Frenzied Lobbying on a Treaty Not Yet Written," *Washington Post*, 23 May 1991.

[60] John E. Yang and Guy Gugliotta, "Bush Seeks to Allay Hill Fears on Free Trade Pact," *Washington Post*, 2 May 1991.

[61] Lee, "'Fast Track' Sprint."

[62] Leonard W. Condon, deputy assistant U.S. trade representative for Agricultural Affairs, interview with author, 4 February 1993.

[63] Bob Davis, "Free-Trade Pact Provisions Would Curb Competition in Agricultural Products," *Wall Street Journal,* 19 August 1992.

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ange juice producers had pushed for an exemption and were dissatisfied with both the fifteen-year transition period and the tariff-rate-quota they received in the agreement. Their representative on the APAC claimed that if they could not get an exclusion for citrus, at least they should have received a twenty-year transition period with no tariff reductions.[64] Tomato growers also complained that their transition period of ten years was too short. Florida's director of agriculture was said to believe that 400,000 jobs would be lost in Florida agriculture with the free trade agreement.[65]

Not all American citrus and vegetable farmers, however, reacted the same way as Florida growers. California fresh fruit producers were generally satisfied with the concessions they received, but they face less head-to-head competition with Mexico than does the Florida orange juice industry.[66] The same can be said for Texaas fruit and produce growers. The Texas Citrus and Vegetable Association (TCVA) even endorsed the agreement. Since these farmers were presumed to be vulnerable to Mexican competition, some observers may have been surprised by the TCVA endorsement. In fact, Mexico already ships annually to the United States about $1.5 billion of the same products grown by TCVA members. But many of those exports come from farms owned by Texas growers in Mexico, plus Mexico and Texas have different growing seasons.[67]

As reported earlier, business leaders were overwhelmingly supportive of NAFTA from the beginning. But that did not mean that no segments of American business were targeted for side-payments. In fact, two business sectors (textiles/apparel and automobiles) received concessions so generous as to warrant separate mention. The textiles and apparel industry lobbied vigorously for even greater protection in NAFTA than it previously had received in the FTA with Canada. Their concession was a provision requiring items that qualify for regional preferences be produced from yarn made in one of the NAFTA countries.

Automobile and auto parts manufacturers also were big winners. They won rules of origin concessions that "substantially raise the overall regional-content requirements for preferential trade in automotive products."[68] These effectively create a regional zone of preference for the automotive sector, forcing foreign transplant firms in the three countries to buy more auto components in North America in order to gain duty-free access to the integrated market.

Overall, the Bush administration's negotiating strategy of targeted side-payments appears to have expanded the president's win-set with some important Level II constituencies. Although the strategy failed to win over organized labor, significant progress was made with key sectors of industry, agriculture,

[64] Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee, "Report of the Agricultural Policy Advisory Committee Regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement," unpublished document, n.d., 16.

[65] Dunn, interview with author.

[66] Drazek, interview with author.

[67] Scott Pendleton, "NAFTA Will Benefit US Agriculture in the Long Run," *Christian Science Monitor,* 13 August 1992.

[68] Hufbauer and Schott, *NAFTA,* 6.

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and some environmental groups. Constituencies that felt they had the most to lose (agricultural commodities such as Section 22 products and orange juice) probably never could have been persuaded. But for many others, the strategy was effective. The position taken by the Texas citrus and vegetable growers may represent the view held by many of those marginal opponents who came to support the agreement. A spokesman for the growers said: "Free trade is going to set us back a little bit. But it will be positive in the long run.[69]

Recall that skillful Level I negotiators will seldom waste important side-payments on the already committed. An illustration of this tactic can be found in the Bush administration's choice of agricultural groups invited to participate in the APAC. While groups such as the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives had ready access to the advisory panel, the National Farmers Union was deliberately excluded. Although the Farmers Union tried repeatedly to gain representation on the APAC, its efforts were rebuffed.[70] The record of the Farmers Union, in contrast to the Farm Bureau and the National Council, as an electoral supporter of Democrats and as an organization with a protectionist bent, probably convinced the White House that any effort to coopt it would be fruitless.

Nonetheless, the APAC and other private sector advisory committees were broadly based, and not all groups represented on them ended up supporting NAFTA. The greatest value of these committees to the trade negotiations was the structured and formal opportunity they presented the Level I negotiators to coopt domestic constituencies into supporting the agreement by exposing them directly to the consequences and implications of their own demands. Putnam believes that formalizing such practices can improve the prospects for ratification of an agreement.[71]

Generic Good Will

In addition to the strategic "use of specific side-payments, a chief negotiator whose political standing at home is high can more easily win ratification of his foreign initiatives."[72] Although generic good will is no guarantee of ratification, most observers believed the public euphoria over the Persian Gulf War greatly expanded President Bush's win-set on this and most other issues he might have chosen to tackle. Certainly, public opinion polls showed broad support for the free trade pact, at least in the early stages of the negotiations.

Democratic strategists, however, saw the agreement as a potentially potent campaign issue in the 1992 elections. The strategists were watching unemployment figures climb to 7 percent, corporate profits drop, U.S. auto output slide toward a thirty-three-year low, and the fiscal deficit grow to a record level.

[69] Pendleton, "NAFTA Will Benefit US Agriculture."

[70] Dunn, interview with author.

[71] Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," 448–449.

[72] Ibid., 451.

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Long-time party leader Robert Strauss noted that more and more middle class Americans "are finding their jobs gone, and they cannot replace them in this country. They are getting squeezed."[73] Many Democrats wanted to tie the free trade proposal to the jobs issue, claiming that it would export more jobs than goods. The resolution opposing the agreement passed by the Democratic National Committee in March 1991, called it a "disaster for workers."[74]

As the 1992 presidential election results showed, the euphoria of the Persian Gulf faded with the deepening of the economic recession. Whatever generic good will President Bush may have earned in the Persian Gulf did not overcome public concerns about the economy. One wonders whether the failure of Bush's postwar popularity to spill over into other issues weakened his hand in the NAFTA negotiations. With the November election approaching and trailing in the polls, Bush began pushing his negotiating team to finish a trade deal in hopes it would boost his campaign. Mexican negotiators no doubt sensed that this gave them some leverage to strengthen their hand in the negotiations.

Clinton and Two-Level Bargaining

Bill Clinton had displayed little enthusiasm for the free trade agreement during the 1992 presidential campaign. In fact, he repeatedly expressed reservations similar to those of Representative Gephardt and a great many other congressional Democrats. He insisted that any agreement must provide "adequate protection for workers, farmers and the environment on both sides of the border."[75] Since statements such as this touched on many of the issues opponents had been raising, some in the status quo coalition felt that Clinton might renegotiate the agreement if elected.

But soon after winning the election, Clinton rejected any notion that he would reopen the pact for renegotiation. Instead, he outlined a strategy for ratification that was not unlike the strategy of targeted side-payments employed by Bush. First, he enumerated several measures he would propose for inclusion in implementing legislation, including many of the concessions previously made by Bush (for example, broad worker adjustment assistance). Second, he announced his intention to negotiate separate side agreements (or supplementals) on labor and environmental issues and on import surges. Clinton's pledges were meant to defect criticisms that had been mounted against NAFTA by its opponents, many of whom had supported his election. The pledges were constructed to appeal to Level II constituents that might be persuadable.

[73] John Dillin, "Democrats See Trade as Potent Election Issue," *Christian Science Monitor,* 15 April 1991.

[74] Brownstein and Tumulty, "'Mexico Free-Trade Pact Faces Hard Sell."

[75] Stuart Auerbach, "US, Canada and Mexico Agree to Form Trade Bloc," *Washington Post,* 13 August 1992.

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The Supplemental Agreements

Negotiations on the supplementals began a whole new bargaining game, with dynamics quite like those that characterized the Bush negotiations, involving the same players at Level II, but with a largely new team at Level I. Clinton's counterparts in Mexico, however, were not eager to open new talks. They were concerned about being pressured to give up gains previously won or to make additional concessions. This concern was justified. Mexican negotiators had correctly perceived that the election of Bill Clinton, whose political party and main constituencies were less supportive of free trade than those of his predecessor, probably made ratification more difficult. In two-level bargaining logic, this should expand the bargaining space for the United States in additional Level I negotiations, thereby strengthening the U.S. hand and weakening Mexico's.

Some members of the status quo coalition saw the additional negotiations as a new opportunity to fix what they considered "fatal flaws in the original agreement."[76] They hoped that the time needed to negotiate the supplementals would delay the ratification process long enough for them to muster support within the new administration for their arguments. Their hope was not without basis. After all, key members of the new administration were on record prior to their appointments either as opposed to the agreement or as having grave doubts about it. Leon Panetta, for example, Clinton's new head of the Office of Management and Budget, had expressed opposition to the agreement as a member of the House of Representatives. Clinton's pick to chair the Council of Economic Advisers, Laura D'Andrea Tyson, had written a pointedly negative column on NAFTA for the *Los Angeles Times*.[77] Recall too the close political ties between organized labor and the Democratic party and between farm groups such as the National Farmers Union and Democrats. There was reason to expect that such groups would have greater access to the new administration and that their views would be heard.[78]

Others in the coalition no doubt hoped the new talks would provide a wedge for prying open the entire agreement for reconsideration, a development that would almost certainly kill it.[79] Their rallying theme became: "Not *this* NAFTA!" In a letter to members of Congress shortly after the supplementals were unveiled, the Citizens Trade Campaign wrote: "We ask that you abandon this NAFTA and instruct our nation's trade negotiators to work with

[76] Dunn, interview with author.

[77] Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "Free-Trade Pact Must Give US Firms, Workers Edge," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 May 1991.

[78] The new USTR's first meeting with a private-sector agricultural representative took place within two weeks of the inauguration with Michael V. Dunn, vice president for legislative services of the National Farmers Union.

[79] Leonard Condon, Office of the United States Trade Representative, interview with author, 4 February 1993.

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their counterparts to develop trade initiative which will truly benefit the people of all three countries. This will require that the NAFTA be fundamentally recast."[80] Representative Gephardt, who by this time had decided to oppose the pact, used similar language in announcing his opposition: "I will vote against this NAFTA," he said. "The issues are too important and the stakes are too great to pass a deficient NAFTA, and no NAFTA is preferable to a deficient NAFTA."[81]

After several months of negotiations led by new trade representative Mickey Kantor, the supplementals were unveiled.[82] It was apparent that some of the provisions were not as tough as Clinton had sought and certainly not as tough as many opponents had hoped. Most importantly, the supplementals did not contain stiff terms permitting the imposition of trade sanctions on another country for failure to enforce its own labor and environmental laws. This had been a key demand of organized labor and some environmental organizations, and was one reason why they continued to oppose NAFTA ratification.

It would be misleading, however, to portray the accords as failures. Important new mechanisms were agreed upon to monitor each country's compliance with its environmental and labor laws. Two commissions were set up for this purpose: the Commission for Labor Cooperation and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. In addition to monitoring compliance, each commission can establish special panels to investigate complaints and to recommend fines or other sanctions. The imposition of penalties will only be possible when a specific and lengthy process of consultation fails to resolve disputes. Fines for noncompliance can only be levied against countries, not businesses, and the commissions cannot compel payment. But if a country refuses to pay fines levied, the commissions have the power to authorize the other two countries to raise tariffs in retaliation.

The supplemental agreement on import surges permits additional, though temporary, protections beyond those allowed under the snap-back provisions spelled out in the basic agreement. Such protections were designed to deal with large and unexpected surges in imports that might result from implementing NAFTA.

Organized labor responded to the provisions of the supplementals with expected criticism and accused Clinton of retreating from promises he had made during the presidential campaign.[83] Greenpeace and some other environmental

[80] Citizens Trade Campaign, "Letter to Members of Congress," Washington, DC, 14 October 1993, mimeographed.

[81] Richard Gephardt, News Conference Announcing Opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 23 September 1993.

[82] See *NAFTA Supplemental Agreements* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).

[83] J. I. Levinson, "The Labor Side Accord to the North American Free Trade Agreement: An Endorsement of Abuse of Worker Rights in Mexico," *Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper,* September 1993, 2–3.

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groups reacted similarly. Literature published by Greenpeace stated that "even by modest expectations, the side deal . . . would have to be judged a complete failure.[84] A senior policy specialist for the Natural Resources Defense Council told this writer he believed Greenpeace and some other groups "never intended to support NAFTA." He added that Greenpeace thought "NAFTA was so bad no one could redeem it and anyone who made constructive proposals was seen as providing a convenient 'cop-out' for the administration."[85]

Nonetheless, the support of many of America's largest environmental groups was reinforced by the environmental side agreement. After the basic NAFTA text was released and the supplementals negotiated, most of America's leading environmental organizations endorsed the agreement and worked for its approval in Congress. Stewart Hudson, legislative representative for the National Wildlife Federation, testified before the House Ways and Means Committee that his organization believed initially that trade and environmental issues could never be linked in NAFTA. But over the course of the negotiations, he said, they concluded that "environmental concerns are clearly one of the pillars of the agreement."[86] In an interview with this writer, Justin Ward, speaking for the Natural Resources Defense Council, said that "much of what we wanted in the agreement all along was included in the side agreements."[87]

Clinton's strategy of targeted side-payments apparently produced some results. Although some important Level II constituencies were not won over by the strategy, for others the supplementals worked much the way Clinton had hoped. Clinton's decision to negotiate side agreements was a successful attempt to expand further the NAFTA win-set by dealing with opponent's objections in a more formal manner. Opponents would no longer have to rely on promises and good will to get their objections addressed, as was the case under President Bush. With the side agreements, their concerns were addressed in binding supplemental accords carrying the same legal force as the basic treaty itself. The advantage of this approach was to put ratification prospects on firmer ground.

Congressional Side-Payments

The Clinton strategy of side-payments and deal-making with key private sector groups thought to be persuadable became the cornerstone of his strategy for winning final approval in Congress. It proved to be a difficult, though successful undertaking. The toughest battle by far was in the House of Representatives, where Clinton had to cope with deep divisions in his own party. Even the Dem-

[84] Greenpeace, "NAFTA: Trading Away Tomorrow, " Washington, DC, brochure, n.d., 4.

[85] Justin Ward, senior policy specialist, Natural Resources Defense Council, interview with author, 19 October 1993.

[86] Stewart J. Hudson, "Testimony of Stewart J. Hudson on Behalf of the National Wildlife Federation, before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means," National Wildlife Federation, 103rd Congress, 1st sess., 21 September 1993 (mimeo).

[87] Ward, interview with author.

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ocratic leadership was split. Speaker Thomas S. Foley backed the president, but House Majority Leader Gephardt and Democratic Whip David E. Bonior opposed NAFTA. In fact, Bonior organized the opposition members in the House. With the leadership so divided, it was "impossible to employ the normally effective Democratic whip organization or to appeal to Democrats with the argument that they must vote for NAFTA out of loyalty."[88] Thus, much depended on the president's ability to manipulate the bargaining game.

Representatives of agricultural constituencies were among those frequently targeted by the White House for a vote trading deal. Since the supplementals had dealt largely with environmental and labor issues, many representatives from agricultural districts felt that not enough had been done to ameliorate the concerns of farm producers. In order to win over some undecided representatives from Texas, Oklahoma, and Florida, Clinton promised "to protect growers of wheat, tomatoes, peanuts and citrus by limiting imports that could depress U.S. prices.[89] Essentially, this deal involved additional monitoring of Mexican imports that might trigger the snap-back mechanism. This concession, combined with others aimed at balky fruit and vegetable growers, proved decisive in some key congressional delegations.

Florida's twenty-three member House delegation was a case in point. Initially, Representative Sam Gibbons had been the only Florida member to support the free trade agreement. But after the White House concessions were announced, Representative Jim Bacchus switched from undecided to "yes" on NAFTA. He stated that "never before have the concerns of Florida agriculture been so comprehensively addressed."[90] He was soon followed by a majority of the Florida delegation, precisely what the White House had been seeking. Commenting on the negotiations with Florida's congressional representatives, a White House spokesperson said: "it is a quid pro quo. We're not going to do this unless it's going to deliver a significant number of votes."[91]

Many of the deals were not closely related to trade issues. One New York representative, for example, got a White House pledge to support a Small Business Administration pilot urban renewal project in his district in exchange for his vote. Another got help untangling federal red tape that was holding up money for a dredging project in his district. Ralph Nader's group, Public Citizen, blasted the administration for these actions. In a report entitled, "NAFTA's Bizarre Bazaar: The Deal Making that Bought Congressional Votes on the North American Free Trade Agreement," they were particularly critical of the deals unrelated to the trade pact.[92] The report outlined twenty-one deals

[88] D. S. Cloud, "Defection of House Leaders Reflects Deeper Concerns," *Congressional Quarterly,* 11 September 1993, 2374.

[89] William Douglas, "For Some, Playing the Game Means Let's Make a Deal," *Newsday*, 18 November 1993.

[90] David Dahl, "Farm Deal Wins NAFTA a Floridian," *Washington Times*, 10 November 1993.

[91] Peter Behr, "Mexico Yields on NAFTA to Gain Votes," *Washington Post*, 4 November 1993.

[92] Public Citizen, *NAFTA's Bizarre Bazaar: The Deal Making that Bought Congressional Votes on the North American Free Trade Agreement* (Washington, DC: Public Citizen, 1993).

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involving "the President in a process of complex sleaze that doesn't do the republic any good."[93] The result of Clinton's strategy was what many called an impressive victory. Just ten days before the vote, Representative Bonior had boasted of having enough support to defeat the agreement. But when the votes were cast on 18 November 1993, the agreement was approved by a vote of 234 to 200. Democrats supplied only 102 of the votes for NAFTA; Republicans voted 132-43 in favor.[94] In order to win, Clinton (and Bush before him) successfully employed a two-level strategy of carefully targeted side-payments to individuals and groups comprising the swing votes needed for ratification.

Conclusion

This analysis of the negotiations leading to the North American Free Trade Agreement has demonstrated the utility of Putnam's two-level approach to international bargaining. Putnam's framework shows how the particular distribution of domestic coalitions and preferences across the U.S. polity influenced the negotiations and how they were affected by the intersection of interests and strategies at the domestic and international levels. The Bush and Clinton administrations were shown to have skillfully manipulated the two-level bargaining game to fashion an agreement acceptable to enough domestic constituencies to win ratification.

In the logic of two-level games, the strategy of targeting side-payments to wavering domestic constituencies significantly expanded the win-set for ratifying NAFTA. Bush's use of an extensive private-sector advisory system played a major role in the early negotiations, helping to identify broad areas of agreement and building support for the trade pact among major American interest groups. In agriculture, strong support was found early among wheat and corn producers and within the American Farm Bureau Federation. Agricultural opposition came mainly from growers of Section 22 products, citrus and vegetable farmers, and from the National Farmers Union. Despite being extensively targeted for strategic side-payments, organized labor steadfastly opposed NAFTA from the start. However, key organizations representing environmental interests, notably the National Wildlife Federation and the Natural Resources Defense Council, were persuaded to back the agreement by concessional side-payments.

Many of the anti-NAFTA farm groups remained in opposition until the final days of ratification, when Clinton was able to win them over with the last-minute concessions. Clinton's use of carefully targeted and sometimes narrowly focused side-payments in the waning days of congressional debate on the agreement swayed a number of undecided representatives to vote for passage. More-

[93] Joanna Ramey, "NAFTA Deal-Making Called Dangerous," *Daily News Record,* 29 December 1993.

[94] D. S. Cloud, "Decisive Vote Brings Down Trade Walls With Mexico," *Congressional Quarterly,* 20 November 1993, 3174.

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over, Clinton's decision to negotiate formal supplemental agreements to deal with the contentious issues of the environment, labor, and import surges offered opponents the additional side-payment of putting their concessions on equal legal footing with the basic agreement itself. The aim of Clinton's strategy (and Bush's before him) was to persuade the uncommitted or the marginally committed by directing concessions to those interest groups and representatives thought to be persuadable. The result was the creation of a NAFTA win-set sufficient for ratification.

Would the North American Free Trade Agreement have been possible without the successful manipulation of the two-level bargaining game by Bush and Clinton? Probably not. Had the Level I negotiators failed to look over their shoulders and consider how commitments made in the trade talks would be received at Level II, it is unlikely they could have fashioned an agreement with enough domestic support for ratification.

One might argue that some type of two-level bargaining characterizes virtually all international negotiations and that Putnam's scheme is only a metaphor for describing what is commonplace. But this analysis shows that Putnam's approach is a very useful analytic tool, well suited to explaining the negotiating dilemma created by tensions between conflicting interests of national groups and states. How successful policy makers are at resolving this dilemma depends on their ability to manipulate the two-level bargaining game. It is not an overstatement to say, therefore, that when states engage in negotiations, the hardest bargaining is not between states but within them.*

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

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Tale of the Presidential Tapes: A Review Essay

ROBERT A. DIVINE

Two recently-published volumes of transcripts of presidential tapes would appear to be a bonanza for historians.[1] In an age when the records of any kind of White House proceeding, even notes taken by aides, are subject to subpoena, we can be almost certain that future scholars will never have access to similar presidential recordings. And while there is rich evidence in these tapes on both the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, they also prove somewhat disappointing, failing to give as much insight as might be expected.

One problem with both sets of tapes is their surreptitious nature. John F. Kennedy had his tape system installed secretly in the White House Cabinet Room and Oval Office; none of his aides and advisers, except his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, realized that the president was taping the crucial deliberations over the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Only Kennedy knew when the device was operating; he alone decided what to record and what to omit. Lyndon B. Johnson was equally secretive about his telephone taping system and equally in control. He would signal his secretary when he wanted a conversation taped, and the person he was speaking with never was aware that his words were being recorded. The editors of these volumes are unable to tell us why the presidents made these recordings or how they planned to use them. Knowledge is power, however, and both JFK and LBJ clearly wanted to have exclusive control of information that they knew gave them a political advantage. Only when their successor, Richard M. Nixon, proved that such secret recordings could be used to destroy a presidency did the practice finally end. Scholars may bemoan the

[1] Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); and Michael R. Beschloss, ed., *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963–1964* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).

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loss of an important type of historical record, but the principle of free and open discussion in the White House clearly benefited.

Kennedy Tapes

The Kennedy Tapes reflect both the advantages and the drawbacks of a detailed record of presidential discussion and decision making in the gravest international crisis of the cold war. These transcripts provide a fascinating hour-by-hour, day-by-day account of how President Kennedy and his closest advisers reacted to the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba and gradually worked out the American response. There is a remarkable candor and openness to the recorded discussion, since all the participants except the president were unaware of the taping. What the reader gains above all else is a sense of the way the crisis unfolded, from the initial surprise and anger at the reckless Soviet move through the stumbling efforts to define the issues and choices down to the final delineation of the policy to be pursued. The often rambling comments, the occasional moments of genuine insight, and the sometimes brutal confrontations, especially between Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, give the reader a sense of witnessing history as it was made.

At the same time, however, these recorded discussions add little to what we already know about the crisis from the many memoirs, written summaries, and oral histories that have formed the basis for our understanding of the crisis. The initial attractiveness of a surgical air strike, the worry over Soviet countermoves, especially against Berlin, the possibility of trading Jupiter IRBMs in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the decision for a quarantine to be followed, if necessary, by an invasion—all are well known. The tapes simply confirm the generally accepted version of the Cuban crisis, adding rich detail but not changing the broad outline of how the United States was able to force the Soviets to back down.

The editors assert that the tapes clearly reveal the dominant and generally wise and prudent role played by John Kennedy. One incident they cite, when the president single-handedly rebuffed the pleas of the Joint Chiefs for the use of armed force, is particularly impressive. On the tapes, Kennedy rejects General Curtis E. LeMay's charge that a blockade would be a weak response, "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich," calling the Joint Chiefs' alternative of a massive air strike "unsatisfactory" (pp. 178, 186). Reminding the military leaders that we were engaged in a "worldwide struggle with the Soviet Communists," Kennedy fears a Russian reprisal against Berlin (p. 183). The blockade, he points out to the generals, is an attempt "to avoid, if we can, nuclear war by escalation or imbalance" (p. 186).

These tapes, however, also show a John Kennedy who is often more concerned about appearances than reality—more worried about perception than substance. When the Ex Comm is first discussing an air strike to knock out the missiles in Cuba, JFK warns that "a lot of people would regard this as a mad

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act by the United States" (p. 134). Later, when a consensus begins to build around the quarantine approach, the president wonders whether "a blockade would appear to the free world as a strong response to the Soviet action" (p. 195). When the decision is made to invoke the quarantine, Kennedy cautions his advisers not to let it be known that they even contemplated an air strike. ". . . we don't want to look like we were considering it," he warns, suggesting that his aides deny they ever discussed such an attack (p. 238).

Kennedy's concern for how others would view American policy became most influential on Saturday, 27 October, when he received Nikita Khrushchev's proposal for a missile swap—the United States to take its Jupiter IRBMs out of Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of its missiles from Cuba. While many Ex Comm members expressed outrage, since the day before Khrushchev had appeared to be willing to accept an American promise not to invade Cuba as the only quid pro quo, the president was inclined to take Khrushchev's swap proposal seriously, because on the surface it appeared to be so reasonable. The exchange of the Jupiters, Kennedy noted, would seem like "a very fair trade" to "any man at the United Nations or any other rational man" (p. 498). Time and time again the president, who had earlier expressed his belief that the Jupiters in Turkey were obsolete and thus expendable, kept saying how "reasonable" Khrushchev's new offer would seem to the rest of the world. He finally vented his frustration by exclaiming, "We can't very well invade Cuba, with all the toil and blood it's going to be, when we could have gotten them [the Soviet missiles] out by making a deal on the same missiles in Turkey. If that's part of the record, then I don't see how we'll have a very good war" (p. 602).

It was Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, along with Robert Kennedy, who finally persuaded the president that trading the Turkish missiles under duress would appear to our European allies to be a betrayal of a NATO commitment. Thompson, the Soviet expert, made the most telling argument when he pointed out that Khrushchev was simply upping the ante; Thompson was sure that the Soviet leader would back down if Kennedy insisted on accepting his original proposal of an American pledge not to invade Cuba. "The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me," Thompson concluded, "is to be able to say: 'I saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion'" (p. 554). The president agreed to follow this course, demanding that Khrushchev withdraw the missiles in return for a no-invasion pledge, or else face an attack on Cuba. As the editors point out, new information from Soviet sources indicates that Thompson was right; Khrushchev was bluffing on the Turkish missiles, trying to see if he could force Kennedy to make additional concessions. The missiles in Turkey were just a useful bargaining chip for the Russians, not a primary concern.

Finally, it is worth noting that the most surprising thing about these transcripts is a topic that is rarely mentioned in them—the overwhelming American nuclear advantage at the time of the crisis. Kennedy's critics have long held that he manipulated the Cuban missile crisis, knowing all along, as the American public did not, that the U.S. lead in ICBMs and Polaris submarine-launched

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missiles put Khrushchev in a bind. The placing of missiles in Cuba was a desperate Soviet effort to redress that unfavorable strategic balance. Yet the Ex Comm, while acknowledging this likely Soviet motive and showing an awareness of American nuclear superiority, did not appear to be confident that it would alone force the Russians to back down. Far from feeling invincible because of the strategic advantage, American leaders realized that rational calculation of nuclear disparity would probably not deter the Soviets from responding to an American invasion of Cuba. It is to Kennedy's everlasting credit that, unlike the Joint Chiefs, he realized that his true goal was not to humiliate Nikita Khrushchev but rather to spare the world a nuclear holocaust.

JOHNSON TAPES

Scholars will approach the Johnson tapes with great anticipation, hoping they will reveal the LBJ who simply cannot be found in the voluminous files of his presidential library. Throughout his career, Johnson rarely committed himself on paper, preferring instead to give his views face-to-face or on the telephone, which he used constantly.

These recorded conversations prove both enlightening and disappointing. They contain substantial evidence regarding LBJ's personality and leadership style, but they offer very little of substance on the critical issues of his early presidency—civil rights, the war on poverty, and, above all, Vietnam.

The tapes tend to confirm what we already know about Johnson. There is ample evidence in these transcripts of his monumental ego, personal insecurity, and boundless self-pity. His frequent complaints to friends and associates about media coverage, especially the newspapers, reveal how sensitive he was to criticism. He took all attacks personally and frequently complained that the press was plotting his downfall, telling his aides that the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* "must have a conspiracy to wreck us" (p. 233). His suspicions stemmed from his belief, expressed most candidly to press secretary George Reedy, that the presidential press corps thought they were "the masters of the White House." "They're just the servants," Johnson insisted, "and we give them what we want to give them" (p. 308). To LBJ's dismay and frustration, the media refused to accept this docile role.

Lyndon Johnson's best and worst traits come out in extended conversations with two individuals, Senator Richard Russell and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. With Russell, one sees Johnson's lifelong tendency to rely on trusted senior leaders for advice and support. From the day he becomes president, Johnson talks regularly with his old Senate mentor. In part, LBJ is still cultivating Russell. Trying to persuade him to serve on the Warren Commission in spite of Russell's hatred for the chief justice, the president appeals to him as a surrogate father, saying he must rely on Russell's judgment and wisdom, "cause I haven't got any daddy and you're going to be it" (p. 71). He also needs to placate Russell and try to mitigate his opposition to civil rights legislation. Yet on

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other issues, notably Vietnam, Johnson uses Russell as a sounding board, freely expressing his own doubts and misgivings. Unfortunately, Russell is unable to offer LBJ a solution to this dilemma.

Bobby Kennedy brings out the worst in Johnson—his personal insecurity. From the day he entered the White House, LBJ felt that Bobby was plotting to take the presidency away from him, the interloper, and return it to the Kennedys. Johnson sees Bobby Kennedy as behind all his problems, from press investigations of how LBJ acquired his wealth to the challenge from the black Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at the 1964 national convention. In these tapes, Johnson is constantly talking about ways to deny Bobby the vice presidential nomination in 1964, finally adopting Clark Clifford's plan to rule out all cabinet members. Despite Kennedy's surprising efforts to be cooperative, even at times obsequious in their telephone conversations, there is no way that he can overcome Lyndon's dark suspicions. When George Reedy calls the failure of White House teleprompters during a presidential speech an accident, LBJ is not so sure, "I thought that it was almost sabotage, George," he retorts, leading Beschloss to assume that Johnson suspected Bobby of foul play (p. 361).

Rich as the tapes are in revealing the strange personality of Lyndon Johnson, they throw much less light on Johnson's political beliefs. We learn little about what motivated his policies on civil rights and the war on poverty from these tapes, or about the origins of the Great Society as a reform program. The conversations show that Johnson is indeed deeply involved in the legislative process, constantly calling congressional leaders to press them for speedy action and often offering tactical suggestions. But beyond his desire to get legislation passed, Johnson reveals virtually nothing on why he wants to help blacks gain civil rights and to banish poverty from America. Did he favor such programs solely out of political expediency, or did he believe deeply in the need to achieve fairness in American social and economic life? There are no answers in these tapes—Johnson's innermost feelings and beliefs remain a mystery.

The most elusive of all the issues Johnson dealt with in the first year was Vietnam. There are many passages in the tapes that show LBJ's doubts and uncertainty about the situation in Southeast Asia. Again and again, he tells others that he feels trapped, obligated to honor Eisenhower's commitment to defend South Vietnam, but fearful it will lead to disaster. Affirming his belief that withdrawal would lead to communist domination of the entire region, he seems sure that any president who pulled out would face impeachment. Yet at the same time, as he tells National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy in May 1964, "It's damned easy to get in a war but it's gonna be awfully hard to ever extricate yourself if you get in" (p. 372). He prefers to follow a middle course between withdrawal and escalation, at least until after he is safely reelected. Despite his fondness for picturing himself agonizing over alternatives, he is clearly unwilling to entertain the option of pulling out, dismissing the advice of doves like

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Adlai Stevenson, George Ball, and Mike Mansfield as "just milquetoast as it can be" (p. 371).

The Gulf of Tonkin incident, which occurs in the last month covered in this volume, brings out the ambiguities and inconsistencies in Johnson's handling of the Vietnam problem. Accused later by critics for maneuvering Congress into giving him a blank check to escalate the war after his reelection, Johnson at the time seems concerned only about the immediate political consequences of the presumed North Vietnamese attack on American destroyers. He acts largely to preempt Barry Goldwater, his GOP rival, in ordering a retaliatory air attack on North Vietnam and in seeking congressional authorization. Indeed, the greatest concern he expresses in these conversations is his fear that by announcing the air strike nearly two hours in advance, he will be subject to criticism for endangering the lives of American pilots. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara assures him that this is not the case, but when a Republican congressman makes such a charge, LBJ is quick to bring it to McNamara's attention. The tapes reinforce the view that Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf affair to enhance his reelection effort and not to lay the legal basis for later escalation. Yet it is hardly flattering to his reputation to learn that his foreign policy reflected political pragmatism rather than devious calculation.

These taped telephone conversations tend to confirm the prevailing portrait of Lyndon Johnson. His defenders will point to his doubts about Vietnam and his concern for passage of civil rights and antipoverty legislation as proof of his wise leadership. Critics, however, will cite the new evidence of his almost paranoid suspicions about the press and about rivals like Bobby Kennedy. A neutral observer might conclude that the tapes reveal a flawed leader—a man who sought to do good on a monumental scale but who was betrayed by his own personal demons.

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Book Reviews

Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO—Then and Now *by Charles G. Cogan. Westport, CT, Praeger Press, 1997. 776 pp. $55.00.*

Historians of the Atlantic alliance have often strongly endorsed the less than positive appraisal of French diplomacy voiced by American and British officials during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Why French officials of vastly different political persuasions have often vigorously dissented from the consensus of the Anglo-Saxons is a question that historians have far too frequently left unexplained. In a concise yet thorough examination of France and the origins of NATO, Charles Cogan has taken great strides toward rectifying an imbalance that has marred the historical literature for far too long. Books that provide both an excellent introduction to nonspecialists and yet advance arguments that will demand attention from specialists are written far too infrequently by historians; *Forced to Choose* is one of those rare books that superbly bridges the gap between the two groups.

Although the author might not accept it as a fair characterization of his primary contribution to the literature, what Cogan provides above all else in *Forced to Choose* is a sophisticated intellectual defense of the Gaullist critique of NATO as an unequal partnership between France and the Anglo-Saxons. This support for de Gaulle's views can be seen in the strong emphasis placed by the author on the continuing rivalry and mistrust of Great Britain underlying French diplomacy throughout the formative period of NATO. While the author does not endorse the rather extreme view of Great Britain as the "hereditary enemy" that de Gaulle himself put forward in the early 1960s, he does show how important concerns about France's relative status and position vis-à-vis Great Britain were during the early period of the alliance. The author's general acceptance of the Gaullist thesis on NATO also can be seen in his criticisms of what he terms the "hegemonic impulse" that increasingly motivated American policy makers in the early 1950s. By emphasizing these two themes throughout the book, Cogan is implicitly suggesting that much of the history of the formative period of NATO provided a legitimate and understandable basis for the later French withdrawal from the institutions of the alliance in the 1960s.

The one glaring shortcoming of *Forced to Choose* is its lack of any sustained critical analysis of French diplomacy. Legitimate concerns about British and American policies are often presented without any analysis of the weaknesses of the alternative policies put forward by the French. The best example of this weakness is in the author's treatment of the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC). A visionary proposal of French origin that American policy makers perceived as the gateway to a united and supranational Western Europe, the four year conflict over the EDC and the more general issue of German rearma-

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ment was the crucial period in which the European security order was worked out among the allies. If there was ever a possibility that the French might have constructed a European security order less susceptible to Anglo-American dominance, the creation of an institutional framework such as the EDC was imperative. Yet despite the fact that the Americans were the greatest supporters of the French proposal and the ones who clearly saw the EDC as the mechanism for greater European self-sufficiency, it was the French themselves who ultimately dealt the final death blow to the EDC in 1954. A more comprehensive analysis of this paradox should be an essential element in any analysis of French policy during this period, but the author unfortunately treats the EDC much like the Gaullists did at the time—as an institutional framework contrary to French national interests and thus undesirable. However, if both the EDC and NATO were flawed institutions from the French perspective, one can only wonder about whether there was a potential alternative security that could have avoided the divisions that continue to plague the alliance. Instead of reiterating the familiar criticisms of NATO and EDC, it would have been far preferable if the author had used the conflicts of the period to explore the inherent weaknesses and limitations of the Gaullist critique of American and British foreign policy. This is particularly true since the history of the early 1950s illustrates many of the fundamental problems and contradictions that will surely reappear in the future as contemporary policy makers seek to restructure the alliance to meet the challenges that lie ahead. Nevertheless, American policy makers would certainly profit by studying Cogan's excellent account of the challenges and dilemmas faced by their predecessors.

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Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do *by Leonard J. Schoppa. New York, Columbia University Press, 1997. 406 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $17.50.*

On 29 May 1989, the Bush administration proposed a new initiative in trade negotiations with Japan. Congress had thrust upon the free-trader administration the Super 301 provision of the 1988 Trade Act, which virtually forced it to label Japan as an "unfair trader." But George Bush managed to avoid applying those provisions to informal barriers to trade by instead proposing the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). The negotiations resulted in an agreement in 1990. Three years later, the Clinton administration tried to negotiate a more specific results-oriented agreement, especially in autos and auto parts, that came to be known as the "Framework" talks.

Leonard J. Scoppa's *Bargaining with Japan* takes as its primary subject the SII negotiations and its secondary one, as a comparison, the Framework talks. The book's argument is that *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) can influence Japanese policy outcomes, especially when the Japanese political arena offers opportunities for employing synergist strategies that take advantage of divisions of opinion and interest on the Japanese side.

The SII talks actually consisted of five separable and identifiable issues and demands by the United States, all of which were designed to eliminate what the United States perceived to be policies and practices of the government and private sector that encouraged the Japanese from saving too much and spending too little buying foreign goods, or which discrimi-

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nated and excluded foreign firms from the Japanese market: first, implementing macroeconomic policies to get Japan to increase its public investment spending; second, reforming Japan's distribution system, especially its Large Store Law (LSL); third, lowering Japan's exorbitant land prices; fourth, reducing private sector collusive practices; finally, reforming Japan's *keiretsu* corporate groups. The United States got essentially much of what it wanted in the first and second, some of what it wanted in the third, and virtually no Japanese concessions in the fourth and fifth. What accounts for this variation?

Schoppa takes this question as the opportunity to use the very structure of the SII talks themselves as a systematic research design. By comparing the process and outcomes of these multidimensional talks, he can focus on when American pressure works and when it doesn't, and why. He holds constant such variables as time period and conditions, and even in a broad sense, type of issue (practices and policies that serve as structural barriers and inhibitors of purchasing foreign goods) that have always made it difficult to draw firm conclusions from comparing other trade friction cases.

Schoppa carries this creative design well. Using and expanding upon Robert Putnam's two-level-game analysis, he shows that these outcomes can be explained only by the simultaneous interaction of international negotiations and domestic politics. He elaborates upon various strategies and tactics (such as "participation expansion," "reverberation," "synergistic linkage," and others) that can produce results at the bargaining table because they effectively combine with the opposing side's domestic politics. Then in a series of chapters on the different issue-area negotiations in SII and finally on the Clinton Framework talks, he shows how these were employed and were effective or not, and why.

The book is a major contribution to the literature on foreign economic policy making and U.S.–Japan relations. We have not had enough studies of U.S.–Japan trade friction, arguably one of the most important international political economic issues of the past two decades. Schoppa's work may be the most comprehensive, systematic, and heuristically valuable to date.

Nonetheless, there are a few inexplicable flaws and contradictions in the analysis. In his analysis of the Framework talks and in the conclusion, he argues forcefully for the impact of the end of the cold war leading Japanese bureaucrats and negotiators to stand up more forcefully to American demands. This argument seems especially misplaced and ad hoc given his own critique earlier in the book of simplistic approaches that cannot explain case variation. It does little to explain the differences in outcomes of cases both before and after the end of the cold war, and it is unsupported by a great deal of empirical evidence.

At another point, he argues against the notion advanced by scholars—myself and Simon Reich included—that the American president's role incorporates an ideology of free trade, citing such things as the Clinton attempt at "results-oriented" trade in the Framework talks as a counter-example (pp.76-78). This view ignores, however, the idea that Mac Destler and others have argued concerning the "export politics" of American trade politics in which the president attempts to open up foreign markets in order to prevent Congress from restricting imports. Since Schoppa himself shows how Bush initiated SII in part to prevent greater retaliation against Japan, it is strange that he sees a contradiction here, where none exists.

Despite these few problems, the book remains a creatively conceived and well conducted piece of theoretical and empirical research in an important area of international political economy.

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The Political Economy of Corruption in China *by Julia Kwong. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997. 192 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $24.95.*

Given the inherent difficulty of collecting data on the subject, few social scientists would devote years of research to the study of corruption. Julia Kwong should be credited for doing so in her book, *The Political Economy of Corruption in China*. In the first part of the book, the author sets forth a general definition of corruption as "breaking legal and organization rules to use public goods or the power vested in one's public office for private ends" (p. ix). She contrasts corruption in the period of what she refers to as classical socialism of 1949 to 1976 (the death of Mao) with the reform socialism period of 1976 to 1989.

This contrast in the type of corrupt behavior within China over time, as well as some broad comparisons with how such behavior varies in the West, is persuasive. Particularly interesting is her discussion of how the actual terms used to describe such behavior vary within China over time. For example, the term *touji daoba* (speculation) used to be construed as illegal trade outside of state channels in an attempt to earn excessive profits. In the new economic climate of the reform period, however, such activities were "not only tolerated but even encouraged" (p. 16).

Less persuasive, however, is Kwong's central argument. The thesis of her book is that the course corruption in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) follows is parabolic, or resembles a U-curve. In her own words, "corruption was serious when the Communist government took power, the problem was soon brought under control and rose again in the eighties. . ." (p. 79). Specifically, she argues that corruption during the reform period took place at a higher incidence, involved greater sums of money, and took on more varied forms. From this, she concludes that "China had a more honest government in the period of classical socialism than under reform socialism" (p. 79).

That corruption involved greater sums of money and took on different forms in the period of reform socialism is indisputable. A vast literature exists on how bureaucrats manipulated or designed reform institutions themselves to engage in corrupt activities during the reform period. Moreover, it is widely accepted, as the author argues, that during the period of classical socialism, "The poor economic conditions provided few accessible targets for corruption" (p. 133). This does not mean, however, that corruption did not take place. Indeed, much of the authors own analysis suggests not that corruption decreased, but rather took on a different form. Even during the classical socialist period, the author argues that "Instead of exploiting those under their control, who now had few private possessions, cadres exploited state property usually in the course of their official duties" (p. 95).

The evidence that the actual number of corrupt incidents declined during the classical socialist period is, by the author's admission, weak. The author provides evidence in the form of official reports that show corruption decreasing, including an overall decrease in crime rates, as well as overall impressions based on personal interviews. Showing that crime levels decreased from 1950 to 1956 and then stayed roughly the same until 1965, however, is questionable evidence that corruption decreased. In the first place, one would be pressed as to the validity of crime figures during the highly politicized campaigns, much less the chaos unleashed during the Great Leap Forward. Second, the author takes it as established historical record that the Four Cleans Movement (*siqing*) of 1962–1964 "did not reveal large-scale transgressions" (p. 83). The work of other scholars, however, such as Frederick Teiwes suggests otherwise.

This is not to say that the author is wrong, merely that much work remains to be done on how one measures incidents of corruption. Julia Kwong has written a fine book analyzing

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how corruption took on different forms in the PRC over time. Her conclusion, though, that honor and public recognition "were equally satisfying and further weaned them from material attachments" (p. 134) for bureaucrats in the classical socialist period is open to debate. Much of her evidence suggests that corrupt activities did take place, but took the form of barter and exchange of favors or gifts. And while corrupt activities might have involved smallers amounts of money, one is forced to ask: were bureaucrats not just making a virtue out of a necessity?

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Party vs. State in Post-1949 China *by Shiping Zheng. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 294 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

Shiping Zheng has succeeded in his first book in providing an interesting and comprehensive overview of Chinese politics that is not merely an updated recapitulation of what most China specialists already know. Thus his book will be of interest not only to undergraduate and graduate students in China studies (primarily Chinese politics), but to professional China watchers (academics, journalists) as well. He has done this by taking seriously and analyzing a central but enduring problem in Chinese politics, namely the tension between the Chinese Communist party (CCP) and the Chinese state. This is a problem most other China scholars have seen fit to ignore, arguing that the party and the state have become so interdependent as to be indistinguishable. As Zheng sees it, the party cannot live with the state, and yet it cannot live without it; thus it is both conceptually constructive and analytically imperative to distinguish clearly between the two.

The approach Zheng adopts is institutional analysis, specifically new institutionalism. One gets the impression that the author set out to write an institutional analysis of the state-building process in China, but was then forced by his material to include the CCP. In any event, the book is divided into three parts: an introduction (chapters one and two), which discusses broad methodological issues; Part II, which examines state-building during the Mao era; and Part III (which will be of greatest interest to other specialists and which is also the longest section), which focuses on state building in the reform era under Deng Xiaoping.

The general argument is a surprising one: the PRC is characterized by an uninstitutionalized and hence a rather "weak" state. This is supported by recent evidence indicating an eroding ideology, a lack of coherence in the CCP, virulent corruption, and the center's loss of control of the regions. Here the author borrows or shares the viewpoint of many of the neoconservative or neoauthoritarian writers in the PRC. The chief reason for the institutional weakness of the state, the author argues further, is its lack of institutional autonomy from the party, whose constant meddling and interference in state affairs has emerged as the major obstacle to state building.

Although the party and state are seen as analytically distinct, they are by no means organizationally separate. In Part II the author goes to considerable length to show how the party has sought to control and manipulate the state. The chief organizational devices are the Party Work Departments (which structurally and functionally duplicate state organs), the party core groups (quasi-cells of party members who exert leadership within state organs), and jointly issued directives. And Part II does make a quite convincing case for very

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modest progress in state-building, concluding as it does with an analysis of the anathema of institutionalization, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Deng Xiaoping regime showed much more interest in institutional stability than did Mao or the Gang of Four. Indeed, Deng himself coined the term "stability takes precedence over everything—*wending yadao yiqie*—after the Tiananmen incident. The author indeed finds the record to have been far more encouraging, though still mixed. Mass campaigns have been deemphasized, for example, and there has been an effort to separate party and state offices and eliminate duplication or overlap, and there has been a considerable proliferation of legislation. Yet the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of the party still keeps a watchful eye on government legislation, and such incidents as Tiananmen threaten to derail the progress of institutionalism in the People's Liberation Army.

Thus the author makes an interesting and important argument as well as providing a relatively comprehensive overview of Chinese politics. Whether it is a valid argument is another question. One key problem is a failure to define terms. The author asks a number of existential questions—Why the state? Why the party? But more to the point is the question, what is institutionalization? The author assumes that institutionalization implies organizational autonomy and therefore that the CCP's constant interference is inherently disruptive, but is this in fact the case? It would seem, for example, that the state is quite well institutionalized in the United States or Great Britain, but if the Conservative party captures power from Labour, it certainly expects to implement its own political program and expects the state to be complaisant in its effort to do so. Is that to say that the state in seemingly well institutionalized political systems is still not autonomous from the party? If this assumption is invalidated, much of the reformist thrust of the argument—that the state should be separated from the party—is undermined. It becomes conceivable that institutionalization might just as well apply to a party-state arrangement in which the state is obedient to and controlled by the party, as is preferred by the CCP's left wing. The key to institutionalization is not organizational autonomy but rather the establishment of respected routines and procedures, ultimately protected by legal/constitutional safeguards. The problem with institutionalization during the Maoist era was not so much an inherent contradiction between party and state as a contradiction between a desire to institutionalize on the one hand and a dedication to permanent revolution on the other. Of course, party and state are different types of organization with different types of goals, but are not parties subject to the same tendencies toward institutionalization as states? Certainly Robert Michels, for one, would have thought so. And the fact that there is greater institutionalization by the author's estimate during the reform era than during the Maoist era, despite the continued interference of the party, suggests that a party-state is also susceptible to institutionalization.

These are issues no doubt every reader will wish to work out individually. But it is an important and imaginative argument, and should be addressed.

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The President's Call: Executive Leadership from FDR to George Bush *by Judith E. Michaels. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997. 383 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $22.95.*

This book grew from a survey of Senate-confirmed presidential appointees (PAS) conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) when Judith Michaels served there

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as a doctoral research fellow. The survey was administered in 1992, the last year of George Bush's presidency. Michaels's focus is on the five-hundred or so senior presidential appointees who give shape and direction to every presidential administration. Arguing that "presidents are judged by the company they keep" (p. 1), Michaels seeks to examine George Bush's presidential appointees and to place them in the larger context of "the institution of presidential appointments in the modern era" (p. 1).

Michaels sweeps widely through the early chapters, exhaustively reviewing the literature on such topics as the inner workings of the appointment and confirmation processes, tenure and turnover among appointees, and the relationships between political appointees and career civil servants. Those familiar with this literature may find some of this pedestrian: Michaels gathers the usual suspects and then strings together long quotes from each of them. The most frequently appearing word in the first two hundred pages of this book is "ibid."

But for strangers to this literature, Michaels's review is deep and wide. In no other single place has so much of the literature on presidential appointees been so fully discussed. For doctoral candidates preparing for general examinations, this will be a real treasure. Michaels has obviously read widely, consulted imaginatively, and thought hard about some of the central questions of modern public administration. She treats her subjects with respect, but not reverence. Her review of the literature on appointee job tenure is a special tour de force.

After what may seem like the longest introduction since the Old Testament, Michaels gets to the survey of Bush appointees on page 196. Full-blown surveys of presidential appointees are rare and precious. The target population is constantly changing, terribly busy, highly skeptical of even the best-intentioned research, and very hard to reach. A team at the Brookings Institution conducted such a survey in the early 1960s. The National Academy of Public Administration conducted another in 1985. The 1992 GAO survey is only the third of this scope ever undertaken.

But this was a troubled survey from the start, and the difficulties with which it was freighted are clearly evident in the results that Michaels describes. The Presidential Personnel Office (PPO) resisted the implementation of this survey for months. By the time the PPO finally acquiesced, the survey had become the topic of much discussion among presidential appointees and some declined to respond for political reasons. Some of those who did respond were uncertain that their anonymity would be protected.

The outcome was a data set of uncertain validity. Michaels's description of the survey methodology is somewhat more sanguine about the reliability of the data than was the preface to the GAO report in December 1992, which warned: "Due to the low response rate, the results of our survey cannot be projected to the governmentwide population of Senate-confirmed presidential appointees" (GAO, p. 2). So readers must approach the data and the conclusions Michaels draws from them with some caution.

The principal findings reported by Michaels are quite conventional and very much in line with the findings of the earlier surveys of this population. This is a well educated, male-dominated work force. Most appointees like the bureaucrats with whom they work, and they like each other. They are satisfied with and stimulated by their jobs—though not enough to stay in them for more than two years on average. They dislike the Office of Management and Budget; they really dislike the micromanagers in Congress; and they really, really dislike the media.

Because it was conducted by a federal agency, the survey tends to avoid the most interesting questions. We can learn a great deal about the demographic profile of the respondents in 1992 and some notable tidbits about their relations with civil servants, their feelings about the work environment in their agencies, and their job satisfaction. But the survey largely

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shied away from questions about politics and ideology. So we don't learn, for example, how closely this group adhered to the values and political views of President Bush.

This is in many ways a satisfying book, despite the disappointments with the survey at its core. Judith Michaels is a thoughtful guide through a wealth of good scholarship. She writes well and is remarkably successful at engaging the reader in some of the most persistent conundra of contemporary public administration. If this book falls short in pushing the frontiers of knowledge very far forward, it does do a fine job of surveying and characterizing much of the known territory. This promising first book suggests that we'll be hearing much more from Judith Michaels—and that it will be worth our attention when we do.

G. CALVIN MACKENZIE
Colby College

Courts and Congress *by Robert A. Katzman. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1997. 163 pp. Cloth, $38.95; paper, $16.95.*

Robert A. Katzman examines key aspects of the relationship between federal courts and Congress. He focuses on the confirmation process, communications between courts and Congress, and statutory interpretation and revision. Although he draws upon scholarship, the strength of the book is the view from the field, which draws upon his rich personal experiences. Katzman argues that a major problem facing our nation is poor communication between courts and Congress and calls on Congress to craft more precise laws, develop fuller legislative histories, and engage in "statutory housekeeping" to aid court decision making. Katzman sees a growing need for more systematic and routinized federal court-Congress relations because of expanding caseloads, federalization of criminal and civil justice, resource constraints, and increased legislative review of judicial administration and judging itself.

The strengths of the book are the chapters on how courts and Congress can better communicate. Katzman argues that an entity within the administrative organs of the federal court system, such as the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, should collate and review judicial opinions to pinpoint conflicts in interpretation among court circuits and detect statutory gaps, ambiguities, and grammatical problems in particular statutes, and then make such findings available to appropriate congressional committees. He also calls for additional judicial impact statements and more direct communications between courts and Congress through judicial testimony at legislative hearings and telephone conversations and personal visits between judges and legislators and their staffs. Indirect communications include judges writing law review articles, making public speeches, and responding to a media inquiry. A central theme of the book is that there needs to be greater shared understanding of the mutual obligations of all the branches. At the same time, there is a need to preserve judicial independence and to recognize the legitimate role of Congress in setting the jurisdiction of federal courts and their budgets.

Because the book covers so much, the depth of the analysis of some issues suffers. For example, one of six chapters is on the confirmation process. Unfortunately, little new is offered. Katzman concludes that it is appropriate for the Senate "to consider nominees' essential core beliefs about the law, their approaches to decisionmaking, and their previously stated preferences" (p. 38). He then cautions Congress to preserve the integrity of the judi-

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cial function by not requiring nominees to prejudge issues that will come to the Court. In another chapter, Katzman offers a well written, but quite introductory overview of theories of approaches to statutory interpretation: public interest theory, public choice theory, positive political theory, textualist theory, and contextualist theory. This overview adds little to the overall argument of the book.

This book will offer much to the layman or perhaps the member of Congress or judge who wishes to review recent efforts to ensure that federal courts and Congress communicate more efficiently. However, the book is too cautious. It does not go into the politics that motivates legislators and judges to disagree or into the changing political context in which today's judges and legislators operate. Nor does the author choose to deal with questions of partisanship, such as in the present situation of the very slow pace of Senate confirmation of federal judges. Finally, since Katzman is so close professionally to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, one gets the sense from this book that the author has put into scholarly form how our nation can meet some of the objectives of court reform and efficiency that Ginsberg has advocated for years.

RONALD KAHN
Oberlin College

Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History *by Rogers Smith. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997. 719 pp. $35.00.*

This book develops an *American Political Science Review* article that became an instant classic, to coin a phase, among scholars of American political thought and history. *Civic Ideals* will make Smith's argument familiar to a much wider array of scholars, and I confidently predict even more and corresponding controversy. Whether or not his position prevails in the end, the controversy will be highly salutary for the study of American politics.

Civic Ideals argues, contra Alexis de Tocqueville, Gunnar Myrdal, and Louis Hartz among others, that the defining ideology and dominant practice of the United States are not Lockean liberalism. It is one of only three (or possibly four) strands of belief that have shaped the American Constitution, laws, political parties, and public practices. The others are democracy (the belief in rule by the people), republicanism (the search for public virtue by a publicly-oriented community), and ascriptive Americanism (the belief in the rightness of control by white, male, Protestant northern Europeans). Despite the manifest internal contradictions among these philosophies, most Americans have believed through most of their history in most if not all of them. Laws, especially but not only those defining and regulating citizenship, have permitted or required the practice of all of these ideals; the legal system is thus better understood as the almost accidental outcome of combining various contradictory purposes than as a clear development along a precedent-based or any other trajectory.

Contradictory ideals have not emerged, Smith argues, simply from the fact that the United States is a large country with a huge population from many different parts of the world. It is the direct outgrowth of elite political actors' deliberate intentions. Many of them believed (and believe) sincerely in liberalism, democracy, and republicanism. Otherwise these ideals could not have thrived as much as they have in belief and practice for several centuries. But many (often the same people) also believe that they have a God-given right

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to tell others how to live and fear that the others might not initially hold the same belief. In addition, "aspirants to power require a population to lead that imagines itself to be a 'people' " (p. 6); and liberalism, democracy, and republicanism are too soulless and universalistic to be rallying cries for creating a nation. Thus we have "Americanism," with its connotations of racism, sexism, class domination, religious intolerance, and ethnic purity.

Most of *Civic Ideals* works out these ideas through a straightforward chronological periodization from the colonial era through Progressivism. Each chapter is learned, provocative, full of telling quotations and appropriate statistical or institutional facts. The book will be carefully read and deeply mined for lectures and literature reviews; it might even provoke new ways of looking at old historical and cultural questions. The final chapter jumps to the present, and draws normative implications about the urgent need to quell ascriptive Americanism. It seeks, not altogether successfully in my view, to draw strong parallels between the Progressive era and the end of the twentieth century. I concur completely with its exhortation, but I remain dubious about its reading of the historical trajectory of the twentieth century.

Apart from inevitable differences in interpretation and balance, I see two flaws in this impressive book. The first is conceptual and will be of interest mainly to political philosophers. Smith claims to be discussing three civic ideals, but uses all four of the concepts I identified above. In fact, the real distinction in the book is between the first three and the last. That point needs development, which I cannot pursue here, but it is exemplified quickly by noting Smith's interchangeable use of "liberal democratic," "liberal republican," "democratic republican," and even "liberal democratic republic." Smith recognizes the conflicts among these values, which most scholars of American political thought have dwelt on, but they do not much interest him. This seems to me unnecessarily to flatten his own claim of multiple conflicting strands of belief, law, and political practice.

Perhaps a more serious flaw is substantive and should be of interest to all readers of *Civic Ideals*. In his eagerness to show how the United States is not only a liberal democratic republic, Smith comes close to distorting the historical record. I have room here to describe only one instance of this imbalance. The chapter on the Gilded Age devotes two paragraphs to the actual levels and dynamics of immigration between the Civil War and World War I, and fourteen pages to political and judicial efforts to restrict that immigration. Some of those efforts redirected the flow (away from Asians), and the cumulation of others eventually led to the closing of the Golden Door in the 1920s. But in the half century before that, an unprecedented surge of immigrants—most of them Central or Southern Europeans, Jews, or (worst of all) Irish—pushed past the nativist would-be guardians of America's purity. In 1893, three-quarters of the residents of Chicago were of foreign parentage. This is not a portrait of a nation that really wanted to keep out everyone but Anglo-Saxon Protestants.

Smith is on much firmer ground in his discussion of African Americans throughout the book, and I would not for a moment deny that racial domination has deeply constituted the American polity. In my view, the other forms of ascriptivism are more complicated and ultimately more malleable than white-to-black racism. But that is the kind of argument that this wonderfully learned, passionately argued, carefully constructed book should provoke. I am confident that it will—to the betterment of scholarship as well as politics, one hopes.

JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD
Princeton University

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The Road to Nowhere: The Genesis of President Clinton's Plan for Health Security *by Jacob S. Hacker. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 239 pp. $39.95.*

During the early stages of the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton proposed that employers be required either to provide their employees with health insurance or to pay the government to cover them in a public plan. This national health insurance proposal was favored by Ted Kennedy and much of the liberal democratic establishment. By the end of the campaign, however, Clinton had abandoned the play-or-pay model and had embraced a system of national health insurance that policy analysts called "managed competition."

After his election, President Clinton appointed a task force, chaired by Hillary Rodham Clinton, to develop the specifics of his health reform proposal. The task force examined every aspect of the U.S. health care system, and it produced an extraordinarily detailed reform proposal. In the end, however, the task force recommended and Clinton proposed a system of managed competition that was nearly identical to the system he had proposed during the campaign. Under the plan, the federal government would establish a health insurance benefit package that all Americans would receive. Health plans would compete to provide the benefit package. Employers would pay most of the cost, but employees would pay some too. There would be a fiscal incentive to choose a low-cost plan. "Health Alliances" formed by state governments would manage the competition. The newly competitive environment would generate savings (and if it didn't, a national health board would impose caps on the premiums charged by the plans).

In *The Road to Nowhere*, Jacob Hacker examines why Clinton embraced the managed competition model. He argues that two factors were key. First was Clinton's desire to be true to his New Democrat roots: managed competition arguably offered a market-based route to national health insurance. Second was Clinton's belief that managed competition was a compromise between the liberal goal of national health insurance and the conservative goal of marketplace medicine.

Hacker writes beautifully, and he makes a complicated story easy to understand. The first chapter describes the rise of the health reform movement in the early 1990s—a tale of rising costs, more and more uninsured, the 1989 recession, and Harris Wofford's ability to use support for national health insurance to gain a surprise election to the U.S. Senate. The second chapter summarizes the genesis of the managed competition model; the focus here is on Alain Enthoven, who first described the model, and the *New York Times*, which popularized the approach. The third chapter describes how liberal reformers modified the model. The fourth chapter reviews the 1992 presidential campaign and Clinton's conversion to managed competition. Next is a discussion of the actual development of Clinton's plan. Last is an effort to use the health-reform story to generalize about agenda setting in American politics.

There are two reasons why this book should be read by all concerned with U.S. public policy. First, it is a thoughtful and well written history of Clinton's effort to enact national health insurance. Second, it persuasively argues that the failure of the reform initiative was largely because of Clinton's unfounded belief that new policy ideas like managed competition can eliminate old-fashioned politics. The reform initiative focused too much on technocratic policy analysis and too little on political debate and bargaining.

The weakest part of the book is the discussion of agenda setting in the conclusion. According to Hacker, agenda-setting theorists focus on the power of ideas and leadership. Hacker finds both explanations useful in explaining the rise of health reform, though he adds interest groups and the media to the equation. He then notes that the right combination

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of ideas, interests, and leadership will return national health insurance to the national agenda. Hacker is probably right, but he doesn't need a separate chapter to make the argument. Nor does the chapter add much to the agenda-setting literature.

Despite this quibble, I highly recommend the book. It is an excellent analysis of the rise and demise of one of the most important policy episodes in the Clinton administration.

MICHAEL S. SPARER
Columbia University School of Public Health

Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt to Reagan *by Sheldon Goldman. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997. 428 pp. $48.00.*

This book has already been hailed as "the classic study of the subject" by Walter Murphy and a "tour de force" by Lee Epstein. It draws on extensive research in nine presidential libraries, including memos, letters, and unpublished diaries; the files of the Justice Department; hearings, many unpublished, before the Senate Judiciary Committee; numerous personal interviews with key players; systematic compilations of background characteristics of federal judicial appointees; and many other sources such as oral histories, published memoirs, and newspaper stories. It is almost inconceivable that all these materials will ever be surveyed again in a single work by a single scholar. In fact, since Goldman has been researching this topic for more than thirty years, it is fair to call the book a life's work.

The book's organization is straightforward: one chapter on each president from FDR to Reagan, collapsing the Kennedy/Johnson and Nixon/Ford presidencies, plus terse introductory and concluding chapters. Each of the central chapters begins with a thumbnail sketch of a presidency; surveys presidential and senatorial involvement in selecting specific federal circuit and district court judges; considers the involvement of other actors, such as party organizations and the American Bar Association; and concludes by surveying the demographic characteristics of the appointees.

The book can be read either as presidential or as judicial scholarship. In my view, it is most interesting under the former reading. In particular, it provides an extraordinarily detailed portrait of presidential patronage politics, albeit somewhat unsystematically, since the book is not conceived in these terms. Thus, in each chapter, we stand over the president's shoulder and with him read the memos crossing his desk; see him scribble recommendations on them; watch him fire off letters to his attorney general (and then read those letters); and see him receive senators on lobbying visits. We listen to key participants describe bureaucratic operations and recall events. Goldman treats us to hundreds of these vignettes, which presidential scholars will savor. From them we learn the following: presidents rarely trade judicial nominations for specific favors, though this has happened on occasion. Instead, presidents use judicial pork to bolster local party organizations, reward loyal followers, and grease the wheels of senatorial politics by creating a dense web of mutual obligation not tied to specific tit-for-tats. In this regard, the community between modern presidents and nineteenth century pork-meisters like Lincoln is striking. In addition, modern presidents use judicial appointments to score points with valued constituents (for example, Catholics, African Americans, and women) and as a management tool to impose their ideological preferences on the judicial bureaucracy.

The book is in no sense theoretical in the sense of contemporary social science. Indeed, it would fit comfortably in the series on American institutions published at Columbia and

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Johns Hopkins Universities around the turn of the century. Yet, like the best of those studies, it will still be cited fifty years from now. Scholars more interested in the forests of presidential and judicial politics than hundreds of trees will nonetheless find themselves beginning with this work and returning to it frequently. As a life's work, it is a marvelous accomplishment.

Yale University Press has favored the book with a handsome production. The endnotes are sufficiently encyclopedic to be a valuable resource in themselves, and the index, focusing on names of appointees and participants, will prove useful to historians.

CHARLES CAMERON
Columbia University

Truman and the Democratic Party *by Sean J. Savage. Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1997. 259 pp. $34.95.*

Historians have found Harry Truman to be an enigma. On one hand, he was an idealistic reformer, committed to programmatic liberalism, including civil rights and an expanded role for government in the nation's social and economic life. On the other, Truman was a staunch Democratic partisan who valued intraparty harmony and loyalty, a strong proponent of patronage and an enhanced role for party organization, and friend and ally of many of the notorious party machine bosses of his day. How Truman attempted to deal with these often competing impulses and the personal and political consequences that resulted are the major foci of Sean Savage's careful, detailed political history of Truman's career.

Using information from various archival sources, as well as personal interview data from former Truman administration and Democratic National Committee (DNC) members, Savage devotes special attention to Truman's involvement in Democratic party organizational and nomination matters until after his presidency, as well as his presidential behavior as party leader. Especially revealing are chapters dealing with Truman's relationships with the machine bosses and his efforts to be the organizational leader of his party.

The portrait of Truman that emerges from Savage's analysis is largely positive. Truman's long public career witnessed the evolution of the Democratic party from a minority party with a rural and southern base, loosely linked to a few northern urban machines, to a majority party committed to nationalizing initiatives, but with an unstable coalition, including southern segregationists, organized labor, farmers, and blacks. Truman adapted to the changes and is depicted as a responsible party advocate, who, despite great personal costs, "maintained the programmatic, ideological, and coalition foundation of the expanded Democratic party and liberal identity that Franklin D. Roosevelt had established"(p. 204). Truman is credited with moving the Democratic party beyond the New Deal with his Fair Deal, with new initiatives in the arenas of civil rights, public education, and national health insurance. In the end, "Truman's liberal, reformist ethos and his sense of campaign obligations to blacks, the ADA [Americans for Democratic Action], and organized labor were more influential in the conduct of his party leadership than his more pragmatic, cautious ethos as a party regular" (p. 164).

Savage does criticize Truman's party involvement on a number of dimensions. During the last years of his presidency, Truman proved unable to deal with what the author calls "dissensus" (p. 165), where "party members increasingly lack a shared ideology and policy

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agenda and become alienated from each other multilaterally, rather than just bilaterally, as they are confronted by new types of issues" (p. 166). By the time Truman left office, the New Deal coalition was being torn apart, something he could not forestall. Truman, a lifetime believer in grassroots politics and party loyalty, was also unable to anticipate the diminished influence of straight-ticket voting and the elevated impact of mass communications upon candidate-centered elections.

While there are no major revisions of political history found in this volume, it makes a number of important contributions to the existing literature. Scholars of contemporary party politics, used to presidents either not paying attention to party organization issues or simply using the national organization for their own purposes, will be rather surprised by some of the material uncovered by Savage dealing with party building by presidents. Truman, for example, was quite instrumental in helping develop the DNC research division, played a direct role in the development of the party platform as a programmatic instrument, and took seriously his role as the electoral leader of the party coalition.

ALLAN J. CIGLER
University of Kansas

Congressional Caucuses in National Policy Making *by Susan Webb Hammond. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 256 pp. $39.95.*

Congressional scholars have spent the better part of the twentieth century studying the formal structures of the institution. Why do we have a committee system? How are they powerful? How can we explain policy decisions? While the current state-of-the-art focuses on the debate between the informational, distributive, and partisan models of legislative organization, this book turns our attention to the largely unstudied congressional caucus system. Why do we have caucuses? What are their roles? And how do they function? To address the issue of congressional caucuses, Susan Webb Hammond presents a comprehensive account of the caucus system and an integrated explanation building on current theoretical models. The caucus system is explained in a manner similar to established theory, where a combination of "member goals, contextual factors, and the organizational characteristics and structure of Congress" help shape why and how we have caucuses (p. 13). Caucuses exist because there are no formal structures to address specific member demands. Caucuses address those member needs that fall outside the formal structures of party and committee, and serve to fill in the gaps where those institutional tools have failed.

The work is textbook in style and covers the full range of caucus development, beginning with an accounting of purpose and action. Next, the author addresses how members build and maintain caucuses, followed by an explanation of the motivations for members to join caucuses and how they are used to influence policy. The book then addresses how caucuses work with the established formal congressional structures such as committees, party leaders, and the executive branch. Finally, the work concludes with an analysis of caucus influence on floor voting, as well as an updated analysis reflecting changes in the 104th Congress.

The existence of caucuses presents interesting problems for congressional theorists. This book does an excellent job of explaining why caucuses exist and particularly why they are a relatively recent phenomenon. On the surface, their structure seems simple. Caucuses are voluntary organizations that operate independently of formal rules, allowing members with

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similar interests to organize to attain policy goals. They serve to fulfill traditional member demands: good policy, reelection, and influence in the chamber. Caucuses attain these goals by providing research and information, influencing agenda development, developing specific legislation, and forming coalitions to move issues from pre-committee ideas to winning floor votes. In short, they perform many of the functions of committees and parties, yet are not formally associated with those institutional structures. Caucuses allow members who do not hold formal positions to work in areas where they hold some interests. Thus, if the formal institutions are unable to address member demands, caucuses may form to provide this service.

One area that the book does not fully address is how the caucus system fits with the established theoretical debate on legislative organization. While the author does place the caucus system within this framework, she does not address how a strong caucus system could change our understanding of legislative organization. Much theoretical and empirical work could address this aspect in the future.

The book is a fine text for those interested in public policy generally and is of great interest to those students who study Congress. Written in an accessible style that focuses on rich interview and survey data, the work builds a case for the importance of caucuses to understanding congressional output. Supplementing the casework is a fair amount of empirical work, centered on the models of how caucuses influence floor voting. The book fits a model in the literature similar to Christopher Deering and Steven Smith's 1997 work on the committee system as a valuable source of information that builds our knowledge of the congressional institution.

JEFFERY C. TALBERT
University of Kentucky

The Dual Agenda: The African-American Struggle for Civil and Economic Equality *by Dona Cooper Hamilton and Charles V. Hamilton. New York, Columbia University Press, 1997. 384 pp. $24.95.*

The story of the organized political efforts of African Americans to overcome their treatment as second-class citizens is one not often told. It is a story that generally languishes in the shadow of the more dazzling and dramatic account of the martyred civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. and his civil rights movement. Dona Cooper Hamilton and Charles V. Hamilton in *The Dual Agenda* not only meticulously describe the political activities of civil rights organizations working on behalf of blacks from the 1930s to the 1990s, but they clarify their goals. From the 1930s on, not only were civil rights groups working to win the equal rights and freedoms of African Americans, they were also actively pursuing policies that would benefit the poor more broadly. Economic justice for the economically oppressed was not a new agenda for civil rights organizations that King had initiated in the last year of his life. *The Dual Agenda* is a wonderfully well written book that fully supports its principal thesis—that civil rights organizations have consistently and persistently fought for a liberal social welfare agenda that would benefit blacks and whites alike. It is an important and informative book that should be required reading for those interested in public policy, black politics, and interest groups.

The story of civil rights organizations working on behalf of blacks that the Hamiltons tell stands somewhat at odds with those of other analysts. Although civil rights groups were

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seen as crucial to the success of the modern-day black civil rights movement, they were also identified as a major factor in its demise. The increasing rejection of integration as the only goal of the movement and the lack of consensus over what its new goals were contributed to the disintegration of the movement's strong organizational base. And, indeed, for many of us the continued lack of ideological unity is a principal reason why civil rights organizations have continued to decline. After reading *The Dual Agenda*, it appears that ideological differences of civil rights organizations have been exaggerated. For the Hamiltons, ideological warfare within and across the civil rights groups was less a problem than the battle over political strategies. Black civil rights organizations have a clear and largely united record on the civil rights and social welfare front; where they differed most was over how to achieve these civil rights and social welfare goals.

The battles over strategy go back further than the emergence of Black Power in the 1960s. One difficult point in the NAACP's history came in the 1950s, when it decided against supporting future social welfare legislation that did not explicitly forbid discrimination. The change in strategy led to a decade-long debate over principle versus practical politics. Southern segregationists dominated Congress at that time. A statute prohibiting discrimination for any social welfare, employment, or housing bill would kill it outright. Many thought it best to fight racial discrimination in the courts and leave it out of the fight for economic justice in Congress. Mary McLeod Bethune best summed up this position by writing, "Do we put our Eggs in One Basket" (p. 100)? Why the NAACP stuck to principle on this issue and how it survived the political heat from this change in strategy are excellently accounted for by the Hamiltons.

This issue would come up again, not only in the case of Richard Nixon's Family Assistance Plan (FAP) legislation, but most recently in welfare reform. It helps clarify the civil rights organization's weak response to the new welfare reform legislation that President Bill Clinton signed into law just months before his successful reelection bid. One cannot attribute the general silence on welfare reform to organizational disarray, ideological disunity, or simply the economic elitism, or (my personal favorite) sexism inherent in the make-up of these civil rights groups. Jesse Jackson would picket the White House to protest the welfare reform legislation, but he would nevertheless actively campaign for Clinton in the end. Jackson's address at the Democratic party's national convention in 1996 was strikingly unlike his previous addresses, as it did not highlight the shortcomings of the party's representation of blacks and economically disadvantaged. But the civil rights community and members of the Congressional Black Caucus had not been won over by Clinton; nor had they much faith in Clinton's claim that in the second term he'd work to undo the law's worst features. Many felt compelled to back Clinton in 1996, believing, as Jackson himself stated at the Democratic National Convention, that in light of the Republican party's control of Congress and a Supreme Court stacked with conservatives, the stakes were too high.

Civil rights organizations come across in a more favorable light in *The Dual Agenda.* Dona Cooper Hamilton and Charles V. Hamilton establish very convincingly that ideologically, civil rights groups have not strayed from their dual agenda of racial and economic justice for all. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact the blacks have become an important voting force in American politics, civil rights groups are still finding it exceedingly difficult to effectively combine ideological purity with practical politics. More than twenty-five years have passed since the rules of the game changed for black voters. Blacks are now part of the political process, but, in this post-civil rights era, their civil rights organizations are still struggling to find the most effective way to represent them and the poor generally.

KATHERINE TATE
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The Racial Dimensions of American Overseas Colonial Policy *by Hazel M. McFerson. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 208 pp. $55.00.*

The character of the U.S. overseas empire has long perplexed scholars. U.S. imperialism clearly did not rival that of Europe, either in scope or objective. The United States most definitely has colonies, however, and it has fallen to Hazel M. McFerson to offer an explanation for U.S. policy toward territories under its flag. She does so through reference to a major preoccupation and characteristic of American life—race.

In *The Racial Dimension of American Overseas Colonial Policy*, McFerson asserts that the "racial tradition" of a particular nation-state will influence its relations with dependent peoples and greatly determine how it articulates its colonial policies. The tradition is formed from accreted law, social usage, and ideology; and in the case of the United Sates, it is one the author considers comparatively rigid. Rigidity is measured by the degree of fluidity and mobility in the social structure and by the permanence with which racial lines are etched. The racial tradition is not, however, equally fixed with respect to all groups. McFerson observes, for example, that when Native American lands were at issue in the old West, the tradition was flexible enough to permit intermarriage and thereby facilitate the subsequent transfer of real estate from Indians to whites.

The author examines the origins of racial classification, using African American and Native American models. She then examines major judicial cases concerning the legal status of Chinese and Japanese aliens and the racial issues embedded in immigration. Racial tradition in U.S. history serves here as a guide to American international behavior and links readily to an analysis of U.S. relations with Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Marianas. McFerson wants to know what determined how closely integrated with the United States each territory would become and how resignation to permanent political uncertainty was obtained from the indigenous peoples.

Such conventional explanations as the search for markets or strategic considerations are deemphasized here. The seeming comfort of Puerto Ricans and other colonized people with their status is explained by citing Booker T. Washington's late nineteenth-century model of racial accommodationism. The United States controlled subject peoples through a quid pro quo that they were willing to accept: military security and some material boons in exchange for political acquiescence.

The actual conduct of colonial policy, according to the author, has always been colored by the popular perception that the United States has no empire. Officialdom echoes this notion through the government's failure to have ever articulated a formal colonial policy or streamlined administration of the territories. The resulting ambiguities have served to disguise the real hand of power.

McFerson's work is based on considerable research. One of her goals, which she has substantially achieved, is to permit race relations scholarship and comparative politics to inform one another. Some aspects of the study would also benefit by better historical analysis. The record does not allow us, for example, to conflate in either intent, design, or consequence the U.S. protectorates once established over independent Caribbean and Central American states with U.S. rule over the present dependencies. Similarly, an accurate portrait of Puerto Rican Governor Luis Muñoz Marin cannot rest as heavily as this one does on the idea that he pursued a Booker T. Washington-like accommodationism. It must take more seriously Muñoz Marin's New Deal affiliations and modernizing sentiments.

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Such flaws aside, McFerson has written an attractive book that is methodologically interesting, intellectually provocative, and of the right proportions to serve as a useful text for students in several social science disciplines.

BRENDA GAYLE PLUMMER
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Between the Branches: The White House Office of Legislative Affairs *by Kenneth Collier. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997. 323 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $22.95.*

The subtitle to this useful book is a bit misleading. Kenneth J. Collier does more than document the founding and evolution of the White House Office of Legislative Affairs; he examines more broadly the range of tactics and tools utilized by presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower through William J. Clinton to influence Congress. Alas for presidents, Collier concludes, the effectiveness of these efforts is distinctly limited, in no small part because members of Congress and their allies in the political universe are adept at expropriating institutional innovations for their own use. Thus the Office of Legislative Affairs is as likely to serve as a vehicle through which members of Congress can lobby the president for political goodies as it is a tool for persuading legislators to see things from the president's vantage point.

Collier's argument necessarily presumes some means of measuring presidential influence in Congress. He avoids quantitative indicators, however, such as individual legislator's presidential "support" scores or roll call outcomes, because he does not believe they fully measure a president's success in influencing congressional behavior. Instead, he relies on qualitative data drawn from presidential archives, interviews, and secondary historical material to gauge successive presidents' ability to exercise "prospective influence" in Congress. By this he means their capacity to leverage the electoral uncertainty felt by most members of Congress into support for a president's objectives. Collier's fundamental claim is that a president's influence over the legislative process depends on the degree to which the president can make legislators believe that he can affect their electoral prospects.

Collier acknowledges that presidential influence of this sort is largely determined by the ideological and partisan composition of Congress. But if these political factors help delineate the limits of presidential influence, they do not determine them; some uncertainty always exists because of the pervasive electoral insecurity all legislators feel, no matter how electorally safe in fact. The key is for presidents to develop tools for exploiting legislators' insecurities.

Historically, however, the search for and efficacy of particular tools is heavily conditioned by the political context in which the president and Congress interact. Borrowing Samuel Kernell's terms, Collier argues that the most significant change in this regard since Eisenhower's presidency is the transition from "institutionalized" to "individual" pluralism. The decentralization of power in Congress, the proliferation of interest groups, the declining influence of already weak political parties, and the increasing importance of the electronic media, among other developments, collectively help shape the ways in which presidents seek to influence Congress. Under individualized pluralism, presidents are more likely to emphasize "merchandising" legislation in ways that make it appear more germane

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to legislators' electoral interests. Presidents are also more likely in the new era to adopt techniques designed to augment their prestige among the general public and to target specific publics for legislative support.

These changes are reflected not only in the evolution of the Office of Legislative Affairs as a lobbying tool, but also by other institutional changes outside the White House designed to maximize presidential influence in Congress, including a more overt lobbying role for the Office of Management and Budget and more presidential interest in the legislative outreach capacities of executive branch departments and agencies.

After laying out the conceptual argument in chapter one, Collier uses separate chapters on each president from Eisenhower through Clinton to trace these institutional developments. The descriptive chapters avoid the superficial treatment that frequently plagues these types of multi-administration historical surveys. Instead, Collier presents pointed insights explaining why a particular president's efforts to influence Congress are a break with past administrative practices, and how they are driven by the changing political context. Thus, Collier describes how Richard Nixon sought to build popular support for himself as president, rather than mobilize the public on behalf of particular policies. In discussing Gerald Ford's presidency, Collier describes the impact of the reforms that opened Congress to public scrutiny and devolved power to rank- and-file legislators. The chapter on Jimmy Carter's presidency notes the potential drawback to White House staff specialization, especially the separation of staff responsible for policy formulation from those charged with selling legislation to Congress. Finally, the Ronald Reagan chapter explores the impact of television on presidential bargaining more generally.

Critics may find some of Collier's impressionistic claims squishy. If so, I think it will be because the theory he articulates in the opening chapter is not fully integrated with the descriptive chapters that follow. Rather than use the conceptual framework to guide the choice of historical material, Collier is content to employ it in an hoc fashion to remind the reader that there is a unifying thread of logic linking the separate descriptive chapters. Although he acknowledges more than once the importance of the composition of Congress to presidential bargaining effectiveness, this point tends to get lost in detailed descriptions of the relative effectiveness of specific aides and institutional innovations.

But these minor shortcomings should not detract from what is a solid piece of scholarship. For the most part, the logic of the argument and evidence marshalled in its support is quite persuasive. Undergraduates will find the book a useful compendium on both the growth of the Office of Legislative Affairs, as well as a primer on presidents' efforts to influence the legislative branch more generally. Graduates students will appreciate Collier's ability to weave archival material with secondary sources to produce an accurate, nuanced, and yet concise history of one aspect of presidential institutional development across a half-century. This book is a welcome addition to the now burgeoning literature on the growth of the presidential branch.

MATTHEW J. DICKINSON
Harvard University

Bureaucracy and Self-Government: Reconsidering the Role of Public Administration in American Politics *by Brian J. Cook. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 224 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $14.95.*

This book evidently has not quite decided what it wants to be. It traces, often quite nicely and originally, the tension between what the author calls "instrumental" and "constitutive"

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conceptions of public administration through American history. By "instrumental," the author refers to the surprisingly resilient model of bureaucracy as simply the agent of the so-called political branches, a picture that traces its lineage back to Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber (who, surprisingly, does not receive a mention). Cook seeks to find in American political history, by contrast, hints of an alternative, "constitutive" view of public administration, in which public administration is understood to play an independent political role in shaping not only policy outcomes but also the character of relations between state and society and, hence, public understandings of and beliefs about politics. Cook shows that at a series of critical moments in history when the administrative state was configured and reconfigured—the Founding, the Jacksonian era, the Progressive era, and the New Deal—the instrumental conception repeatedly won out over the constitutive.

Although Cook tells this story effectively, he strains the distinction between the two views of public administration, which has been essentially untenable since Herbert Simon (another puzzling absence) subverted it half a century ago. Since Simon, two estimable research traditions in political science—both laying claim to the "new institutionalist" label—have demonstrated the link between the instrumental and constitutive roles of bureaucracy in democratic politics. Historical institutionalists such as Hugh Heclo, Peter Hall, Theda Skocpol, and Margaret Weir have shown how bureaucratic organization and administrative capacity have shaped politics and policy; rational choice institutionalists such as Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast have shown how formal rules afford elected officials' control over their administrative hirelings. Attention to these bodies of work would have enriched Cook's empirical account of public administration in the United States.

At the same time, however, the book is a philosophical essay about the dangers inherent in the instrumental conception and the corresponding virtues that might accrue to American politics if we took the constitutive view more seriously. The instrumental view of public administration, in which citizens and their elected leaders understand bureaucracy to be simply a tool with which to pursue their ends, leads, Cook suggests, to inevitable disappointment. Public agencies simply cannot bear up under the strain and scrutiny that their awkward, extraconstitutional position imposes on them. As a result, citizens' faith in government declines, along with their willingness to entrust important tasks to government. Conversely, he argues, if citizens and public officials understand public administration to be not merely a means to previously and independently determined ends but rather part of the process by which a society shapes and reshapes its public goals, then bureaucracy can occupy a more constructive and honored place in the democratic pantheon. This is, to say the least, a provocative argument—that democratic self-government would be enhanced by giving more, not less, scope to the bureaucracy. Maybe so, but Cook does little to indicate why electorally ambitious politicians would consent to such a solution. To an elected official, the problem is always that an agency is not instrumental enough, that is, it defies his bidding or favors the wrong interests and thus needs to be reined in.

These two ambitions sit uneasily with one another. The historical narrative provides extensive evidence of the potency of the instrumental conception of bureaucracy for American politicians, who have sought responsiveness above all from the administrative branch of government. But this story undermines the book's theoretical claim about the priority of the constitutive view. Elected officials seem constitutionally, as it were, wedded to the instrumental view of public administration; it seems unlikely that even the most cogent philosophical argument will pry them loose from these institutional moorings. Nor, if democratic government is to survive, does it seem desirable.

ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN
Columbia University

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Splintered Sisterhood: Gender and Class in the Campaign against Woman Suffrage *by Susan E. Marshall. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1997. 320 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $21.95.*

Why would women organize against the extension of political rights to women? That is the question addressed in Susan Marshall's fine new book on the antisuffrage movement. In it she argues that the women of the antisuffrage movement were acting in their own perceived class and social interests, rather than as reactionary ideologues, fronts for particular business interests, or extensions of male political concerns. Women antisuffragists were distinctive from the men who opposed suffrage, who tended more toward personal attacks and concern over a decline in male authority. Nor were these women fronts for the liquor industry, as many suffragists claimed. Rather, they were elite women concerned with protecting their own privileged positions in the social hierarchy.

The contributions of this book are severalfold and cross several disciplines. Marshall corrects the neglect and misrepresentation of the antisuffragists by social historians, who have treated the movement mostly as represented by its opponents, the suffragists. In the area of social movement theory, this book builds on our understanding of the role and development of countermovements. The antisuffrage movement was not simply reactive to the suffrage movement but developed interactively with it. Further, in the area of gender theory, this account of the antisuffragists argues for a situated understanding of gender identity and interests that takes account of women's class and racial position.

If this book has weaknesses, it is only because this detailed treatment of the antisuffrage movement is not fully exhaustive. The book focuses primarily on the activities of antisuffragists in one state, Massachusetts. While it may be argued that the antisuffragists from this state were leaders in the national antisuffrage movement (in particular, in the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage), and it should be noted that information on several other (especially northeastern) states is also included, this still may slant our understanding of the national antisuffrage movement. In particular, how well do the concerns of the women from the New England Brahmin class compare to those of the antisuffragists in western states, where the first successful suffrage campaigns were fought? More needs to be learned about these western women on both sides of the suffrage debate. Further, in her last substantive chapter, Marshall follows the political fortunes of antisuffragists in the aftermath of the Nineteenth Amendment and notes that while some became hardened conservative opponents of women's public realm politics, others joined the partisan fray. Yet of these two tendencies, the book follows the fortunes of the former group to the relative neglect of the latter. Given Marhsall's other arguments about the very political nature of the supposedly antipolitical antisuffrage movement, it might have been more interesting to follow the antisuffragists who actively joined the electoral realm.

Indeed, one of the most interesting and suggestive findings of this book concerns the political nature of this antipolitical movement and the degree to which the political views of the antisuffragists paralleled and overlapped with those of the suffragists. While celebrating the domestic seclusion of women, the antisuffragists were engaging in public and semipublic political campaigns. Further, while antisuffragists were explicitly opposed to women's use of the vote, many were favorably inclined toward alternative forms of women's political activism, particularly those that most closely resembled women's traditional involvement in voluntary and charitable activities. It is here that the parallels to the suffragists begin to emerge, since the building of a "female dominion of American reform," as Robyn Muncy has called it, was an extension of the ideal of a nonpartisan female politics

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in which many suffragists shared. At least three areas of political overlap between the two movements is apparent—the ideal of nonpartisanship, the promotion of a female reform tradition, and the assertion of a tiered hierarchy of social groups in which African Americans and recent immigrants were particularly politically suspect.

Marshall has given us a fine account of an important and neglected social movement. Moreover, she has added considerable insight to our understanding of turn-of-the-century women's politics.

GRETCHEN RITTER
University of Texas at Austin

The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan's Development *by Monte R. Bullard. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1997. 223 pp. Cloth, $62.95; paper, $24.95.*

Taiwan's rapid economic growth, political democratization, and equal income distribution have attracted a great deal of attention from social scientists. Efforts have been made by both dependency and modernization theorists to locate Taiwan within their framework. This book provides another interesting and unique explanation of Taiwan's development. The author tries to find the answer by looking at the programs of political socialization carried out by the political warfare system in Taiwan. The author thinks neither the term "political socialization" nor the term "political warfare" is sufficient to describe the struggle between Nationalists and Communists. The term "allegiance warfare" is thus introduced to describe "the struggle for the hearts and minds or loyalties (allegiance) of all citizens, military and civilian . . . in the context of active civil war conditions" (p. 14). The struggle includes not only political socialization but also economic and cultural elements. The military aspect of allegiance warfare in Taiwan not only effectively prevented communist penetration on Taiwan (a counter to Lenin's organizational warfare) but also succeeded in maintaining domestic political order, which preceded development in Taiwan.

Faced with military defeat on the mainland, continuing communist threats, an ailing economy, distrust by the people, and other internal problems, allegiance warfare became the solution to all these problems in the 1950s. The author thinks the principal weapon in the allegiance warfare was education, in which the military took the leading role. A Political Warfare Department was established to develop and execute various educational and political programs. Thus, the military became a school of citizenship as well as an establishment for political socialization.

The author devotes more than half of the book to describing how political socialization policy was formulated, how the political warfare system was organized in the military, how political education was implemented, and how civil-military relations were promoted for the three target audiences—military personnel, youth, and the civilian populace in Taiwan.

In the conclusion, the author says: "The principal difference in Taiwan's approach to warfare with Communist China was to elevate the role of allegiance warfare—the political and social struggle for the hearts and minds of the people" (p. 170). As a result, social order was reestablished, which provided the environment for Taiwan's economic development. However, the author's view that the military political socialization effort led to democracy is questionable. How could an authoritarian state that emphasized political education, control, and order become a democratic society? It is obvious that factors other than allegiance

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warfare contributed to Taiwan's political democracy. In addition, it is questionable whether the allegiance warfare effort has been very effective. If it was an effective program to achieve national integration, how can the author explain the movement for Taiwan's independence? The effectiveness to win people's support is questionable. Moreover, allegiance warfare loses its ground when relations between Taiwan and mainland China continue improving, political influence is withdrawn from the miliary and schools, and people have different views on Taiwan's future. Party competition, instead of allegiance warfare, becomes a way to gain people's hearts and minds. It is questionable whether allegiance warfare will continue in Taiwan. However, this book is useful to understand the unique situation in Taiwan during the Martial Law period.

WEY HSIAO
Commonwealth of Massachusetts

The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf *by Nathan J. Brown. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 258 pp. $59.95.*

This provocative and broadly conceived institutional history of the Egyptian court system addresses current debates regarding the relationship of legal reform and imperialism, law and democracy, and law and statebuilding in the postcolonial world. In an argument aimed at scholars, policy makers, and those who do business in the courts of countries like Egypt, Nathan Brown seeks to dispel deep-rooted misconceptions about both the nature and intent of the rule of law within postcolonial, authoritarian regimes. The core of the argument is that in the past century or so, Egypt's ruling elite has paradoxically embraced the construction of an autonomous and powerful judiciary with the primary intent of building a strong state. Because its statist ethos was attractive to other rulers, the Egyptian system became a much imitated model in neighboring countries, particularly the Gulf states, discussed in two chapters.

Challenging previous studies of legal reform in Egypt, Brown argues that statism was the primary motive; of only secondary importance were an internal impulse toward liberal, democratic principles and the external pressure of imperialist powers. Contrary to historical studies that have posited a liberal age in Arab countries before the post-World War II rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and revolutionary authoritarianism, Brown argues that the liberal impulse has always been relatively weak among elites. Legal reform was never primarily intended as a liberal check on executive authority or as a guarantee of individual rights. Rather, the rule of law was seen as a tool for enhancing state power, not limiting it.

Brown seeks to demonstrate, however, that the rule of law can exist without liberalism in an authoritarian regime. He argues that the rule of law is not a fiction in Egypt: Egyptian courts have commanded a considerable degree of autonomy. The state has tolerated judicial autonomy primarily because it has been an instrument to enforce state laws among the masses. In an interesting chapter on how lower-class Egyptians flock to the courts to solve marital problems and landlord-tenant disputes, Brown demonstrates that the statist legal system does not necessarily favor the rich and powerful. However, the state and ruling elite's support for judicial autonomy has in fact rested heavily on their ability to circumvent the courts when the rule of law has proven inconvenient, as in the state's current use of military courts to try violent Islamists. The reader may wonder in the end whether Brown's emphasis

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on autonomy is meaningful when it is restricted to areas of the law that least challenge elite interests.

In this argument against alien and imperialist origins of legal reform, Brown notes that Egyptians began to reform their judicial system before the British occupation in 1882. Egyptians also chose to model their national court system on that of the French as an anti-imperialist strategy, because French-style centralized and hierarchical judiciary would enhance the executive's power to enforce Egyptian sovereignty against British challenges. Furthermore, Brown argues that the large number of Egyptians who use the courts belies claims that they are alien to local values. While these points appear valid, scholars may view the argument as based on a rather simplistic notion of imperialism.

A broader understanding of imperialism as a political, social, and cultural process involving both Europeans and colonized peoples might have enabled Brown to contribute more substantively to our understanding of indigenous elites' political behavior in a colonial context, and of the historical links between statist postcolonial ideologies and imperialism in general. Nonetheless, this is an interesting and refreshing contribution to our understanding of postcolonial regimes, of value particularly to political scientists and historians, although the latter will wish that Brown had made use of judicial archives to bolster his various arguments.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON
University of Virginia

After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires *by Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1997. 200 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $22.00.*

There is much more in this volume than a review can capture. It is a collaborative effort of historians, sociologists, and political scientists, generally of the first rank in their fields, fine stylists, and seasoned thought-provokers. The basic structure of the book has a classical symmetry. It opens with two grand theoretical introductory pieces (by Charles Tilly and E. J. Hobsbawm) and concludes with a survey by the editors of the theoretical implications of the main text, which divides into two halves, one on the reasons that empires collapse and the other on the consequences of the same. Each of these halves opens with a theoretical piece (by Alexander Motyl on causes and by Karen Barkey on consequences) and is followed by a specialized study focusing on one of the four empires considered: the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian empires and the Soviet Union. The Ottoman pieces are by Caglar Keyder (causes) and Serif Mardin (consequences), the Habsburg by Solomon Wank and István Deák, the Russian by Mark von Hagen and Ronald G. Suny, and the Soviet by Victor Zaslavsky and Rogers Brubaker.

Although the editors chose to design a careful structure, they did not impose any conceptual framework or research agenda to be shared by the contributors. Each author approaches the assigned topic individually. In the case of Rogers Brubaker's contribution, this latitudinarianism bumped against the editors' otherwise perfect symmetry, since Brubaker decided to focus on a singular aspect of the consequences of the Soviet collapse: whether ethnic Russians could be expected to migrate to Russia from the independent non-Russian republics. However, he placed this narrower problem within a wide comparative framework

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of Muslim migration from the formerly Ottoman Balkans, Hungarian migration from the successor states of the Habsburg monarchy, and German migration from territories formerly included in the Habsburg monarchy and German empire. The result was such a strong and stimulating study that the editors quite rightly included it.

The editors allowed contributors to question the very parameters of the project. Victor Zaslavsky, for example, wrote a brilliant interpretation of Soviet history, tracing the connections among the political order, economy, international situation, and nationality policy, which produced, he argues, a system fundamentally different from anything that the pre-World-War-I empires had ever known. Can they be compared meaningfully, he asks?

From the editors' point of view there is much that these states have in common. Editor Barkey, an Ottomanist and sociologist, attempts a practical piece of generalization in her contribution, trying to determine what factors influenced the formation of civic or ethnic nationalism across the set of examples. In his contribution on why imperial Russia collapsed, editor von Hagen delineates what distinguished these four states: they were land-based empires that broke up into independent states organized on the national principle. But in the companion, consequence-oriented piece on Russia, Suny makes the important point that the old Russia did not break up the way the old Turkey and Austria-Hungary did. Instead, most of the old multinational empire was transformed into the Soviet Union, another imperial structure.

In the end, the editors advanced modest claims. They saw that in each concrete case the historically unique seemed to outweigh the general, but also that "fascinating patterns emerge in our reflections" (p. 189). This is true. Ultimately, one of the most important contributors to this volume is the reader, who can survey this enthralling panorama with the best of guides and reflect intelligently on some of the most significant events of modern history.

JOHN-PAUL HIMKA
University of Alberta

Casualties of the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars
by Michael Wesley. New York, St Martin's Press, 1997. 200 pp. $65.00.

The post-cold war era has dramatically altered the role of the United Nations in international peace and security affairs. The Security Council is no longer as limited by a superpower standoff, and so the UN has dramatically increased the number and variety of roles of its peacekeeping missions over the last decade. During the same time, most of the challenges that the organization has faced have involved an exclusive or primary internal conflict component; unfortunately, civil conflicts are those that have proven to be the most difficult for international organizations to manage. Michael Wesley's book is one of a handful of systematic books or articles to address the causes of UN difficulties in these contexts.

The author's general argument is that the interaction of inherent UN weaknesses in peacekeeping and other missions with civil war dynamics leads to a failure of UN intervention efforts. The inherent weaknesses are those dealing with cracks in the UN member state coalitions that authorize and direct the missions, vague mandates, and poor or inappropriate UN strategies for dealing with civil conflict. UN mission failures are exploited by the actors involved in the civil conflict and by third-party states with a vested interest in the outcome

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of the conflict. Such weaknesses can be mitigated if all the conflict parties accept the mission and if the powers stick together in support of the UN effort.

Many previous books on UN peacekeeping have focused too heavily on microissues such as logistics in identifying conditions for UN success and failure. Refreshingly, the author demonstrates that broader concerns in the way that UN missions are organized (strategy, behavior of the member states) are more critical. Importantly, this analysis recognizes that contextual factors are critical in affecting UN success or failure, and the author provides an excellent framework for understanding how the structural and contextual elements combine to affect outcomes.

As illustrations of these central theoretical arguments, the author uses six case studies of recent UN efforts in civil wars. He pairs cases of success and failure for each of three different types of post-cold war UN missions: mediation, peacekeeping (more correctly understood as observation and interposition), and election supervision. Although several of these cases (Somalia, Bosnia) have been the subject of lengthy scholarly treatments on their own, the presentation here is not unduly descriptive; it is well argued to illustrate the broader theoretical points and insightful because of the comparative case study dimension.

The framework here may be the basis for a general understanding of the success or failure of all UN missions, not simply those related to civil wars. The author does not attempt such a claim, but there is little reason why most of the variables or conditions cited could not be relevant to understanding the success or failure of peacekeeping missions in interstate conflict, for example. The lack of broader ambition, however, is one of the few problems in this otherwise solid, well developed book.

PAUL F. DIEHL
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

European Monetary Unification: Theory, Practice, and Analysis *by Barry J. Eichengreen. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997. 349 pp. $45.00.*

Few have written more about the European Union's (EU) move toward economic monetary union than Barry J. Eichengreen. This volume presents ten of his most important contributions to this literature grouped into three broad topics: the extent to which the European Union meets the criteria of an optimal currency area; the adjustment processes once monetary union is formed; the political-economic logic of European monetary integration. These essays provide as broad and thorough a discussion of these issues as is currently available.

Is the EU an optimal currency area (OCA)? The critical issue here is the symmetry of shocks across regions (countries) within the currency union. The more symmetrical are shocks, the more the area constitutes an OCA. Taking the United States as a point of reference, Eichengreen finds that European countries are exposed to shocks larger in magnitude and less correlated across EU members than regions in the United States. Moreover, adjustment to shocks is slower in the EU than in the United States. This suggests that the EU as a whole is not an optimal currency area. The costs of monetary union that arise from abandoning independent monetary policies and exchange rates, instruments that can be used to adjust to shocks, are greater than the benefits that result from eliminating transactions costs and exchange rate uncertainty.

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Given asymmetric shocks, adjustment inside a monetary union falls upon labor markets. In examining European labor markets, Eichengreen again uses the United States as a point of reference and finds that interregional migration of labor is much less sensitive to wage differentials in Europe than in the United States. In conjunction with other work that suggests that wages are rigid in Europe and that capital tends not to flow into depressed regions, this finding implies that asymmetric shocks will yield persistent unemployment in the affected regions. And while the employment and output consequences of shocks inside monetary union can be mitigated by counter-cyclical fiscal policy, Eichengreen points out that if the fiscal constraints embodied in the Maastricht Treaty (the stabilization pact limits government deficits to 3 percent of GDP except in extraordinary circumstances) are "vigorously enforced, they could significantly diminish the stabilization capacity of national budgets" (p. 232).

The volume's broad message, therefore, is that Europe's move toward monetary union is puzzling from an economic perspective. Individual countries within the union will confront adjustment costs in the wake of asymmetric shocks, labor markets are ill-suited for making these adjustments, and European governments have unnecessarily limited their ability to respond to these shocks with fiscal policy. Why, then, are European governments creating EMU? It is in answering this question that the volume is least satisfying. Eichengreen presents a rather functional argument. EMU emerged as a consequence of economic integration: as European economies have become more tightly integrated, European governments have placed greater emphasis on exchange rate stability. As European financial markets integrated, it became difficult to sustain fixed exchange rates. Thus, a single currency became the only way to sustain fixed exchange rates in a financially-integrated Europe. There are many potential objections to be raised to this argument: Eichengreen does not demonstrate that costs of flexible exchange rates are greater than costs of monetary union; EMU was initiated and negotiated before it became obvious that fixed exchange rates were hard to reconcile with financial integration; it ignores the conflict between the Bundesbank and the French over control of European monetary policy. This shortcoming aside, the papers in this volume are required reading for anyone interested in the economics and politics of EMU.

THOMAS OATLEY
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East *by Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy. Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment/Brookings Institution Press, 1997. 491 pp. Cloth, $52.95; paper, $22.95.*

This ambitious and provocative work on the post-cold war Middle East reasserts the importance of geographic factors to the analysis of regional conflict and strategic access. Its wide scope derives from a broad conception of the region, defined to include some three dozen states of the Middle East, North and East Africa, South Asia, and the Caspian basin. The study is descriptively rich, and it succeeds in its sophisticated military analysis. Still, some readers will be disappointed that its expansiveness is not fully matched by analytical clarity; it would have profited greatly from a stronger editorial hand to streamline the argument and eliminate redundancies.

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The eleven chapters are divided among four parts, supplemented by five appendices and an impressive array of maps and figures. In spite of its encyclopedic coverage, the book does have an overarching theme and policy agenda: the Middle East is resource rich, conflict prone, and in all likelihood the necessary target of American military intervention. For the authors, geographic factors are both causes of regional conflict and constraints on policy choices. Much of the work is a subtly structured argument supporting this view, directed toward a policy audience more than the international relations literature or regional specialists in political science. The Caspian basin, for example, is included not only to highlight its impending significance as a source of energy, but to show that it holds little immediate promise of replacing the Persian Gulf.

The work's general persuasiveness may depend on the extent to which one already accepts the authors' initial premises, for their evidence is anecdotal and their logic will not convince more skeptical readers. Thus, in arguing that "there is no technologically, economically, and environmentally viable alternative" to oil, the authors' citations include a study of ethanol by the American Gas Association and a statement by the president of the American Petroleum Institute (p. 368). Comparable examples of preaching to the converted are found throughout.

Some readers, moreover, will miss a fuller analytical treatment of precisely how geographic factors interact with other variables to produce outcomes, for the work lacks a rigorous theoretical grounding. Technology and resources, for example, are deemed critical variables that combine with political ideologies and population dynamics to influence the effects of geography. An alternative approach from political economy, however, might counter that it is not the interaction of technology and geography that shapes patterns of conflict, and that such a claim confuses cause with consequence. Accordingly, it was not the development of transcontinental railroads that "catapulted the United States to world power status," as the authors contend, but the underlying political and economic institutions that permitted the building of a unified railroad system in the first place (p. 450).

The book also may provoke some regional specialists with chapters like "Getting into the Middle East: Power Projection and Forward Presence." Its discussion of "the impressive new technologies that provide rich countries such as the United States with the means to overcome geographical and political obstacles" (p. 229) and the use of evocative military jargon like "forced entry" (p. 326) could be supplemented by a closer analysis of the targets of intervention. In the absence of such, thoughtful readers may dismiss improbable scenarios like that of a hypothetical U.S. confrontation with "an Iran-Iraq alliance . . . in which Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey have all been taken over by Islamic fundamentalist forces" (p. 322). The authors here are inattentive to the domestic dynamics of these states, treating regional actors more like geographic obstacles to be surmounted than complex polities to be understood.

ANDREW FLIBBERT
Columbia University

Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries *by Sylvia Maxfield. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 187 pp. $35.00.*

Sylvia Maxfield provides a useful introduction to the international political economy of central banking in developing countries. She argues that politicians will increase central bank

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independence in order to signal increased credit worthiness to potential international investors. The longer politicians expect to stay in office, the worse their economy's balance of payments problems, and the scarcer capital is in international markets, the more likely that politicians will use this device. After framing her hypothesis about developing countries with a discussion on the politics of central banking in advanced industrial economies, Maxfield presents case studies of the travails of central bankers in Thailand, Mexico, South Korea, and Brazil. She tests her hypothesis against many, but not all, competing hypotheses, specifically that central bankers' ideological predilections, the banks' legal status, and the states' need for seignorage drive central bank independence. She then tests her argument with a brief regression analysis. Unfortunately, she regresses total investment rather than foreign investment against a legal measure of central bank independence after arguing strongly that legal measures of independence are not particularly useful and after structuring the book as an investigation of politicians' relationship with foreign investors.

Operationalizing these variables is very difficult, and I doubt that any wholly satisfactory solution exists. Maxfield assesses both independent and dependent variables in impressionistic ways, and her data are not comprehensive. Global financial supply conditions (an ecological variable) are used to characterize individual countries. She uses nominal interest rate deviations from the London Inter Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) to measure credit worthiness, but ignores more precise ex ante measures like credit ratings. These, moreover, assess individual countries in relation to other countries. Regressing both ratings and real interest rates against some measure of bank independence would have been interesting.

The empirical difficulties in composing these variables stand out in the South Korean case. Maxfield argues that Korean politicians were not concerned about credit worthiness (how do we know this?) and thus happily subordinated the central bank to economic planners. Yet foreigners financed nearly 40 percent of Korean capital formation in the postcoup decade, which suggests politicians must have had some concerns. Foreigners for their part assuaged their worries by lending exclusively in hard currencies. The Korean case suggests that planning boards, currency boards, and foreign lenders are the gatekeepers of growth, not central banks, and that exchange rate risk looms larger for foreign investors than inflation.

Finally, while the book cannot be blamed for appearing after the recent Asian financial debacle, it does not deal with what should be a critical test of the argument, the mid-1990s. Central bank independence became a major issue in this period, finance ministries become obsessed with credit ratings, and the investors Maxfield thinks most sensitive to central bank independence—foreign portfolio investors—dominated financial flows. Currency boards, whose utility to foreign investors as guardians of exchange rate stability is much more obvious than either de facto or de jure central bank independence, also came into fashion. Currency boards are mentioned only briefly in Maxfield's survey of central banking changes in the 1990s.

In her favor, Maxfield admits that her argument is about necessary, but not sufficient, causes, and is compatible with other arguments about central bank independence. The more plausible competing hypothesis that lenders extort bank independence among other things as a price for finance during crises is mentioned and ignored, although arguably this may be the sufficient condition. So are other necessary conditions. Maxfield's argument is intuitively obvious, logical, and reasonable; but by focusing on only a few necessary conditions she leaves the reader hungering for more on what is a timely and important topic.

HERMAN M. SCHWARTZ
University of Virginia

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The International Dimensions of Democratization *edited by Laurence Whitehead. Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1996. 431 pp. $65.00.*

Laurence Whitehead has long been recognized as an authority on both conceptualizing and documenting those international or external forces that have supported or sustained internal movements in democratization processes around the globe. In this anthology, Whitehead gathers an impressive group of scholars to examine the range of ways international actors, institutions, structures, and norms have influenced democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe, with two additional chapters by Whitehead addressing East-Central Europe.

In many ways, the volume revisits the arguments and cases presented in the 1986 *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* collection; indeed, Whitehead and Philippe Schmitter, who together with Guillermo O'Donnell were the editors of that collection, wrote the conceptual chapters to frame this volume. The *Transitions* authors argued, among other things, that while international dimensions and international structural conditions were important to transitions processes, domestic actors and strategy were far more important. None of the chapters in *The International Dimensions* volume fundamentally challenge that premise, yet they do convince us that international factors are more important than the *Transitions* volume recognized, a notion we are all the more willing to concede at the close of the 1990s, an era of intense, dynamic globalization and of what Douglas Chalmers has termed the "internationalization of domestic politics."

Of particular interest in the volume are the chapters by Kathryn Sikkink and Andrew Hurrell, who in different ways adopt an almost philosophical view of the indirect and long-term effects on overall normative as well as behavioral transformations resulting from international pressures. Both recognize, as do most of the authors in the volume, that the effects of external forces are extremely difficult to specify and measure, yet they document ways in which external policies, groups, and institutions lend legitimacy to human rights and democratization efforts. Hurrell disaggregates the "classes of interaction" between Brazil and the international system, highlighting the paradox of "the overall importance of the international context" juxtaposing "the relative absence of specific linkages" between Brazilian and international forces (p. 146). Hurell's classes of interaction help set the stage for several primarily descriptive chapters, including those on the roles of party Internationals (Wolf Grabendorff), European political foundations (Michael Pinto-Duschinsky), and exiled opposition leaders and their support networks (Alan Angell). Sikkink's chapter draws from her work on transnational principled issue networks, highlighting how such networks, through intense linkages primarily between local and international nongovernmental organizations, contribute to redefining what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior by the state toward its citizenry.

Paradoxically, the chapters on Southern Europe (Charles Powell on Spain and Basilios Tsingos on Greece) serve as a check to the oft-made argument that the European Union (or what was then the EEC) provided the major impetus to redemocratization there. In his chapter on southern Europe as a whole, Whitehead briefly discusses what he terms the "fuzzy boundary between domestic and external factors." It is to this notion that more attention could be paid, both conceptually and empirically, as internal actors move among many boundaries (witness Angell's Chilean exiles) and international forces affix themselves to domestic politics. This would involve exploring the interpenetration of international actors, institutions, and structures at subnational as well as national level in politics far from limited to democratization issues.

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As recent alliances on a host of levels among Mexico, the United States and Canada attest—from human rights, labor, and environmentalist groups to trinational governmental monitoring boards—there is an unprecedented and increasingly unavoidable transparency of politics taking place that is creating new constraints as well as possibilities for the daily practice of politics. Much of this was the unanticipated result of struggles both for and against the North American Free Trade Agreement, hardly a democratization issue for its strongest proponents, which nonetheless was an important catalyst in bringing Mexico's shaky democratization record into sharp relief. A conceptual lens on the internationalization of politics, highlighting highly authoritarian as well as democratic daily political life around the world, would enhance Whitehead's important contribution, emphasizing motives and mulitidimensionality as well as "control," "contagion," "consent," and "conditionality" (p. 29).

KATHERINE HITE
Vassar College

Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution *by Glenn E. Robinson. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997. 248 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

In discussing the Palestinian uprising (*intifada*), Glenn Robinson asks three fundamental questions: What is it that enables an aggrieved people to turn rebellious acts into collective action? How is revolutionary collective action sustained in the face of overwhelming counterforce? And how does the revolutionary process shape the political outcome in an emerging state? His answers are sensible: The intifada "became possible only with the rise of a new and distinctive political elite in the West Bank and Gaza"; it was sustained by virtue of the "devolved authority"—grassroots organizations and popular committees—that marked the rise of this new elite; and it came to an end just as it scored its principal success—the return of the PLO leadership to Palestine, which then proceeded to "undermine the new elite through cooptation, coercion, and marginalization," feeling threatened by the homegrown leadership the uprising had nurtured (pp. ix–xii).

What follows is a description of the intifada and its antecedents in which these claims are fleshed out. The author's attempt to bring together the various strands of the uprising is particularly useful, offering the reader an overall, if summary perspective on what the intifada was all about. He describes the rise of the student movement and grassroots organizations in health and agriculture prior to the uprising, as well as the emergence of popular committees, the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), and a powerful Islamist movement shortly after the uprising's start in December 1987. Moreover, Robinson's choice of the town of Beit Sahour as a case is compelling, not because of the tax revolt that took place there, which was not replicated in any significant fashion elsewhere in Palestine, but because of the shift in power the revolt wrought from the town's old elite to a new one. The new elite failed to consolidate its power fully, which, as Robinson observes with acuity, "epitomized the real but indecisive sociopolitical transformation the Intifada spawned" (p. 93).

There is much that is good about this book—its overall assessment of the uprising and its accessibility to the lay reader. But there are also some notable lapses. Some of the key arguments providing the analytical links for the larger claims Robinson makes are not

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backed by evidence. For example, the author claims to have "argued that Hamas came into being . . . largely as a result of a revolt . . . within the Muslim Brethren" (p. 172). In fact, he has merely affirmed this important claim without supporting it in any way. Likewise, a discussion of the origins and composition of the UNLU appears to be based on a single source who as a member of one of the UNLU's factions is unlikely to be unbiased.

The recurring reliance on a single source for long stretches of text is surprising for an author who spent considerable time in Palestine conducting research. More disturbing yet is his frequent use of the *Jerusalem Post*, but also the *New York Times* and the *Economist* as this single source, especially when discussing developments within Palestinian society (internal conflicts, pp. 114–115; collaborator killings, pp. 124–127; the Hamas-UNLU rivalry, pp. 157–158). None of these publications excelled in their reporting of the uprising, were often blinded to the nature of developments by their own prejudices, and had notably poor access to key actors on the ground.

The dearth of reliable sources compels one to question automatically the accuracy of the information that is presented. If it reflects a failure to conduct more thorough research, this may explain the few factual missteps, including the assertion that the law in the West Bank and Gaza has been left largely unchanged by successive occupiers. In fact, it has been profoundly transformed (p. 183); Robinson refers to the links between the post-1989 UNLU leaders and "their respective PLO factions in Tunis," which somehow controlled these people. In fact, only Fatah and Fida were in Tunis; the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were in Damascus, while the PCP had no significant presence outside of Palestine; the UNLU leaders named here were never beholden to the external PLO leadership (p. 99). Robinson makes strange references to "tribes" and "tribal representatives" (pp. 195 and 197). These methodological shortfalls and occasional errors of fact mar an otherwise highly readable account of the Palestinian uprising and how it came about.

JOOST R. HILTERMANN
Georgetown University

The Agony of Algeria *by Martin Stone. New York, Columbia University Press, 1997. 274 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $16.50.*

In the throes of a civil war that even by the standards of the twentieth century appears gruesome and grotesque, Algeria's citizens appear caught between two authoritarian solutions—one military, one Islamist—to what is a lingering but fundamental disagreement over the nature and future of the Algerian state. Stone hopes to explain this crisis, which goes far beyond the simple religious-secular dichotomy that the country's ongoing debacle is most often portrayed as. This is, of course, a daunting task that has escaped the efforts of even the most seasoned local and foreign observers of Algeria: the refusal of the military to allow the parliamentary elections to proceed in 1991 acted as a catalyst and reinforced some tendencies, already opaquely visible after the 1988 riots, for a multidimensional confrontation between different clans, tendencies, and political groups within Algeria. Although his book contains an adequate, if somewhat unimaginative recall of the different factors that led to the current debacle and civil war, Stone does not provide a more synthetic summary that goes beyond much of what has already been written in a more general fashion about the North African nation and its panoply of problems.

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The book contains in essence a chronological recall of Algeria's political, economic, and sociocultural history since independence, with a brief introduction to postindependence political and economic developments, as well as two chapters that deal with Algeria's foreign policy. Two chapters as well deal specifically with the political rise of the Islamist movements in Algeria since 1991, although the author leaves out much relevant material by concentrating almost exclusively on the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and its more violent offshoots. Unfortunately, beyond a somewhat journalistic summary of the country's history and more recent events, there is no general analytical theme to the volume. The different chapters are almost haphazardly thrown together, with a chapter on "The Berber Question," for example, suddenly cropping up toward the end of the book without any real explanation as to its purpose or relevance. This is a book exclusively meant for a general audience that does not possess an in-depth understanding of Algerian events or their importance; but, unfortunately, there is nothing in the volume that merits the attention of informed observers of Algeria or specialists. Its use would perhaps best be restricted to introductory courses in comparative politics or general courses on comparative political development, with the caveats noted above kept in mind.

To this reviewer, however, the publication of *The Agony of Algeria* raises an even more serious question beyond its academic merit. It is alarming that Columbia University decided to publish a volume that by the author's own euphemistic admission, "has eschewed some of the more rigorous academic structures to maximise accessibility to students, analysts, businesspeople and general readers" (pp. v–vi). In a climate where single case studies like the one under review are increasingly difficult to get published, one cannot but wonder why a book with a total of eighteen footnotes, all of which refer to secondary literature, and with no discernible analytical value that would allow one to suspend those customary academic strictures, enjoys the grace of an established academic press? If this is a harbinger of things to come, regional specialists will not only have to worry about reduced funding but also about *boulevardist* treatments now enjoying the imprimatur of quality university presses.

DIRK VANDEWALLE
Dartmouth College

The Founding Myths of Israel *by Zeev Sternhell. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998. 419 pp. $29.95.*

In the past fifteen years or so, there has been a remarkable burst in Israel of what might be called passionate scholarship: historical, political, and sociological research reanalyzing conventional interpretations about Israeli politics and society as well as the origins and dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Collectively, these works are known as "the new Israeli history" and "critical sociology," and they have compelled a sweeping reassessment of a number of crucial but unexamined assumptions about Zionism and Israel, especially about the Palestinian-Jewish conflict.

The importance of this reassessment is far more than historical, for it has a direct relevance for the still unresolved Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the psychological prerequisite for a lasting settlement is an acceptance by the Israelis of their role and responsibility for over eighty years of hatred and violence. Fortunately, a whole generation of dedicated Israeli journalists and scholars are helping Israelis better understand their history, free of the dis-

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tortions and myths that have blinded them in the past. As one might expect, this effort is bitterly controversial in Israel, and it is fiercely resisted by the Israeli right wing, including the present Likud government.

Zeev Sternhell, the Leon Blum Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and one of Israel's most renowned academicians, has made a major contribution to both scholarship and public discourse on Israeli democracy and on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is a good thing that his credentials are so impeccable and his scholarship so impressive, for it is certain that his devastating arguments will engender furious debate in Israel. As Sternhell puts it, "In contemporary Israel . . . the historiographical debate assumes a particularly intense tone . . . [for] this academic debate merges with the public debate on the future of Israeli society (p. xi). . . . [T]he scholar who brings to light unpleasant truths, who challenges the myth and comes up with unorthodox interpretations . . . [may even be treated] as an enemy of the people" (p. x).

Sternhell's major argument is that Zionism grew out of and was essentially the same as many other European "tribal" or "romantic" nationalist movements of the early twentieth century. Zionism seemed to be more than just that, for it purported to represent democratic socialism as well as Jewish nationalism. But the ideology of democratic socialism was more nominal than real, for "the universal values of socialism were subordinated to the particularist values of nationalism" (p. 7). Despite the mythology and the rhetoric, the real Zionist goal was not to build a democratic or socialist state but simply a Jewish one—and "when nationalism is used for state-building, it is generally incompatible with liberal democratic values" (p. 15). Thus, the Zionist leaders sacrificed the values of democracy, social justice, individualism, egalitarianism, and—above all—justice to the Palestinians, whenever these values conflicted with the single-minded need to mobilize the Jewish community and wrest the land and a state from the Arabs.

The main body of the book is an archivally-based ideological history of the Histadrut, the Jewish labor movement that provided the political elite or founders of Israel, especially Berl Katznelson and David Ben-Gurion. It is probable that only serious scholars and specialists will want to pay close attention to the long and highly detailed analysis or will be able to provide an authoritative evaluation of the overall argument, but there can be no doubt that Sternhell has provided an impressive body of evidence in support of his conclusions.

Sternhell concedes that until 1949 the "narrow perspectives," "fundamentalism," and "rigid nationalism" (pp. 182, 265) of Katznelson and Ben-Gurion were necessary to create the state of Israel, for the country had to be "conquered by the gun" (p. 339). However, he argues that after 1949 and especially since 1967 the founders' outlook and continuing legacy became profoundly harmful to both Israeli democracy and the chances for peace with the Palestinians.

It is sometimes assumed that it is only the Israel Likud party—led by Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Benjamin Netanyahu, and others—that has been inflexible in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But as Sternhell emphasizes, until 1977 Israel was ruled exclusively by the Labor party and Ben-Gurion's chosen successors: Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, Levi Eshkol, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Rabin. With only the partial exceptions of Eshkol and Rabin, Sternhell argues, all were unabashed expansionists who sought to extend Jewish rule over all the ancient land of "Greater Israel," peaceably if possible, but by military force is necessary.

While temporary tactical retreats were sometimes necessary—like Ben-Gurion's acceptance of the 1947 UN partition resolution that resulted in the creation of Israel—none of

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the Zionist leaders accepted either the moral or pragmatic need for genuine compromise with the Palestinians, who were considered to have neither rights in the land of Palestine nor the power to resist Zionist goals. As a result, "the doctrine of conquering territory whenever the opportunity arose" and then "creating new facts on the ground" continued to prevail, long after it was "necessary" in order to create a secure state (p. 331).

Sternhell's conclusions on Israel's expansionism after 1967 are important and powerful: "the conquest of the West Bank lacked the moral basis of the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the circumstances of distress on which Israel was founded. A much-persecuted people needed and deserved . . . a state of their own. No one then argued that this objective had been achieved in 1949 and that there was a moral difference between the territories conquered in the War of Independence and those won less than twenty years later. . . . Whereas the conquests of 1949 were an essential condition for the founding of Israel, the attempt to retain the conquests of 1967 had a strong flavor of imperial expansion" (p. 33).

The demythologizing work of Sternhell and his fellow new historians is, finally, profoundly constructive—as they clearly intend it to be. If Israel is at last to become a genuinely liberal, fully democratic, and just society, it can only be built on the solid foundation of historical truth and reconciliation with the Palestinians, who have been the victims of Zionist success.

The Founding Myths of Israel is certain to engender furious controversy, especially in Israel. Nonetheless, the findings of the new historians are gradually entering the mainstream of academic and even public discourse in Israel, and this gives grounds for optimism that the peace process will survive even the Netanyahu government and will sooner or later result in a lasting political settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. If so, not merely the Israelis and the Palestinians but the world as a whole will owe a debt of gratitude to the commitment of so many Israeli scholars to the cause of both historical truth and a genuine compromise peace with the Palestinians.

JEROME SLATER
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Crisis and Political Beliefs: The Case of the Colt Firearms Strike *by Marc Lendler. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997. 186 pp. $30.00.*

Marc Lendler's wonderful new book illuminates the ways that humans change their perceptions of economics and politics when they endure a jarring, protracted crisis. This book provides the thoughtful reader considerable food for reflection about the nature of complacency, democracy, economic power, and political mobilization.

Americans pay lip service to democracy, but readily accept their subordination in the workplace. Until the mid-1980s, the 800 employees of the Colt Firearms plant in Hartford, Connecticut, had no reason to question their situation. Colt seemed to be a "nice place to work." In April of 1985, however, the contract between Colt and the United Auto Workers local expired. After ten bitter months of subtle, in-factory warfare between labor and management, the workers walked out in early 1986. They stayed out for four years.

Marc Lendler began to observe the strike in midcourse. He reconstructed the ways that the strike affected workers' perceptions about their employer, the government, and the broader opportunities afforded by American society. Using both surveys and interviews,

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he asked workers how their common crisis affected their interpretations of their economic position, their adversaries, their erstwhile political allies, and the system within which all of them acted.

He discovered that the strike was an explosive moment of democratization. The months of in-plant civil warfare—with small acts of worker resistance countered by stern disciplinary actions by management—alienated the employees. When they walked out, a feeling of solidarity, cooperation, and a determination to succeed found them together for the duration of the conflict. The strikers reassessed the meaning of the American dream and came to doubt the Horatio Alger myth of unlimited opportunity. They began to think more in terms of broad categories, such as class, than in individual terms. They conceived of broader solutions to their problem, including policy change and workplace democracy. The workers changed their view of citizenship itself and became more attentive to government (though hardly sanguine about government, many politicians, or the Reagan-appointed National Labor Relations Board). The strikers became more attached to the Democratic party.

Lendler concludes that the mutability of the strikers' ideas cannot easily be explained by rational choice or from some hidden transcript of opposition latent in all of us. Instead, the workers' views of authority, government, and democracy were transformed by their experience. These workers became "changed people," not just people in changed circumstances (p. 103). It is true that his conclusions depend on thin information about workers' preexisting attitudes. This limitation, however, constitutes an invitation to other political scientists to pursue further the kinds of questions laid out in this fine volume.

Marc Lendler's book merits considerable attention. He reminds us that participatory democracy remains potent, despite the cynicism of our times. Economic uncertainty and radical personal change powerfully alter not only politics but also individual perceptions of political and social systems. He reminds us that one can address important questions about politics with a well designed study that uses several different types of objective methods, which any reader can readily apprehend. Finally, he reminds political scientists that they need not write much to communicate a lot. Ultimately, the Colt workers won a stunning victory and returned to work with back pay. Marc Lendler's book provides an even more unexpected positive result of the Colt strike.

DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON
University of Missouri–St. Louis

Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroots Movements *by Temma Kaplan. New York, Routledge, 1997. 243 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

Joining an increasing number of women's studies scholars, historian Temma Kaplan has produced a book that uses gender to redefine what is meant by politics, citizenship, and human rights. *Crazy for Democracy* uses personal and organizational case studies of community-based social movements in the United States and South Africa to demonstrate the ways in which women are key actors in promoting direct democracy and are struggling to improve conditions for their communities. She argues that in their movements demanding housing and urban infrastructure in South Africa, forcing the government to buy their contaminated homes in Love Canal, New York, and demanding that toxic waste be cleaned up in Warren County, North Carolina, women are exercising their full rights as citizens.

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Through their collective action, women are often merging demands for their family's survival with a struggle for their own freedom and dignity.

The book is an engaging read, and the personal focus on women who are leaders in community organizations provides useful detail in understanding how individual women become engaged in community organizing and how it changes their lives. While not heavily theorized, Kaplan's underlying thesis is an extension of her notion of "female consciousness," which she first articulated in a well known 1982 *Signs* article on women and collective action in Barcelona. "To characterize the state of mind exhibited by these women, who accept the division of labor by sex in their culture and historical period and sometimes demand privileges associated with fulfilling their responsibilities, I coined the term 'female consciousness'" (p. 185). Here, Temma Kaplan has refined the concept and does not dwell heavily on it for explanation. She clarifies that women engaging in community action who pressure state officials and others for responses have created a third space, which is neither public nor private. Clarifying how participatory democracy and grassroots political spaces subvert such divisions is a key contribution of the case material. While the psychological aspects of exactly how one comes to and continues to have female consciousness are never clarified, the case studies do an excellent job of highlighting the changes that women go through in the process of becoming political activists.

I found the section of the book that details the struggles of women in the community of Crossroads outside of Cape Town, South Africa to be powerful and insightful. In vivid prose, Temma Kaplan outlines the devastating impact of segregation policies of apartheid on women. Women were separated from men, they had to negotiate travel to cities to care for sick children, and they struggled to live in shantytowns where their residential permission was constantly revoked and their make-shift dwellings bulldozed. With compassion and insight, Kaplan drives home the fundamental ways that apartheid structured women's lives in all arenas—in their families, their neighborhoods, their economic participation, and their socializing. The activists featured in this section of the book, such as Regina Ntongana, are truly inspiring. Regina provided Kaplan with a wonderful insight into organizing: ". . . the grassroots are like a bundle of clothing, all in different colors. What gives them shape is the wire over which they dry. The clothesline is the leader" (p. 157).

Another important contribution of the book is its focus on the work of black women in the U.S. South who are active in combatting environmental racism. While the book has two worthwhile chapters focusing on Lois Gibbs and others who organized in Love Canal, chapters on southern black women offer important new material. One chapter featuring young black organizer Kim Burwell offers a useful contrast with a portrait of her mother, an older activist. Kim's activism and work with black youth suggests that the concerns of 20-something youth of the South are quite different from the hegemonic images of white youth on American television.

Crazy for Democracy is an important contribution in the fields of women's studies, history, and political science. It challenges dominant frameworks for understanding democracy that focus almost exclusively on electoral politics and abstract notions of individual citizenship. The movements represented in this book suggest a major challenge offered by civil society to the globalizing project of neoliberalism. They question the notion of individual rights and highlight struggles for collective rights and the need to redefine human rights to include the social and economic support necessary for human survival and dignity.

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Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work *by Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1997. 320 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $19.95.*

Edin and Lein present a painstaking examination of the factors that contribute to single mothers' decisions either to go to work or to depend on welfare. To correct the distortions of reality that they argue arise from government statistics' underrepresentation of the true depths of poverty, the authors set out to collect primary data on the personal finances of 214 single mothers on public assistance, and then compared these mothers' situations to those of 165 of their working counterparts. Their research presents policy makers with the most intimate insight yet into the realities of life for the poorest Americans. *Making Ends Meet*'s greatest value, however, lies in the context it provides for viewing recent efforts to break long-term dependence by coaxing single mothers into employment.

Making Ends Meet follows the lives of welfare-dependent mothers, examining their financial decisions and questioning the view that many turn to public assistance simply because they have too much difficulty managing their own money. In fact, Edin and Lein found just the opposite: almost all of the mothers on welfare were careful consumers, struggling to maximize the spending power of their minimal welfare checks. Nearly all paid their fixed housing and food costs before turning to discretionary needs. Even basic necessities often were purchased from "boosters"—shop-lifters who sold their goods at a fraction of their ticketed price. Yet Edin and Lein found that no matter how carefully or frugally these mothers lived, the public assistance their families received (cash grants, food stamps, housing assistance, etc.) fell significantly short of their expenses. In virtually every instance, families dependent on welfare were able to survive only by not "playing by the rules." Edin and Lein found that all but one of the welfare mothers supplemented their welfare income with unreported work, cash assistance, or other forms of support, most often depending on live-in boyfriends to help pay bills, or on family members to care for their children so they could take on unreported work. Mothers could not provide for their families on welfare without such assistance without leaving their children at risk of foster care placement or their families at risk of homelessness. In fact, the only woman in the study who did *not* supplement her public assistance could not afford to send her child to school in anything but tattered clothing and was reported to child welfare for neglect.

While life on welfare clearly was not easy, the experiences of mothers who chose low-wage work over welfare proved equally unenticing. Those who took low-skill jobs were left with an even larger gap between their income and expenses than their welfare-dependent counterparts. The addition of work brought with it additional expenses—such as child care, transportation, and health care—that low-wage jobs simply could not meet. Even when money was available to cover these primary needs, the irregular hours associated with many low-skill jobs created logistical obstacles ranging from the need for child care at odd hours to limited public transportation. Indeed, "to make it while working, unskilled single mothers had to be extra-ordinarily lucky: They had to have a set of special circumstances that artificially lowered the cost of working and they had to be able to employ a set of survival strategies that were consistent with work" (p. 220).

In the end, Edin and Lein conclude that the choice between welfare and low-wage work is simple. Work offers no financial incentive and compromises the care mothers can provide for their families. Those women who choose employment are motivated by the value they place on work and their distaste for dependence on public hand-outs. For the rest, welfare, supplemented with outside support, makes more sense.

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The value of *Making Ends Meet* does not rest solely in its findings, none of which will startle anyone experienced in social policy. The book's real value lies in the depth of the insight and the documentation it adds to the discussion of welfare policy, and the forecast of the future to be read from its lines. TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) has replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children on which families barely survived at the time of Edin and Lein's research and has brought with it stringent work requirements and time limits. *Making Ends Meet* shows that TANF may be short sighted in its efforts to mandate employment as an alternative to long-term dependence. Virtually all of the mothers in the study will soon be working. Yet even if no longer dependent on welfare, they will be barred from independence by the trappings of poverty and their inability to earn a living wage. Edin and Lein's findings make it clear that the answer to permanent welfare dependence cannot be jobs alone, but higher paying jobs that enable employees to afford the costs of working—jobs that today are available only to those with higher levels of education and skills.

In their introduction, Edin and Lein tell of Mary Ann, a single mother of three. She had little work history or skills, had abused drugs, had even lived in a shelter. Like so many other single mothers, she depended on the help of her live-in boyfriend to get by. In 1994, the *New York Times Magazine* reported that Mary Ann had thrown her boyfriend out, found a full-time job, and was working sixty hours a week. In December 1997, after publication of *Making Ends Meet*, the *Times* revisited Mary Ann. She is back on welfare and her dreams of permanent independence have vanished; the work required to manage her family's transition off welfare was simply too much. *Making Ends Meet* does more than explain the rational decision made by Mary Ann and other mothers on welfare. It predicts the storm to come if these decisions continue to be overlooked. Either way the flags are up and the book is worth reading.

RALPH DA COSTA NUNEZ
Columbia University

Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest *by Amy Bridges. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1997. 244 pp. $35.00.*

In this study of municipal reform in the Southwest, Amy Bridges demonstrates her superb skill as an analyst of urban political history. Anyone who has studied a single city at length will appreciate the enormity of her effort in closely examining political development across the twentieth century in seven major cities—Albuquerque, NM; Austin, TX; Dallas, TX; Phoenix, AZ; San Antonio, TX; San Diego, CA; and San Jose, CA. The result is a major reinterpretation of the urban experience in the modern United States. We can no longer look at regional differences in political culture as a sufficient explanation for variation in political style and orientation. Bridges makes us see that political culture is in part the result of the framing of legal and organizational arrangements. Rules shape political institutions and provide staging grounds for political action.

Her insight about the central importance of rules is only part of what Bridges brings to the analysis of reform in the Southwest. She asks the key political question: how does one body of actors rather than another gain the opportunity to write the rules? In answering this question, Bridges uses her skill as urban historian so effectively. In the early days of the

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twentieth century, the municipalities of the Southwest were just small towns in areas only beginning to populate. As new places, they had no entrenched political organizations, and they also had no established economic advantages. In this near political vacuum, local business leaders had a strong incentive to organize to pursue infrastructure development and secure investments. From there they could move toward reshaping political institutions and establishing a reform foundation, which was to be strengthened in the post-World War II period in a new and aggressive pursuit of growth.

Just as the particulars of time and place help explain the launching of municipal reform in the early years of the century, so do the changed particulars of a later period help explain the evolution of the reform experience. Locally designed rules are not fully self-perpetuating. As the cities of the Southwest grew into major metropolises, their leaders could insulate themselves for a time from the needs and wants of their diverse populations—but only for a time. The stresses and strains of growth itself along with changes in the national political environment opened the way to challenges against the established rules of participation and representation. However, even as challengers brought about change, the momentum of past institutional arrangements carried forward with considerable force.

This review gives only a bare sketch of the highly nuanced argument that Bridges presents in rich detail. What makes *Morning Glories* a compelling account is the sophistication of the political understanding that guides it. For Bridges, politics is no mere epiphenomenon resting on the determining foundation provided by social and economic conditions. Rather, politics is a matter of agents acting in particular and complex contexts to try to shape public channels of action through which they can pursue ends they see as worthy.

Moreover, for Bridges, political life is a whole composed of interconnected parts. It is not an aggregation of pieces that can be examined separately. Political rules, constituency building (and delimiting), political and technical skills, policy expectations, group aspirations, and coalition formation are related elements; therefore, political life is best understood in relational terms. With this approach, Bridges offers the reader a multitude of important insights to which this limited space cannot do justice.

In short, *Morning Glories* is a major contribution to the fields of urban politics and urban political history and a model of how to do a sophisticated analysis of urban political development.

CLARENCE N. STONE
University of Maryland

Neighborhood Politics: Chicago and Sheffield *by Larry Bennett. New York, Garland Publishing, 1997. 288pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

The book is a comparison of grassroots neighborhood activism in the urban communities of Uptown and Sharrow. Substantively and methodologically, this approach may sound familiar. However, the uniqueness of the book is that one community is in Chicago, Illinois (Uptown) and the other in Sheffield, England (Sharrow). This cross national comparison examines how neighborhood organizations developed and subsequently responded to processes of neighborhood change, in particular development and redevelopment wrought by demographic change, public policy, and private sector actions.

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An historical examination of the two neighborhoods reveals many critical similarities that shaped local development. Particularly important are the rapid population growth and physical development followed by economic stagnation and physical decline experienced by the two neighborhoods. The cross national approach, however, demonstrates how larger factors of national policy context, local governmental structure, and local political tradition mitigated against these similarities to shape very different strategies of grassroots politics in Sharrow and Uptown, which had decidedly different outcomes. England's (pre-Margaret Thatcher) tradition of a strong welfare state combined with Sheffield's progressive government, which practiced a version of "local socialism" (p. 49), created a context in which grassroots mobilization took the form of securing government support for local programs. By contrast, the private sector and individualistic nature of the U.S. policy context combined with the pro-development, antineighborhood activist posture of the Chicago Democratic machine created an environment in which organizational development in the form of creating countervailing power structures was deemed necessary. In Uptown, organizational activity was often confrontational, whereas in Sharrow it followed a more conciliatory route, often in a cooperative, working partnership with local government.

On the local level, the way in which development was perceived in Sharrow and Uptown contributed to structuring the politics of neighborhood organizing. Sharrow residents viewed development as serving the interests of the existing population. Consequently, organizational activities resulted in a fairly coherent community that was able to reach workable compromises on most issues. Uptown, by contrast, was divided between newer and more affluent residents and those with scarce economic resources. Thus, the issue of "development for whom?" drew a wedge through the Uptown neighborhood and was reflected in the organizational landscape.

Although the book seeks to root neighborhood politics in larger political, policy, and institutional contexts, there are other significant differences between the two countries that are given scant attention. The issue of class, for instance, is only briefly noted. However, we know that the absence of strong class identification in the United States has made room for other more divisive cleavages, particularly race, to assume center stage. Thus, achieving the kind of coherence that Sharrow did, a neighborhood that has benefited from strong class identification, is extremely difficult in the U.S. context.

Another contextual factor that should have been given more attention is the high mobility of Americans vis-à-vis many Europeans. The notion that neighborhoods are merely way stations on the road to someplace else clearly impacts how we perceive neighborhoods, how we care for neighborhoods, and how we approach and perceive development in the United States.

Despite these shortcomings, the book is an ambitious attempt to illuminate the neighborhood context of organizational development and the political and social consequences of the particular forms of development. This is a richly empirical work that examines neighborhood activities at a level of detail rarely seen in social science analyses of urban change. The cross national approach distinguishes this book from the existing literature on neighborhood politics. Anyone interested in the dynamics of neighborhood politics will find this book enlightening and engaging.

BARBARA FERMAN
Temple University

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The Lavender Vote: Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals in American Electoral Politics *by Mark Hertzog. New York, New York University Press, 1996. 278 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $18.95.*

Mark Hertzog's *The Lavender Vote* is the first full-length study of how sexual identity affects voting behavior in the United States. As such, the book is a groundbreaking contribution to voting studies, but its very uniqueness presents some problems. First, the accomplishment.

The early studies of voting behavior sought to find the "American Voter." The scholars of the Michigan School wanted to define the typical voter, the statistical norm if you will, among all the differing groups, individuals, and identities of the American electorate. Gender and race were recognized, but party was the overriding factor in imputing identity categories over behavior. More recent studies have focused on specific groups of American voters—defined by gender, race, religion, generational cohort, or even materialist vs post-materialist attitude. In addition to broadening our understanding of voting, these studies frequently challenged the assumed universality of some of the conclusions of the early Michigan school—especially about identity formation and the sources of party identification.

Hertzog's book adds another dimension to this newer research, showing how sexuality affords its own explanatory power in voting behavior. This was quite a task to assert a new, significant category in voting behavior and to demonstrate how useful it is in explaining political outcomes and attitudes. The accomplishment is even more marked since—as a whole—mainstream political science did not find the lesbian and gay rights movement all that interesting until very recently. Part of Hertzog's accomplishment was to obtain data from sources outside the usual channels of professional political science—a path others dealing with behavioral political studies of lesbians and gay men have also had to take.

Specifically, Hertzog shows that there is a sexual identity vote in the United States; that after controlling for political attitudes, party identification and sociodemographic variables sexuality still has an independent effect on voter choice; that it was statistically significant in some congressional and state elections in 1990; and that sexuality was clearly important in the 1992 presidential election. In arguing these points convincingly, Hertzog implies that by not including sexual identity into current models of voting behavior, analysts miss an opportunity to explain some previously unexplained aspects of voter behavior—such as why Jesse Jackson received so large a vote among urban whites in the 1984 and 1988 presidential primaries, or which men were not so angry (not so "white") in 1994 to have voted to sustain the Democratic majority in the House. Moreover, he frequently contrasts the gender gap, now well studied, with what he calls the "sexuality gap," showing that the latter, while smaller in numbers, is more consistent and pronounced.

Along the way, Hertzog also provides some interesting demographic information on who tends to self-identify on exit polls as being lesbian, gay, or bisexual, and describes some key values that give this voter cohort a political definition beyond bedroom juxtapositions that differ from the national norm. Lesbian and gay voters tend to self-describe as liberal in rates out-scaling the typical American Voter; they strongly support the availability of abortion services and have education and health care as their primary policy interests. (Hertzog is surely correct on these later conclusions. In last spring's Los Angeles municipal elections, lesbians and gay men were the second strongest voter group to support a school bond issue, falling only a few percentage points behind Latinos, now the ethnic identity with the largest number of children in the Los Angeles Unified School District.)

Yet there are also some problems with Hertzog's book. Because he attacked these issues early, and because there was little or no interest (and thus data) within mainstream political

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science, Hertzog sometimes pushes the analysis of the data that he does have to a cracking point. He relies primarily on the 1990 CBS News/New York Times National and State Exit Poll and the 1992 Voter Research and Surveys National exit poll. In addition, he makes use of a 1990 exit poll, conducted in a Manhattan assembly district that was expected to elect the first self-identified lesbian to the New York State Legislature. (It did.) Some of this analysis is fascinating. For example, using logistic regression, Hertzog shows that it was the legitimating effect of editorials from the nongay media—especially the *New York Times* endorsement—that calmed the concern of straight voters that in electing a lesbian to the assembly they might be sending to Albany someone principally concerned with civil rights issues, possibly at the cost of the local concerns of nongay constituents.

But other portions of the book raise questions. One specific problem is Hertzog's use of samples of a quite small size in his analysis of the gay vote in state elections. The VRS/VNS (Voter Research and Surveys, Inc./Voter News Service) sampling and weighting techniques do not have self-correctives for possible oversampling or undersampling of lesbian and gay voters as they do for race, population, and urbanization. The sample districts chosen are not chosen for a sample of differing sexualities, but for other indicators proven in the past to be potent in predicting electoral outcomes on short notice. As a result, the gay/lesbian sample is caught almost by accident—a happy accident nonetheless—in a stratification process defined by other variables. While the sample is random, the analysis of a small gay/lesbian sample can be quite misleading, even if the actual statistical manipulation meets the default test of significance. No warning on this is necessary for the practitioner of the statistical arts, who can appreciate the trade-off between data availability and the reliability of analysis. But the amateur—and many amateurs will read this book—should be warned.

Still, even with the caveats that must be applied on method, the central conclusions of *The Lavender Vote* seem irrefutable. There are many scholars who can claim to have added nuance to the analysis of a specific variable in voter behavior. There are very few who can say they showed it was necessary to add a new variable to those analyses. Hertzog has accomplished this.

ROBERT W. BAILEY
Rutgers University–Camden

Florence Kelley and the Nation's Work *by Kathryn Kish Sklar. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997. 456 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $20.00.*

Florence Kelley (1859–1932) found her calling as a political activist in 1891 when she became a resident at Hull House, Chicago's pioneer settlement. Like other members of the Hull House inner circle, Kelley was the daughter of a politician, longtime Philadelphia Republican Congressman William ("Pig Iron") Kelley. Like the other residents, too, she was a college graduate (Cornell, 1882). Atypically, Kelley was a divorcee and a mother. After college, she had studied law and government in Zurich, where she married a Polish Jewish socialist medical student, had three children, and translated the works of German socialist Friedrich Engels. When Kelley and her family returned to New York in the late 1880s, her marriage collapsed, and she fled to Chicago with her children.

At Hull House, according to Sklar, Kelley helped shape the settlement's approach to reform by redirecting its activities "away from neighborly aid and toward larger issues in

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public policy" (p. 194). She also studied law at Northwestern, where she received a degree in 1894. Finally, entering the local political fray, Kelley drafted an Illinois maximum-hours law of 1893, led a campaign of women's groups to enact it, and, then, as the state's chief factory inspector, led the team of twelve that enforced it. When Chicago employers challenged a major section of the law, which curtailed women's work days, the Illinois Supreme Court upset it. *Ritchie v. People* (1895) blasted Kelley's achievements. But in 1899, she became general secretary (the effective head) of the newly-formed National Consumers' League (NCL). In this post, for the next three decades, Florence Kelley promoted nationwide the goals that had failed in Chicago—the enactment of protective laws for working people. These laws provided precedents for New Deal labor policies that ultimately guaranteed most American workers maximum hours, a minimum wage, and improved working conditions.

Sklar's compelling biography, which carries Kelley through her formative years up to her NCL appointment (a second volume will cover the rest) offers many original interpretations. First, Sklar sets forth a gender analysis of reform politics: she contrasts men's public culture at the end of the nineteenth century (political machines, craft unions, civil service reform) to a more dynamic women's public culture (suffrage, settlements, women's organizations). Kelley, she shows, navigated her way through both. Second, Sklar analyzes Kelley's pivotal role in the *Ritchie* case, where her search for irrefutable arguments against property rights led her to stress women's reproductive lives, a policy that proved controversial in women's history and one that even Sklar finds "overdetermined" (p. 256). A less engaged analyst might find Kelley misguided. Third, Sklar defends Kelley's promotion of women's labors laws as not only a tactic to force "a callous judiciary" into "social responsibility" (p. 260) but as an effort to use gender-based legislation "as a surrogate for class-based legislation" (p. 282). This argument is convincing. Fourth, Sklar skillfully traces Kelley's route from European socialism to progressivism and ultimately to social feminism, which meant dependence on a bourgeois female power base. By the end of the century, "no longer empowered by the state, she turned to the next alternative: middle-class women activists" (p. 315). A final achievement is that Sklar copes successfully with a difficult protagonist. Beloved by her colleagues, Kelley was in fact headstrong, domineering, and manipulative, or, as Sklar concedes, she had a "demanding personality" and a "ferocious temperament" (p. 294). A splendid addition to the literature of Progressive era politics, this first-rate biography deserves all the praise it has received. Sklar's admirers eagerly await the next installment.

NANCY WOLOCH
Barnard College

The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System *by J. Lawrence Broz. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997. 269 pp. $35.00.*

This fine book does, as promised, explain the emergence of central banking in the United States. That's value enough, but beyond that, the book provides leverage for handling an important collective action problem in the rationalist account of the creation of institutions.

Central banks have often been the object of epic political battles whose resolution tells us a lot about the relationship within each country among politics, the emergence of market

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economies, institutions, and international relations. To explain these battles, Broz turns to the logic of efficient institutions. Central banks emerge because they provide benefits to growing economies; they stabilize payment systems, flatten interest rate fluctuations, and eliminate banking panics; in so doing, they enhance investment, growth, and prosperity. (This view is not without its critics: free banking advocates argue against regulation of any kind, because it causes problems of moral hazard and rent seeking, which provokes a debate reflected in contemporary arguments over the International Monetary Fund at the international level and regulation within countries.)

If central banks provide benefits, we should not be surprised to see them created. A rationalist account of institutions dating back to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jeremy Bentham argues that political institutions exist to serve specific goals; if they are inefficient, they will not be created or will not survive.

Yet, there is a problem in this account. If central banks are demanded because they provide general benefits, they are a public good, nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption. Who, then, has an incentive to provide them? Even if an institution is efficient, it takes resources to bring it into being—organization, lobbying, politics. If all benefit, who has the incentive to undertake the work? The logic of the motive (rationality) questions the logic of the cause (free riding).

Enter the concept of joint product. That an institution provides public goods to society as a whole may obscure the possibility that it may at the same time provide selective benefits. Some portion of the population may gain a distinct benefit which it can privatize, capturing a substantial share of the benefits. If so, that group will have an incentive to provide the good and thereby overcome the collective action problem.

This, Broz argues, is precisely what happened with the Federal Reserve. Finance interests concentrated primarily in New York sought to make money from having the U.S. dollar become a player in international finance. The dollar could not play this role without stronger domestic foundations to American finance. These interests lobbied to create the Federal Reserve. In so doing, they provided a public good—a stable currency and greater wealth to the United States from that stability and the earnings of a reserve currency. At the same time, as the key players in the new system, they made a handsome profit for themselves. Broz nicely examines the economics of finance before and after the creation of the Federal Reserve and explores the politics that led to its creation. He then extends the argument to some other cases, mostly drawn from earlier periods in U.S. history and the United Kingdom.

The functionalism in efficiency explanations of institutions has always been a weakness, for it cannot explain the microincentives needed for action. Broz's approach provides a key conceptual road map out of that bind. The argument is of very great interest for understanding current battles over financial institutions around the world. And it is of great interest to students of institutional creation and design more broadly.

PETER A. GOUREVITCH
University of California at San Diego

Taking on Goliath: The Emergence of a New Left Party and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico *by Kathleen Bruhn. University Park, Penn State Press, 1997. 365 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $22.50.*

In 1988, Mexico's PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary party) faced a major challenge to its more than half-century of domination. A new political movement led by PRI dissidents

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burst onto the scene, only to see its fortunes decline just as dramatically shortly after the election. Kathleen Bruhn's *Taking on Goliath* analyzes the varying trajectory of the PRD (Democratic Revolutionary party) from the perspective of new party evolution. The book makes a valuable contribution to understanding both Mexico's ongoing process of democratization as well as broader issues of political party origin and development.

Bruhn's thorough study of a particularly important group and moment in Mexican history, the PRD and its early evolution, provides some revealing insights into the Mexican political system. Her analysis tempers overly optimistic interpretations of democratization in Mexico by demonstrating the true difficulty of opening up a one-party system. Yet this study also shows that, in part because of the PRD's challenge, some progress does seem to have been made. The PRD did experience a serious decline in its popularity following the 1988 elections, only recently moving toward reversal, with the election of leader Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as Mexico City's mayor. However, it nonetheless did advance democratization. The near-loss in the election of 1988 and the ensuing uproar about fraud forced the PRI to concede significant seats to the traditional opposition party, the Partido de Accion Naciohal (PAN), and to expand electoral transparency. Nevertheless, Bruhn demonstrates that democratization remains limited, as the PRI continued to actively prevent PRD success through techniques such as fraud and the manipulation of voting conditions.

While some of the PRD's difficulties came from the PRI's concentrated hostility, Bruhn proposes that the innate differences between political party emergence and consolidation phases also contributed. When first emerging, the PRD could benefit from such factors as "leftist positioning, vague ideology, internal heterogeneity, and charisma" (p. 205), which in the context of government neoliberalism helped the new party mobilize large numbers of PRI opponents. However, new parties subsequently need more cohesion than initially. They must form "a permanent activist core" and "institutions to coordinate them" (pp. 204–5). Bruhn's argument thus suggests that not only the PRD but most new parties may find that the ideological vagueness and diversity that served them as opposition movements come to impede their consolidation. Without having yet attracted a stable support base—in Bruhn's terms, "reattaching" the temporarily unaffiliated voters who initially backed them—and without having the institutional access and skills to effectively govern, early popularity may quickly subside.

This approach helps illuminate important evolutionary challenges common to new parties and helps explain why so many promising starts trickle to nothing. At the same time, the author's efforts to generalize do lead her to downplay some of the unique aspects of the Mexican experience. For example, the emergence of a charismatic leftist movement had implications in Mexico with few parallels in other Latin American countries, as the dominant party had historically based its legitimacy on its origins as a "revolutionary," nationalist party. An electoral challenge from the Left thus very directly threatened the PRI in ways that may not be easily paralleled elsewhere. Mexico's PRI is also in a far better position to act on its antagonism toward a new party, due to its prolonged dominance. Such factors as presidentialism and centralization, which Bruhn identifies as contributing to the continuation of the party in power, are far stronger in Mexico than in more competitive electoral systems. Nevertheless, overall, this book does a fine job drawing generalizable lessons from a significant case of new party development.

DEBORAH L. NORDEN
University of California at Riverside

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The Political Economy of Dual Transformations: Market Reform and Democratization in Hungary *by David L. Bartlett. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998. 299 pp. $52.50.*

Can political transition and economic transformation be compatible? This is the question that David Bartlett seeks to answer in his study of Hungary's move to democracy and a market economy. Along the way, the author makes related claims about the utility of institutional approaches to political and economic change. While his arguments are worthy of consideration, they are hindered by shortcomings in his theoretical approach.

Bartlett begins his work by rejecting the assumption that the difficulties of dual political and economic transition necessitate authoritarianism as a precondition for capital accumulation, arguments which parallel a debate over the relative state strength required to carry out economic reform. In contrast, the author shows that in the Hungarian case, political transition actually reduced, rather than exacerbated, opposition to market reforms. Why? Bartlett suggests that rather than approach dual transitions simply in terms of state power, we are better served by investigating the specific institutional configuration of state and economy. The kind of state relationship to the market, rather than the degree of market intervention, is what matters. Most important in this configuration is what the author terms "the balance between the universalistic and particularistic dimensions of the state's role in the economy" (p. 17). Although the author never clearly defines either term, the former refers to uniform market rules enforced by the state, while the latter is concerned with preferences given by the state to certain economic actors. In Eastern Europe, Bartlett argues, democratization helped sever particularistic links to the state, leading to the introduction of more universalistic market rules.

A number of questions surface in reading this work. An initial empirical problem is Barlett's use of Hungary as a case study by which he can explain the dual transitions across Eastern Europe. While he acknowledges that Hungary is exceptional in terms of its long history of economic reform dating back to 1968, he asserts that his conclusions are valid for Eastern Europe as a whole. Yet in a number of East European states (Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) particularism as he understands it has been effectively vested into the new political structure since 1989. It is hard to accept that the outcomes of Hungary's institutionally unique "goulash communism" and the manner of its demise can be so easily applied to the region as a whole. A related conceptual problem lies with the author's use of the institutional approach. While Bartlett attempts to fold cultural and rational-choice approaches to institutions into one another, the result is a lack of clarity over how context or path dependent his analysis is. For example, the author argues that although institutional particularism hindered markets in Eastern Europe, it fostered market development in East Asia and China. This makes his independent variable problematic if it can generate a multiplicity of outcomes. In the end, the flow of causation between particularism/universalism and democratic and market reforms simply is not clear.

But an interesting question does emerge from the work. As Bartlett implies, authoritarian systems tend to control their economies through preferential relations, blurring the line between market and state power. Under periods of political transition, these relations may give way, but not always. Why does particularism survive political transition in some cases and not in others, and to what effect? This would seem to be the core question that lies within this work, but in the end it does not clearly emerge.

PATRICK H. O'NEIL
University of Puget Sound

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An Insider's Guide to Maine Politics 1946–1996 *by Christian P. Potholm. Lanham, MD, Madison Books, 1998. 373 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $19.95.*

The Craft of Inquiry: Theories, Methods, Evidence *by Robert R. Alford. New York, Oxford University Press, 1998. 168 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $17.95.*

Encyclopedia of the Middle East Peace Process and the Middle East/North Africa Economic Community *by Jerry M. Rosenberg, Greenwich, CT, JAI Press, Inc., 1997. 451 pp. $143.50.*

The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence *edited by Eugene Weiner. New York, Continuum Publishing Company, 1998. 653 pp. $75.00.*

Historical Dictionary of Socialism *by James C. Docherty. Lanham, MD, Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1997. 395 pp. $48.00.*

Index to International Public Opinion, 1996–1997 *prepared by Survey Research Consultants International. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1998. 760 pp. $325.00.*

The Political University: Policy, Politics, and Presidential Leadership in the American Research University *by Robert M. Rosenzweig. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 200 pp. $31.95.*

SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security *by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1997. 585 pp. $115.00.*

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

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The Academy of Political Science will offer a lecture series at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. Authors will discuss their recently published articles from the *Political Science Quarterly*.

Time and Place:	*Participants and Topics:*
24 September 1998 4:00 - 6:00 p.m. Kellogg Conference Center Room 1512 IAB	**COMPLEXITY AND THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE** *Robert Jervis, Columbia University* "[W]e need to take more seriously the notion that we are in a system and to look for the dynamics that are at work. ... Very little in social and political life makes sense except in the light of systemic processes. Exploring them gives us new possibilities for understanding and effective action; in their absence we are likely to flounder." —*PSQ*, Winter 1997-1998
7 October 1998 4:00 - 6:00 p.m. Alschul Auditorium Room 417 IAB	**FROM BONN TO THE BERLIN REPUBLIC: CAN A STABLE DEMOCRACY CONTINUE?** *Lewis J. Edinger and Brigitte L. Nacos, Columbia University* "The challenges prompted by the reunification of the two Germanys, the move toward increased economic and political integration in Europe, and the intensifying global interdependence of the economic and monetary markets are enormous. Whether the German democracy can adapt to and cope with the rapidly changing domestic and international conditions and whether the country remains a model of stability in the heart of Europe is of vital interest. ..." —*PSQ*, Summer 1998
9 November 1998 4:00 - 6:00 p.m. Kellogg Conference Center Room 1512 IAB	**RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE FUTURE OF NATO** *Bruce Russett and Allan Stam, Yale University* "NATO expansion up to but not beyond the boundaries of the former Soviet Union looks like a done deal. But in its current limited incarnation it is a bad deal, an ill-considered and potentially regressive move. By limiting NATO expansion to small Eastern European states, NATO leaders preclude the alliance from devcloping the capabilities it will need to confront the coming security challenges of the twenty-first century." —*PSQ*, Fall 1998

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AHiF NEW FROM THE AMERICAN HELLENIC INSTITUTE FOUNDATION AND THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE OF AID TO GREECE

A FIFTY-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE

Eugene T. Rossides, Editor

To commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine, the historic 1947 decision to counter the Soviet threat of communism, APS and AHIF present for the first time this collection of never before published essays from their 1997 conference.

Contributors address the impact and legacy of the Truman Doctrine. Essays also look into the current balance of power in the Mediterranean and its implications for U.S. policy toward this vital area.

FROM THE INTRODUCTION...

> [T]his set of excellent essays on the "Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty Year Retrospective" ... tell[s] the story of a successful foreign and military policy intervention by the United States without loss in combat of any American lives. ... The hallmark of the Truman Doctrine was that it be "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." ...
>
> These essays, beyond fleshing out the historical record of how the Truman Doctrine was conceived and implemented in Washington and Greece fifty years ago, also offer lessons for the present, especially now that the United States is the only remaining superpower. ...
>
> Finally, as some of the essays discuss in depth, the value of Greece's friendship with the United States did not end with the cold war. Greece's strategic location athwart sea lanes connecting the oil users of western Europe and the United States with the oil producers of the Middle East remains important to keep in the hands of a friendly government and a friendly people. As fewer and fewer governments in the Middle East are willing to give the United States bases for ground troops or warships, the superb harbors of mainland Greece and its islands are becoming more valuable for maintaining large American naval forces from which to project power in the eastern Mediterranean. And Greece's presence as a modern, economically-growing, stable democracy adjoining the war-torn states of the former Yugoslavia may yet prove valuable to bringing about a long-term reconciliation there through peaceful democratic processes.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY
President, Academy of Political Science
Professor of Political Science,
Barnard College and Columbia University

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WITH TWENTY-ONE CONTRIBUTORS, CONTENTS INCLUDE...

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  General Andrew Goodpaster—United States Army, Retired
- **George C. Marshall: The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan**
  Larry I. Bland—Editor of the George C. Marshall Papers, Marshall Foundation
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

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

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

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

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